VALERIA JAKOBSON

Role of the Estonian Russian-language Media in the Integration of the Russian-speaking Minority into Estonian Society

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
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The last but not least I have to express my deep gratitude to my mother, Tamara Pirnipuu, and my husband Sergei Abakumov for their patience and moral support during my studies.
The present study is focused on the question if after restoration of national independence of the Estonian Republic, the Russian-language press of Estonia was mainly oppositional to the Estonian state, its establishment, institutions, ideology, or it rather promoted the integration of the Russian-speaking minority into Estonian society and its adaptation to the changing environment.

Previous analyses have paid more attention to the political and economic deprivation of Russian-speakers (Andersen 1997; Birkenbach 1998; Offe 1996 etc.), migration in post-Soviet countries (Pilkington 1998; Subbotina 1997; etc), political loyalty (Aasland 1996; Haab 1998; Kirch, A., Kirch M. 1995; Lauristin et al. 1997; Linz, Stepan 1996; Raid 1996; Smith, G. & Wilson 1996 etc.), adaptation of Russian-speakers (Vihalemm, T. Lauristin 1997, Lebedeva 1998; Lauristin et al.1997), identity building (Aasland 1996; Kirch, A., Kirch M.; Tuisk 1997; Kirch M. 1997; Kolstø 1996b; Laitin 1998; Lauristin et al.1997; Linz, Stepan 1996; Smith, G., et al. 1998; Vihalemm, T. 1999 etc.). Quite few studied the Russian-language press in connection with the above mentioned issues (Kirch M. 1997; Raudsepp 1998; Vetik 1999; Vihalemm, T. 2000a). Here the Russian-language press was mainly seen either as an ‘extension of Russian Federation propaganda’ (Kirch M. 1997) or as purposely separatist and isolationist (Raudsepp 1998; Vetik 1999). Each Russian-language newspaper was studied as a homogeneous entity, while the complexity of relations between different subjects of mass communication was not considered. All these studies are observations, performed from outside of Russian-speaking community.

The author of this work is a native Russian-speaker, born in Estonia in a multi-ethnic (Russian-Estonian-Jewish) family, who has been working as a free-lance journalist in the majority of the Russian-language newspapers based in Tallinn since 1991. Thus, looking from inside of the analyzed environment, it may be seen that there are different groups with their different, often contradictory interests. Considering these interests and their influence on the Russian-language press, the Russian-speaking community in general and its interrelations with the wider social environment (Estonian community and state) helps to estimate media activities and effects more adequately.

1. INTRODUCTION
The conceptual starting point of the present study is that the long-term effect of ethnic minority media is neither total assimilation nor cultural preservation, but a compromise between two extremes. Usually commercial media combine a dominant ideology, expressing the elite’s interests and counter-ideology, opposing the elite’s interests. (Riggins 1992, 276–285). Acknowledging the justice of this statement, one should ask: who are the elites, in particular in a multicultural society? The empirical premise of this study is that since the Soviet era up to now in Estonia existed concurrently two elites – Estonian and Russian-speaking (including not only Russians, but also Jews, Ukrainians etc.) and two media systems – Estonian and Russian-language. As in the 1990s the Russian-speaking elite has decreased in number and in power, it could be conditionally called counter-elite. Nevertheless, the interests and ideology of minority elite and low-class population (which accounts for over 50% of Russian-speakers – see Human Development Report 1997) could coincide or contradict each other, so that there could be as minimum two minority counter-ideologies.

Considering all said above, the study raises theses that:

1. The Russian-language media did not accept any distinct supportive or oppositional position towards Estonian state in general and on the majority of politically important issues in particular (except the political status of non-Estonians issue).

2. In the 1990s the Russian-language press mainly expressed the local Russian elite’s interests and opinions, consequently forming patterns responding to its interests. We could conditionally call Russian elite to be the counter-elite at these years, as the national politics of the Estonian state, especially in first half of 1990s, was directed on removal of Russian-speakers from governing Estonia in all spheres. Therefore, in the press there could dominate the patterns of the integrated Estonian society and means for achieving these patterns convenient for the local Russian-speaking counter-elite. These patterns could be based on the elements of national exclusiveness and victimization of Russian-speakers. Nevertheless, the models of integrated Estonian society proposed by the state institutions and the newspapers’ audience should be also met there, as media are always also dependent upon the audience and should preserve some degree of loyalty to the state in which where they function (according to Riggins 1992).

3. As a response, the Russian-speaking population started producing its own ethno-class counter-ideology, which is scantily reflected by the Russian-language press.
4. The role of the Russian-language media in informing Russian-speakers and forming their group identities was decreasing in the 1990s, its functions were limited.

5. As to the role of the Russian-language press in constructing group identities of Estonian Russian-speakers:

5.1. In the Soviet era the Soviet supranational identity dominated in media (see Castells 1998, 35), being attractive to “forced migrants” since it allows for the resolution of the disjunct between ethnos and territory experienced upon displacement (Pilkington 1998, 194).


5.3. It promoted the formation of a kind of local identity, which is different from core Russian. (Kolstø 1996b, 626, Pilkington 1998 and Subbotina 1997, who pointed out Russian re-migrants’ feeling of ‘otherness’ in Russia, Vihalemm, T. 1999), probably, local ethno-class identity (see Laitin 1998).

5.4. It did not actively construct Russian political identity, as the observed identity with the newborn Russian state is quite weak (Stepan & Linz 1996, 410–411), although theoretically possible (Aasland 1996, Kolstø 1996b).

5.5. Due to the lack of a clearly articulated state position towards Russian-speakers in the 1990s, the heterogeneity of Russian-speaking community and low degree of its political mobilization (Vihalemm. P. et al. 1997, Vihalemm, T. 2000b), the Russian-language media did not form any distinct pro- or counter identities with the Estonian state and Estonians, but reflected a vague and unstable variety of spontaneously forming as well as artificially configured identities.

This dissertation consists of a theoretical-methodological overview and four articles, which are ready for publication, all of them as book chapters.

upon historical conditions at different periods. In order to get an idea about the historical roots of the present situation, the article gives a brief overview of the functioning of the Russian-language press in Estonia since the second part of 19th century up to 1999. There is an analysis of wide range of conditions: the potential audience of the media, conditions of production, needs and interests of different subjects of the mass communication process (state, audience, political parties, journalists), conditions of control (censure or other pressure), culture and ideology. Considering this background I related it to the media content and analyzed its role in integrating the Russian minority into the Estonian community and society on the one hand and its role in preserving Russians’/Soviets’ cultural and/or political identity on the other.

**Article 2** Civic, Political and Ethnocultural Collective Identities Constructed in the Russian Press of Estonia Since 1947, (In: *The Challenge of the Russian Minority: Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia*, Lauristin, M., Heidmets, M. (eds.), Tartu: Tartu University Press 2002). This study was carried out within the general theoretical and methodological framework of an international comparative study ‘National identities in Post-War Europe in 1945–1996’. It concentrates on the following questions: which political and civic loyalties the Russian-language press in Estonia constructed 1947–1996; how were potential objects of loyalty, citizens/members of national/civic entity and their interrelations constructed; which means were used in this process.


In **Article 4** The Chechenian Case in Estonia’s Dual Press (in: *Media discourse in comparative perspectives*, J., Ekecrantz, P., Aker, T. Olsson, K., Riegert (eds.), Stockholm: University College of South Stockholm 2002) we were interested in how on the basis of a real event, which was a Russian anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya and the OSCE summit 17–18 November 1999, there were constructed two virtual realities in the Estonian and the Russian-language press and what conditioned the differences between them.
2. BACKGROUND

2.1. The Soviet nationalities policy towards Russian-speaking minorities in the Soviet Republics

Much has been written about the hierarchy of Soviet nationalities and duality of the official policies and practices in this sphere, which ‘have not only varied with time but also have differed in their application from one nationality to another. /…/ In granting nationalities a Union Republic status, three additional factors were considered: a population of at least 1 million, territorial compactness of the nationality, and location on the borders of the Soviet Union’. (Zickel 1989). Nevertheless, the problem of Russian migrant communities in Soviet Republics was not a subject of Soviet politics until the last years of the Soviet regime, ‘when politicians started playing the ‘Russian card’ to prevent break-up of the unitary state’ (Kolstø 1995, 263). Migrant communities in Soviet Republics were not studied separately until the end of 1989, when they started experiencing tensions because of the rise of national feelings between indigenous nationalities. Since then the position of ethnic Russians in the USSR has become a subject of theoretical discussion.

A number of experts ultimately consider Russians to be a privileged nation, as many national elites were replaced by Russian migrants, in spite of the constitutionally established equality of nations and languages, ‘demography and Soviet policies have made Russian the dominant language, Russian has been a compulsory subject in all elementary and secondary schools since 1938, some higher education courses have been available only in Russian, Russian has been the common language of public administration in every republic, it has been used exclusively in the armed forces, in scientific research, and in high technology’ (Zickel 1989). Also, second secretaries of local Party Committees (who were responsible for cadre selection), KGB chairmen, directors of big factories etc. were usually Russians.

On the other hand, to my mind it is difficult to call these Soviets of Slavic origin Russians in an ethnic sense or to suspect them in favoring ethnic Russians in their everyday work. The national politics was defined by the political leaders of the Communist Party, it changed in different periods, but except short period after the 2nd World War, ‘Russian history, religion and traditional identity were the main
targets of Soviet cultural repressions’. (Castells 1997, 37) Castells considered one of the greatest paradoxes of Soviet federalism that Russia was probably the most discriminated of the USSR Republics. It transferred wealth, resources and skills to other republics. Its autonomy degree was lower than of any of the Soviet Republics: Russia was the only Republic which did not have its own ministries, Council of People’s Deputies, other Republican bodies. (1997, 36–37). Tishkov (1997, 341) said, that the USSR was ‘paradoxical Empire’, where the rights of the ‘Empire nation’ i.e. Russians, were violated in the same way like the rights of other nations. Hobsbawm (1992) said that Russians were the most deprived and least complaining nation in the USSR. Kolstø (1995, 71–104) concluded that Russians in the former Soviet Republics were more privileged than other minority groups, better off than the average Russians in the RSFSR (which is totally confirmed by Arutunans’ data about Russians’ income in the Russian Federation and Soviet Republics – see Arutunjan 1995), but were handicapped in most places regarding access to political power and in some places in educational opportunities. Relying my own experience (as I graduated from secondary school with Russian as the language of instruction in Tallinn, Estonia in 1989 and discovered that I had quite few possibilities to get higher education in Russian in my native Republic) I am inclined rather like to agree with Kolstø in relation to education opportunities. On the other hand, the range of specialties was not taught anywhere in the USSR except Moscow, Leningrad and Novosibirsk; also, further education for the Candidate or Doctoral degree demanded perfect knowledge of Russian from representatives of any Soviet nationalities, so that various limitations were implied and some possibilities existed for all nationalities including Russians and excluding ethnic groups repressed during or after the Second World War. (see Tishkov 1997, Zickel 1989)

2.2. Demographic composition and political status of the population of Estonia

Before 1940 non-Estonians accounted for 12% of the population of Estonia. Two thirds of these (91 thousand) were Russians of two definite groups: 73 thousand peasants who had lived in Estonia since 1915, and 18 thousand political emigrants. The majority of them belonged to the poorest part of Estonian population. Russians were disassociated, mainly passive and estranged from politics. (Isakov 1996, 7–9, 52–55)

After the war, cities in the North-East of Estonia were rebuilt and repopulated mostly by the newcomers from the Slavic Republics of the USSR, who considered migration to Estonia as moving within the borders of the unitary state. By 1989 the share of non-Estonians in the Estonian population reached 38% (over 602 thousand people). Since then, due to emigration and negative birth rate, by autumn
2000 the population of the Estonian Republic decreased from 1.58 to 1.37 million. During the same period the non-Estonian community decreased up to 437 thousand people or 32% of population. 25.6% of the population were Russians, 2% Ukrainians, a little over 1% Belorussians, who are mainly native Russian-speakers (Estonian Foreign Affairs Ministry web-page) Only some smaller ethnic groups including Finns and Latvians, each of which less than 1% of the population, have other mother tongues, so that in Estonia there are two main language-cultural groups: Estonians and Russian-speakers. The ethnic structure of the population of Estonia 1934–2000 is presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 in thousand people, and in Table 2 and Figure 2 in percentages.

Table 1. Ethnic structure of population of Estonia in 1934–2000 in thousand people

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>953.5</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>946.5</td>
<td>931.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>436.5</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>420.5</td>
<td>412.5</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>350.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>108.5</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Ethnic structure of population of Estonia in 1934–2000 in thousand people
The regional distribution of Estonians and non-Estonians is very uneven: the majority of non-Estonians are concentrated in Tallinn, where they comprise nearly 50% of the population, and in the towns of North-East of Estonia, where Russian-speakers comprise about 98% of the population of Sillamäe, 94% of the population of Narva and 75% of the population of Jõhvi and Kohtla-Järve. At the same time in all other regions including Central, Southern and Western Estonia, ethnic Estonians comprise the vast majority of population.

The Russian-speaking community is often said to be the migrant community. Actually, the migrant communities are very different: people may be political refugees, economic migrants, legal or illegal guest-workers, relics of former ‘empire nations’ etc. Post-Soviet Russian-speaking communities in Estonia comprises a conglomerate of economic migrants, legal (by Soviet standards) guest workers, relics of the former empire nation as well as of the historical Russian minority in Estonia. The latter make about 10% of the non-Estonian population.

Table 2. Ethnic structure of population of Estonia in 1934–2000 in percentages

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source for 2000: Estonian Foreign Affairs Ministry web-page

Figure 2. Ethnic structure of population of Estonia in 1934–2000 in per cent

The regional distribution of Estonians and non-Estonians is very uneven: the majority of non-Estonians are concentrated in Tallinn, where they comprise nearly 50% of the population, and in the towns of North-East of Estonia, where Russian-speakers comprise about 98% of the population of Sillamäe, 94% of the population of Narva and 75% of the population of Jõhvi and Kohtla-Järve. At the same time in all other regions including Central, Southern and Western Estonia, ethnic Estonians comprise the vast majority of population.

The Russian-speaking community is often said to be the migrant community. Actually, the migrant communities are very different: people may be political refugees, economic migrants, legal or illegal guest-workers, relics of former ‘empire nations’ etc. Post-Soviet Russian-speaking communities in Estonia comprises a conglomerate of economic migrants, legal (by Soviet standards) guest workers, relics of the former empire nation as well as of the historical Russian minority in Estonia. The latter make about 10% of the non-Estonian population.
By November 1, 2000 only 38% of non-Estonians had Estonian citizenship, 24% Russian citizenship, 1% other citizenships and 37% of Russian-speakers were stateless (Estonian Foreign Affairs Ministry web-page). Non-citizens, holding temporary or permanent residence permits, are provided with the same social guarantees as citizens, but they have no right to become members of political parties, to vote in Parliamentary elections, to take positions in the state and municipal administration or to serve in the Estonian Army. According to the Law on Cultural Autonomy, non-citizens, to whom the majority of non-Estonians belong, are also not considered to be national minorities.

Ruutsoo (2000) divides citizenship into *social, economic* and *political*. The foregoing means that the majority of Russian-speakers are excluded from political citizenship. Let us examine the situation in social and economic citizenship. It is directly connected with the Estonian language proficiency of non-Estonians. At present only 22% of non-Estonians speak Estonian fluently, 22% ‘normally’, 30% ‘a little’ and 26% do not speak it at all (Kruusvall 2000). Let us examine here briefly, in what spheres Estonian and Russian languages were used in the Estonian Republic in the 1990s.

Table 3. Usage of Estonian and Russian languages in Estonia in 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere</th>
<th>Estonian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political:</strong> Legislation (texts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language of local administrative bodies</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament functioning</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>0.8% (2 town councils, disputable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Knowledge is obligatory.</td>
<td>Actually used in North-East, less in Tallinn. Minority is not guaranteed social services in its language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>According to the Language Law, Estonians are guaranteed social services in their language.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Knowledge is a benefit, applied in accountancy, banking, all spheres of domestic economy.</td>
<td>Used together with English and Finnish in international trade and clients’ serving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*: Basic and secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary professional Higher</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily life communication within ethnic community**</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Approximately, on the basis of demographic statistics

Thus for all those who are not fluent in Estonian (approximately 56% of non-Estonians or nearly 18% of the total population of Estonia), the information circle and available activities are limited to topics related to daily life, to a lesser degree economy and culture. Their social and economic citizenships are thus also limited.
2.3. Media system in Estonia

Before 1991 the circulations of newspapers per person in Estonia were highest in the whole Soviet Union. Nevertheless, comparing the ethnic structure of the population and the language of newspapers issued, we can see that local printed media were more directed on Estonians than non-Estonians, and in spite of an abrupt decline in all circulations, the proportion of Russian-language media in Estonia in the 1990s compared with the Soviet era increased. See Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 3 and 4.

Table 4. Daily circulation of Estonian and Russian-language newspapers in Estonia in 1940–2001, in thousand copies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily circulation of Estonian newspapers, thousand copies</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>450.6</td>
<td>403.8</td>
<td>380.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily circulation of Russian-language newspapers, thousand copies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source for 1940–1986: Narodnoye bozaitstvo v ESSR v 1986 godu

Figure 3. Daily circulation of Estonian and Russian-language newspapers in Estonia in 1940–2001, in thousand copies
Nevertheless, we should consider that before 1991 non-Estonians subscribed to newspapers from all over the USSR, watched Moscow-based TV, listened to Moscow and Leningrad Radio channels. Unfortunately, precise data regarding the consumption of Moscow-based media are not at present available in Estonia.

Since 1991, when the ER has gained independence, the Russian-language media in Estonia turned into minority media. There appeared new newspapers, radio and TV channels, which did not exist before 1991. By 2000 the local Russian-language media system consisted of:

- 15 Russian-language newspapers (2 national dailies, 2 weeklies, 8 local and 3 advertisement newspapers) and more than 10 magazines: 3 cultural quarterlies, TV-magazine ‘Semj’, crossword and entertainment series.
- 1 public service radio station (Radio 4, functioning in Russian with weekly transmissions in Ukrainian, Belorussian and Armenian languages) and 4 private stations with regional coverage (Radio 100 FM, Sky Radio, Russkoje Radio, Radio Katjusha).
- 1 regional cable Russian-language TV and regular broadcasts (several hours per week) in Russian on Estonian state and private TV-channels. The public service TV station Estonian Television has 6 weekly and 1 monthly Russian-language programmes produced in Estonia and a daily Russian news broadcast. A daily Russian news broadcast is also offered by the private TV station TV1. Another private TV station Kanal 2 offers Russian-language programs every Saturday (Estonian Foreign Affairs Ministry web-page). There are moreover 4 private Russian TV channels, which transmit only a few hours per week or in various regions of Estonia.

To compare with Estonian-language media: there are 3 national dailies, 50 local and specialized (business, church, youth, advertisement) newspapers, around 60 magazines in Estonian. Along with them there are 3 public and 14 private radio channels, 1 public and 5 private TV channels. The majority of Estonian language print media belongs to private companies Ekspress Grupp AS (owned by an Estonian businessman H.Luik) and Eesti Meedia AS (owned by the Norwegian company Schibsted Print Media). Their competitors are the Swedish company Bonnier Group and the Estonian-American group TRIO (Baltic Media Book 1999, 62–67). As regards the Russian-language press, the main dailies and weeklies belong to two groups of owners: Rukon-info AS owns the newspaper ‘Estonia’ and the weekly ‘Vesti Nedelya plus’, the liquor producer ‘Onistar LTD’ owns the newspaper ‘Molodozh Estonii’ and the weekly ‘Molodozh Estonii Subbota’. These owners are very small compared to the Estonian ones named above.

Taking into account the impoverished local market for tele-production in the Russian language, the insufficient Estonian language competence of the majority of
Russian-speakers and cultural differences between Russians and Estonians, it not surprising that ‘the Russian-speaking population of Estonia is oriented to the Russian TV-channels. On the average, 80% of Russian-speakers watch Russian TV each day, more than 90% a minimum of once per week. Only 25% of Russian-speakers aged 12 to 74 watch Estonian TV daily, 46% a minimum of once per week. 43% of Russian-speakers do not watch the Estonian telecasts at all. The development of satellite and cable communication during the last 6–7 years increased the Russian-speaking audience of the Western TV-channels; 14% of Russian-speakers watch Western channels daily, 35% once per week (Vihalemm T. 2000).

The consumption of Russian-language newspapers by Russian-speakers is more irregular than the consumption of Estonian print press by Estonians. Russian-speakers prefer Russian TV channels to any others. 75% of the Russian-speaking population watches Russian TV channels daily (Vihalemm T. 2000). Only local radio stations are listened to regularly by them. See Figure 4.

**Figure 4. Consumption of different media channels by Estonians and non-Estonians in 1999, in percentage of all population of Estonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Channel Type</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Non-Estonians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National daily newspapers, daily</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reach (%)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio, weekly reach (%)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Baltic Media Book 2000 by BMF Gallup Media

As to print media, one of the main tendencies in media consumption in the 1990s is abrupt decrease of circulations, especially of Russian-language editions, compared not only with the Perestroika period (1988–1991), but also with the Soviet era. The circulation of ‘Molodozh Estonii’ decreased by 5–7 thousand copies and ‘Estonia’s circulation by 7–8 thousand copies 1999–2001 (according to the data of the Estonian Newspaper Union). At the same time the circulations of Estonian dailies is about 40–66 thousand copies, they are more stable, larger in volume and more varied in content and information sources. See Table 5 and Figure 5.
Table 5. Circulations of main Estonian and Russian-language newspapers in Estonia in 1945–2001, in thousand copies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia (Sovetskaja Estonia up to 1991)</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molodozh Estonii (Stalinskaja Molodozh in 1950-1956)</td>
<td>2.3*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postimees (until 1991 Edasi)</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eesti Päevaleht (until 1990 Noorte Hääl)</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahva Hääl</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>151**</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data for 1950, when newspaper was founded
** Data for 1985

Figure 5. Circulations of main Estonian and Russian-language newspapers in Estonia in 1945–2001, in thousand copies

At the same time, Estonia is one of the leaders among the post-communist countries by the number of Internet users. At the beginning of 2000, 21% of Russian-speakers and 40% of Estonians had experience of using Internet. The majority uses Internet at work (63%), about 33% in an educational institution, 22% at home and 5% at the public Internet-points (Vihalem, T. 2000).

Regarding journalist cadres, it is also necessary to mention the difference in wages between the Estonian and Russian-speaking journalists: the workers in the Russian-language media on the average earn 2–3 times less than their Estonian associates. Here we deal not with discrimination according to the national criterion, since the publishers and the editors of the Russian-language newspapers are Russian-speakers themselves, but with the different level of the financial means of these media.

There are serious differences in the system of training of personnel for Estonian and Russian-language editions. If Estonian journalists were trained in the Department of Journalism of Tartu University, and in the 1990ies also at Tallinn Pedagogical University and Concordia University, then the education of Russian-speaking journalists started in Tallinn Pedagogical University only in 1997 at the Department of the Russian Language and Literature and in Tartu University at the Department of Media and Communication in 2000. Therefore, whereas in the Estonian press in the 1990s there occurred a change of personnel, in the Russian-language journalists and editors predominate who began their careers in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the younger generation of journalists is gradually coming to work to newspapers, they do not demonstrate new approaches and style and remain virtually unnoticed by the readership. At the same time the owners of newspapers are businessmen, who had nothing to do with media until the last years. Besides, until the present time, all journalists’ training was conducted in the Estonian or English language, which made it inaccessible to many Russian-speaking journalists.
3.1. Approaches to the role of media

It seems to be a commonplace to say that media functions in two forms: as a commodity and as a tool. Being a commodity it should satisfy customer’s needs, and being a tool of influence it has to satisfy the needs of the source of finances / organs of control. In order to be an effective tool, it should be an effective commodity. This means, that all the time it has to search for a balance between the interests of the different groups which determine its functioning: on the first hand, audience, owner, media workers, interest groups, state and political institutions etc. The ‘role of media’ is understood here as a result of performing its functions (Wright 1974) and as a result of its interaction with the environment in which it functions. This role depends upon the type and level of development of society including the needs and interests of different subjects of the process of mass communication (see above); conditions of production (finances, equipment, system of distribution); system of control (overt or latent censorship/control/regulations etc.); culture of the society; dominating ideology etc.

The particular question is, what could be the minority media role in a society. Levkovic (1986, 66–67), Togora (1986, 52–54), McQuail (1984, 204) underline minority media importance in preserving minorities’ ethnic and cultural identities, maintaining connections with the historical motherland and at the same time in facilitating their integration into the host society and providing them with information about its institutions. Riggins (1992, 276) writes that ‘the long-term effect of ethnic minority media is neither total assimilation nor cultural preservation, but some moderate degree of preservation that represents the compromise between two extremes’. It is absolutely correct in relation to the Russian-language media in Estonia. Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure the actual impact of media on an ethnic minority, as it mostly remains unknown how mass media messages are interpreted by majority and minority audiences. The ideological complexity of media content complicates this task even more. Any news story contains information that can be interpreted in different ways. Usually in commercial media there are combined a dominant ideology, expressing the elite’s interests, and counter-ideology, opposing
the elite’s interests. Additionally as a reaction to perceived neglect and misrepresentation in mainstream media, ethnic journalism usually tends to be biased. Exercising considerable self-censorship, it concentrates on topics flattering to the minority group. Thus ethnic minority media are characterized by an explicit counter-ideology in terms of ethnicity. Counter-ideology, use of the minority language, the establishment of a minority news agenda, announcement of the community events promoting minority organizations activity oppose minority cultural assimilation. At the same time, extensive use of information sources belonging to the dominant group, borrowing of styles and genres, words and names from the majority language and such phenomena as intellectual ghettoization when the target audience becomes bored by content that does not seem to convey new information promote gradual and partial assimilation of the audience (1992, 277–285). Thus initially the minority media play a contradictory role in preserving and changing minority identity, defining its place at the dominant society.

3.2. Methodological framework of the studies

Four articles included in this thesis are written on the basis of 3 studies, carried out in 1997–2001.

In the article 1 ‘The Role of the Russian-language Media in Estonia 1853–2000’, which is actually a historical library research, use is also made of the materials of my Master’s thesis ‘Role And Functions of the Russian-language Press in the Estonian Republic in 1991–1996’ (Tartu University: Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, unpublished, 1997). The functionalist approach described above was applied in 1) content analysis of the thematics, problematics and journalists’ positions in all materials in Estonian Russian-language dailies ‘Estonia’ and ‘Molodozh Estonii’ for July-December 1991 and January–June 1996; 2) content analysis of letters to the editor and institutional responses in the same dailies for July 1991-December 1992 and January-June 1996. Also, this article used the results of studies 1-3, which are described below.

Study 1
Study 1 is the basis for article 2 ‘Civic, Political and Ethnocultural Collective Identities Constructed in the Russian Press of Estonia Since 1947’. In March 1997 the research group of the Journalism and Mass Communication Department of Tartu University under the leadership of Professor Marju Lauristin joined the international project ‘Constructing of National Identities in Post-War Europe’. It was initially launched by three European Universities: Konstanz, Tampere and Edinburgh University. Launching this project on an international scale was caused by a number of important considerations: the integration process in the European
Union, its consequences and counter-reactions; demands for regional autonomy and independence; growth of ethnic and religious minorities in Europe; growth of racist and xenophobic parties and movements in many countries, new nation states in formerly socialist Europe and reconstruction of national identities (Luostarinen 1997, 3) Many of these phenomena also occurred in the Estonian Republic. We were therefore interested to study how national identity has been constructed throughout media in a historical perspective and to compare these processes in Estonia and other European countries.

A constructivist approach to media role was applied here. This does not mean blind belief in media omnipotence, but that in media we inevitably deal with a combination of reflection and distortion of reality. Although media content is usually based on actual events, the selection of the events to reflect and sources of information to quote is a matter of gatekeepers. To add to this, the processing of texts according to the rules of the genre, the general style of the channel and individual preferences of media workers finally result in virtual constructions, not the raw information.

Initially at the international study the concept of national identity was used in the Andersonian sense, nation was interpreted as an imagined community. Further, the coding system of the project was based on the following system of determinants and contents of national identity (Luostarinen 1997, 3–5):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinant</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Regional identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Language, heritage, religion, sub-culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genealogy</td>
<td>Kinship, race, ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Status, class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, one of the presuppositions of this study was that there are both positive and constructive dimensions in nationalism but also negative and destructive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructive</th>
<th>Destructive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
<td>Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractualism</td>
<td>Essentialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilianism</td>
<td>Militarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementarism</td>
<td>Antagonism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This framework was initially used for working out the coding instruction. Nevertheless, as during the actual study we were dealing with a period of rapid social transformation, where the most interesting aspect turned to be the correlation and dynamics of constructing of different ethnic, national and supra-national identities, this theoretical scheme was not further applied for the analysis of data, although it could be a fruitful idea for the future.

The main method of processing data was Latent Class Analysis (LCA), originally worked out by Lazarsfeld (1966, 1973) and modified by the German researcher Kempf (1994). It is a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. It reverts to Berelson’s content analysis, which was defined as an instrument for objective, quantitative and systematic description of the manifest content of communication where the quantitative results are related to the situation which these data stem from (Krippendorf 1980, 17). The main limitations to the application of the method were that one could not do quantitative content analysis if one word or statement was as important as the rest of the content; and the supposition that only texts which are more or less similarly encoded and decoded by the sender and receiver should be the object of content analysis.

At the same time Lazarsfeld (1950) was developing a multivariate method similar to factor analysis and directly applicable for data produced by nominal scales – he called it Latent-Structural Analysis. The basic idea was that the coding results for the manifest object are a product of some latent aspect or dimension (such as attitudes, mental states, characteristics etc.) which cannot be directly observed but which can be mediated to the field of sense experience. The data based on observations ought therefore to be reduced to the latent structure, which is a description of how persons or other objects under study are situated in the latent dimensions. If there were several dimensions somehow connected to each other, one could speak about a ‘latent space’ in which the units of observation were situated in a certain way (after Reunanen & Suikkanen 1998).

Modern LCA has thus emerged from ‘empirical social research’. It supposes that there is a latent factor which influence the position of the subject in classification or defines his position in one of the latent classes. It helps to reveal latent text structures, called ‘styles’. These styles are continuums between types of content elements. The starting point of LCA analysis is an entity of respondents, for whom there is a one-dimension latent nominal variable with a certain number of gradations. It is supposed that respondents with different values of latent variable will nearly always reply differently to the question and those with the same value of latent variable will reply in a similar way. In media analysis these respondents are replaced by articles and questions by generalized statements – positive and negative – selected from the content of the press and constructed on the basis of pilot research (here done by Kempf, Luostarinen, McInnes in 1996).

Evidently, we will find a statistical connection between the categories, which could be explained by a latent factor. If we fix the meaning of this latent factor, the
statistical connection will disappear. Lazarsfeld called it ‘the principle of local independence’, connecting the latent space and the empirical material describing it. According to this, the coding units are alike in regard to this or that latent property (latent continuum), if they produce statistically unrelated distribution in tests measuring this continuum.

The selection for this study consisted of 204 articles over 14 years (1947, 1956, 1969, 1977, 1987–1996) from the newspapers ‘Sovetskaja Estonia’ / ‘Estonia’ (name as of 20.08.1991)’ and ‘Molodozh Estonii’. 4 national celebrations were selected: 1) New Year; 2) Anniversary of the Soviet Army (February 23) / Independence Day (February 24 since 1987); 3) 1st of May (Labour Day) and 4) Estonian Army Victory Day (June 23 since 1989) / Midsummer day (June 24). We targeted to select such celebrations, which would 1) relate to various important political and cultural aspects in the process of nation building; 2) would be valid during the whole period of the selection; 3) be compatible in international perspective. See Appendix 1 for the criteria of the selection of articles and categories of coding. The coding instruction was adapted to the Estonian material while pilot study was carried out by Külliki Korts and Mari Uba – members of our research group.

According to the general theoretical framework, all categories were united into 11 ‘themes’ (dimensions). The results of coding were presented as frequency tables. The following 8 were selected for further processing, where frequency of the statements was statistically meaningful: 1) ‘patriotism’, 2) ‘militarism’, 3) ‘multiculturalism’, 4) ‘Estonia’s relation to Europe \ EU’, 5) ‘production of national identities’, 6) ‘content of the national identity’, 7) basic national orientation and the state \ citizen relations’, 8) ‘Estonia’s relations with the USSR \ Russia’.

As a result of processing by the programme Lacord 33, the materials were divided into latent classes within each theme. Further processing allowed us to follow the dynamics of diachronic changing of their weight (see Appendix 2).

One problem was that the categories were actually ‘generalized’ statements, which could be verbally expressed in different ways. In order to provide similar understanding of the same categories by different participants of the project, common coding of the same materials in group and regular random control of each other’s coding by different coders was carried out.

Another problem was that the principle of local independence allows the analysis of factors within each dimension, but not within the whole material. In order to reveal wider ‘styles’, characterizing ‘national identities’, I therefore had to go back to frequency tables and group categories according to indices, regarding ‘national identities’.

One more problem was connected with the selection of the texts for the period of the most rapid transformations (1988–1993), as at this time the texts published in connection with national celebrations were often less meaningful for the construction of national identity than texts published in connection with some
events. Nevertheless, we preserved the initial principles of the selection so that it would be comparable with the selections of the other countries.

A special problem was that while the international study concentrated only on the national in the Andersonian sense, i.e. political identity construction, I was dealing with a complicated situation, where the approach ‘one state – one nation’ did not work. Being for decades a part of Soviet empire, Estonia preserved a quasi-state administrative apparatus, a full system of education and cultural establishments, the best developed media system in the USSR, and in the 1990s re-constructed its national independence. More than that, I was dealing with the provincial press of the ‘empire majority’. The latter was very heterogeneous in its characteristics, rootedness in Estonia, and then since 1992 turned out to be mainly excluded from the process of nation-building and was expected by the majority of Estonians to leave for Russia. It is therefore difficult to speak about the national identity of this group, especially of people with aliens’ passports, therefore mainly born in Estonia. While in a pilot study I had to adapt the general coding instruction to this complicity and to specify to which particular identity the results of quantitative analysis refer: 1) Soviet (national); 2) Estonian (national and ethnic); 3) Soviet Estonian (civic), 4) Estonian-Russian (civic, binding local Russian-speakers together and binding them with Estonian society in general) 5) Russian-Russian (ethnic, binding with Russia). While further processing, indices 4 and 5 were united into a common index, as the share of index 5 was statistically too low for LCA analysis.

Study 2

Article 3 ‘The Role of Minority Press in the Process of Integration’ is based on the results of this study. It was carried out within the framework of a joint project VERA, where the efforts of three Estonian Universities were joined and which studied the different aspects of the integration of the Russian-speaking minority into Estonian society at the end of the 1990s. It relies on the different theories of social integration, mentioned below.

The data of the monitoring of the Estonian and Russian press for the period 1999–2000 (see report Integratsiooniprotsessi Kajastumine Eesti Ajakirjanduses 1999 aastal) revealed that the tendencies in national relations get the fullest and widest reflection in the media before the national and local parliamentary elections (during March 1999 national parliamentary elections and October 1999 local parliamentary elections) and during the political crises (Tallinn municipal government crisis in November 2000). We therefore made a content analysis of all the articles (excluding ads and weather forecast) from the newspapers ‘Estonia’ and ‘Molodozh Estonii’ for the periods 11.10.1999–18.10.1999 (a total of 458 texts), and 24.10–02.11.2000 (a total of 356 texts).

In this study comparative content analysis was used. On the basis of close reading of the texts, coding instructions were prepared where categories were grouped into the following themes:
1. Declared aims of integration (High living standard, Security, Equal rights of representatives of different nationalities, Russian language becomes second official language, Russian culture is preserved, Russian parties are widely represented in power structures, Co-operation with Russia, Estonia is a NATO and EU member, Russians speak Estonian and know Estonian culture, Improvement of Estonian-Russian economic relations, Improvement of Estonian-EU economic relations).

2. Declared ways of their achievement (Follow laws, Equal competition conditions, Vote for Russian politicians, Create ethnically mixed parties, Vote for Estonian politicians, Be patient and wait).

3. Latent ways of reaching of declared aims (Illegal ways of needs' gratification, Proposal to solve one's problems by themselves, Distrust of press, Distrust of politicians, Activity and self-organization of the population, Constructing enemy, Labelling, Creating glittering generalities, Constructing a savior, Constructing oppositions, Frightening).

4. Latent aims (Citizen equality, Stable legal situation, High level of information, Material stability).

These categories are usually totals of issues selected as a result of the preliminary stages of analysis of proposed aims and ways of integration. For example, the category High living standards consisted of subcategories like Decrease of unemployment, Increase of social benefits, Improvement of work of city transport, Renovation of roads, Building municipal housing, Stopping price growth for water and heating etc.

According to the frequency tables, selected ‘integration patterns’ should be referred to the sources of opinions who mostly produce these patterns (these were politicians, journalists, officials, specialists and readers). For the analysis for 1999 we also used statistics covering the results of the elections. After that we compared the integration patterns and their sources in the Russian-language media in 1999 and 2000.

Additionally for 1999 we calculated, which personal virtues Russian politicians living in Estonia ascribed to themselves, i.e. what image of integrated Russian was constructed in media. Besides that, we studied the image of audience in the Russian-language press. In order to do so we selected and coded all quotations where references to the audience could be found (here direct appeals such as You, We, readers, as well as descriptions of the audience were considered).

One of the problems of this study conditioned by lack of resources was the short period of selections, which were concentrated around one event. It therefore turned to be impossible to compare the image of ‘integrated Russian’ in 1999 with the same image in 2000, as in 1999 the construction of this image was closely connected with electoral campaign. Also, the division of the categories into themes on the basis of the close reading method could be always argued.
Study 3

Article 4 ‘The Chechenian Case in Estonia’s Dual Press’ is based on the results of this study. It was carried out within the framework of a joint international project ‘Media Societies 2000’, which included studies on media discourse in comparative perspectives, ‘Chechenian discussion’ in media of Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Russia, Sweden and several papers on national media spheres.

In the framework of the current research, we have compared the structure and character of the discussion of the Chechenian conflict in the Estonian and Russian-language press in Estonia in connection with the Chechenian war discussion at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul on 17–18 November, 1999. As a number of previous studies (Kirch M. 1997, Raudsepp 1998, Vetik 1999) has revealed big differences in the coverage of different problems in the Estonian and Russian-language media in Estonia, as well as giving proof that Estonians and Russian-speakers in Estonia have limited common semantic and informational space, we presumed that this discussion in Estonian and the Russian-language press was also different. We were interested in how on the basis of real events there were constructed two virtual realities, what were the differences between them and what conditioned these differences.

We analyzed two Estonian dailies (“Postimees” and “Eesti Päevaleht”) and two Russian-language dailies (“Estonia” and “Molodozh Estonii”) issued between November 15–19, 1999, selecting all the articles, where Chechnya was mentioned. The unit of analysis was an article.

As we supposed that informing about the Chechenian conflict before such an important international event as the Istanbul OSCE summit could be constructed in the media as a propaganda campaign, we used a number of elements of propaganda study after Jowatt and O’Donnel (after Pocheptsov 2001, 386–387). This includes the ideology and aims of the propaganda campaign, the social context, identification of target audience, propaganda technique (including the structure of the discussion and tactics of propaganda, such as repetition of statements, “testimony”, “plain folks”, “card stacking”, “transfer”, glittering generalities, “name calling” (after Larson 1998, 345–354), used myths as well as audience reaction on this technique and effects.

We started from the event, which was the basis for the discussion in Estonian and the Russian-language press and then analyzed, what was the difference between Estonian and the Russian-language press coverage of this event. We analyzed these differences on formal (frequency of articles, genre structure, authors and sources of information) and content (chronological sequence of propaganda campaign, objects of the discussion, sides of the conflict, propaganda tactics) criteria. Having described the campaigns and differences between them, we analyzed the reactions of the audience and made some hypothesis regarding the initial aims of the campaigns.
The ‘identification of the propagandist’ is not described here as a special sub-chapter, as the coded materials are initially grouped in our analysis as belonging to different ‘sources of information’, which are propagandists in broad sense of the term ‘propaganda’. The latter is understood after Herman & Chomsky (1988, 1) as a tool to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs and norms of behaviour and to integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. The division of the sources into 1) authorities; 2) journalists; 3) experts; 4) ordinary readers helped us to follow differences in their representations and thus to analyse differences in their specific interests. It was especially important to follow and compare, in what chronological sequence these sources had expressed their opinions in both presses, i.e. who had been the initial source of the opinion presented and if media/journalists had supported some of these groups either expressed their own opinion. As the propaganda is inevitably directed on the audience, it was especially interesting to follow, if there had been any feedback from these newspapers’ readership and how this feedback correlated with other opinions presented.
4. RESULTS


This chapter is written on the basis of Study 1 and concentrates on constructing collective identities of Estonian Russian-speakers in the Russian-language press. I focus on ethnocultural, political and civic identities. Here we deal with ethnically, culturally and politically heterogeneous society (Smith, D. 1998), passing through the process of abrupt political transformation. Moreover, the positions of its different ethnocultural segments changed radically in 1991, when Estonians became a state majority, preserving number of traits of a ‘threatened minority’, expressed in discourses of ‘threat of cultural extinction’, ‘demographic catastrophe’ and ‘necessity of self-defense’ in many spheres, and Russian-speakers became a state minority. In turn, this minority consists of different ethnic groups, of citizens of Estonia, Russia and non-citizens, who live in different regions of Estonia either in concentrations or in a dominating Estonian environment. It is different with the criteria of rootedness in Estonia, degree of acculturation, political and value orientations, education, social status etc. It is heterogeneous in all respects, except common Russian language, perceived by Estonians as a symbol of former disregard and oppression.

Considering the multiplicity of meanings of the term identity (see Brubaker & Cooper 2000), I here present the working definition used in my research work. Here the term identity is used in order to describe a mechanism of socialization (Freud, Z. 1921, 1926, Freud, A. 1946), permitting an individual consciously and/or unconsciously to define himself in the space of interaction and co-existence of groups, which are defined as relatively close (‘own’) or remote (‘strange’) (Danilova 1997, 11), to understand / feel sameness on certain criteria with some of these groups, to be voluntarily guided by common rules, norms with members of these groups, to get common experience and communicational instruments which provide the possibility of the interaction. From the point of view of needs, we could see identity as a mechanism providing possession of a certain place in the group, security, affiliation, i.e. as a mechanism of gratification of basic needs (see Tajfel 1972, 31...
after Abrams & Hogg 1990, 2). Identity could be also described as a state of mutual recognition/feeling of similarities between subject and object of identification and difference between in- and out-group. *Stable and continuous* identity exists only when there is no discord between identification from inside and outside, when the subject consciously and/or unconsciously locates himself/is located within the object, and both accept this place and the ensuing rights and obligations as legitimate. Otherwise identity is prone to be weak and unstable. Identity is not taken for granted, ascribed/acquired once and forever. Identities are mostly flexible, flowing etc. (Luostarinen 1999, 1). Usually the person has multiple identities, which form a hierarchy and can be either harmonized, or unbalanced (i.e. when one of them supresses others).

Identity construction in media could manifest itself through naming ‘Us’ and ‘Others’, ascribing them certain characteristics, sameness and differences, constructing their interrelations, locating them in social, geographical, and historical space, defining their respective positions. Luostarinen (1997, 5) pointed out that respective media contents deals with stereotypes and characteristics of Us and Them, giving Us models to be followed, teaching objects of loyalty, playing role as a forum interpreting common history and setting goals for the future.

I agree with those researchers who consider *ethnic identity* to be one of the strongest primordial urges (Bromley 1977, Smith 1997). It is formed in childhood together with age and sex identities. Ideological, professional and other social identities are formed later in the process of secondary socialization, they may throughout change an individual’s life, although in some cases they may become even more important for the person. Here ethnic identity is understood as construed like any other social identity. Nevertheless, as internalization of ethnic identity usually takes place in the process of primary socialization, it is combined with deep emotional sentiment, when ethnic group is to some degree perceived as an extended family and the world of his ethnic group is percepted by a person as a real, ‘whole world’, the world of childhood. In mono-ethnic communities this identity could remain unconscious, but in multi-ethnic communities, where the cultural border is visible on a daily level, usually ethnic sense of belonging is comprehended. Looking for ethnic identities in media, it is therefore necessary to check its content for symbols, cultures, myths, historical reminiscences and their evaluations, if special value is prescribed to the language, literature or traditions of a certain ethnocultural group.

The notion of *political identity* will be used here to describe the cognition and sense of political community, of sharing a political project. Constructing *political identity* through media is carried out by using state symbols, propagating state institutions and explanations of their actions, giving models of civic behaviour and loyalty.

Besides that, various studies have pointed out the presence of some vague identity, uniting Estonians and non-Estonians or as a minimum providing relative stability and peace in the Estonian Republic. In order to describe this phenomenon, I also
use the term *civic identity*. Civic identity is connected with political identity and they support each other, but civic identity is feasible even when the political identity is quite weak. In this case the *nucleus* of civic identity is an affiliation to the local ethno-class (see Smith & Wilson 1997, 857) – the specific culture, norms, in-group relations, common experience acquired by this particular community. The *second layer* of this identity is affiliation to host state and society, when 1) the norms and laws of this society are taken for granted, the position of ethno-class is accepted and there is a consensus that change in its position could be achieved only according to the rules and laws of the host society; 2) there are some cultural points (celebrations, communicative tools and luggage, cultural norms, symbols etc.) common to different segments of the society; 3) different ethnocultural and social parts of this society recognize that they have common interests and see themselves as parts of the same wider system (society), although including a number of sub-systems (ethnic, social, interest groups etc.). In a broad sense civic identity is thus a feeling of attachment to state and society, a cognition of commonality of interests with all members of the society (see Marshall, cited from van Houten, Tijsen 1994, 147, Vihalemm, T. 2001). The civic identity of the minority could be constructed in the press through recognition of cultural sameness and common economic interests with the host society, obedience to its laws and expression of some feeling of emotional attachment to it.

Before Russian diaspora identity field studies started, the theoretical discussion on this topic came to two antagonistic conclusions:

1. As Russian migrants retained their language, their ethnic identity did not diminish with the increase of distance from the Russian heartland (Kory 1980, after Kolstø 1996b, 610)

2. Russian diaspora was in the process of acquiring an identity of its own, different from the Russian core group in Russia, as Russians lost contact ‘not only with their former social milieu, but also with the traditional mores of Russian society’ (Pavlovich 1978, after Aasland 1996, 485). This conclusion coincided with the point of view of Aasland (1996, 484–485) and Laitin (1996, 194), who hypothesized that in spite of low fluency in local languages, Russians were influenced by the local nationalities, their way of life, values and norms, which distinguished them from the core group. That made them feel that they are ‘not at home’ when they came to Russia. Another aspect they pointed out was the strength of the Soviet identity of Russians in the Soviet Republics and its domination over Russian ethnic one, conditioned by detachment of Russians from their traditional homelands by urbanization. According to Haav (1986), 78% of Russians in Estonia saw themselves first as Soviet citizens at that time.
I am inclined to support the second point of view. Even migrants who came to the national Republics in their adult years and preserved their Russian cultural identity cannot but feel the border between themselves and local people, which could lead to a strengthening of their own Russianness. As to Russian-speakers born in national Republics, the cultural differences between them and newcomers could be quite sharp, even on the family level, in relation to celebration traditions, normative frequency and ways of meeting relatives etc. The most surprising observation which I made in my own immediate environment, that even ‘pure’ Russians from Russia, who live in Estonia over 10 years with very few contacts with native Estonians and Estonian ethnic culture, coming to Russia are perceived by their former environment as “different”, “strange” due to their different civic culture, which includes greater obedience to the law than in Russia, the expectation that the state must fulfill its duties and a degree of activity towards both, state institutions and their own environment. Depending upon the topic, they could say ‘in our Russia’ or ‘in their Russia’ (‘u nas v Rossii’ /’u nih v Rossii’) and the same about Estonia. Some changes in identity, being conscious or unconscious, do inevitably take place.

Coming to the results of media research, in relation to the Soviet era one could speak about the planned and systematic construction of a supra-national Soviet identity in media. It could be described as a combination of political and civic identities, relying on a certain ideology and value system, common experience, history, traditions, symbols and norms, semantic space and communicational tools. It defined place and the role of the Soviet nation among others. The state was described as strong and economically developed, making people feel pride in belonging to its citizenry. Also, the Soviet identity possessed a strong cultural element. Nevertheless, not culture, but ideology was constructed as a main marker of belonging to the in-group.

The Soviet identity was constructed together with the ethnic identities of indigenous nationalities (Estonian), local civic identities (such as with the Soviet Estonia, where common labour of its population was construed as the main element, uniting its population) and various social identities (professional etc.). In the Soviet era the Russian-language press in Estonia thus constructed multiply identities. The majority of them sought to unite different ethnic groups on political, territorial and social ground.

Until 1987 Russian ethnocultural identity was not constructed at all and after 1987 it appeared, but was never been constructed too intensively. At the same time Russian political identity was not constructed at all. It might seem to be strange, considering the closeness of Russia where the process of nation building is intensified now, heavy consumption of Russian TV-channels by Estonian Russian-speakers (see Vihalemm, T. 2000a), size of Russian-speaking community, preservation of the Russian-language school, media, the Russian Ortodox church, cultural
organizations. Nevertheless, we should consider that for approximately 45% of non-Estonians, Estonia is their actual motherland (Kirch, A 1997), 78% have lived in Estonia longer than 21 years and of the remaining 15% lived here between 10 and 20 years (Stepan & Linz 1996, 404). Next, the attitude of local Russians towards the Russian Federation seems to be quite complicated and varied. First, here could be observed signs of their estrangement from Russia and their Russian roots, revealing itself in a decrease of the status of Russian language and culture among Russians themselves, little concern among local Russians about the cultural marginalization of younger generation (see Kruusvall 1997), sending Russian children to schools with Estonian as the language of instruction, where Russian pupils sometimes felt ashamed of their Russian roots (Vihalemm 1997b). Second, the discourse of Russia in local Russian-language media since 2000 is telling that Russia is the ‘country of wide possibilities’, Russian-speakers prefer Russian TV channels to any others (Vihalemm, T. 2000a), Russia remains their cultural motherland. Third, we cannot even say that they are united by a common nostalgia for the USSR, although it is possible to observe some traces of this nostalgia in the preservation of Soviet identity by part of the population (see Vihalemm, T. 2001) and the forming of a Soviet myth, when younger generation idealizes social and human relations of the Soviet era, based on Soviet films and their parents’ memories. To my mind, it is not a nostalgia for a certain ethnic culture, political institutions, territory, but for a feeling of stability and protection provided by the Soviet state, social optimism and even idealism, and a special kind of collectivist human relations, which were propagated in the Soviet period and are preserved until now in Soviet films, shown by Russian TV channels and in older generation memories. Thus Motherland nostalgia is a complex phenomenon, which could be a topic for special research. To conclude, it is difficult to say that Russians in Estonia are united even by ‘an idealization of the supposed ancestral home’ (Cohen 1997, 180). Studying Iranian emigrant community in London, Sreberny (2000) has come to the same conclusion.

Since 1988 the press has participated in forming local Russian-speaker’s civic identity, where both ethnic and cultural elements were quite important, but only in combination with a number of political and social characteristics. There were constructed such traits of this group as Russian language, intention to stay in Estonia, since 1992 also lack of Estonian citizenship and economic deprivation. In many respects ‘Russians in Estonia’ are the antipode of the ‘Soviet people’: they are a minority group with limited political rights, whose language has no status at this state, living in a small country with a vulnerable economy and security system. While Soviet people were construed as an inseparable part of the Soviet state, Estonian Russians are estranged from the Estonian state. Nevertheless, no alternative to the Estonian state was proposed. ‘We’ were placed ‘here’ in Estonia, united with

1. Statement based on my monitoring of 11–19 year old teenagers during my 3 years of work in NGO Omos in 1998–2001)
Estonians by common territory and problems, governed by the same political institutions. Some kind of civic Estonian identity was indeed constructed there.

Forming a common political identity was complicated by the initial exclusion of the majority of non-Estonians from the Estonian Republic citizenry\(^2\), i.e. from the process of nation-building. It could be explained by the initial logic of Estonian nation-building, rooting in cultural and political opposition to German and Russian metropolises (Lauristin 1997, 34), where the initial attribute of ‘Estonian’ was Estonian language as a mother tongue. It is therefore no surprise that during the ‘national independence struggle’ and ‘state-building’ periods those who did not speak Estonian, psychologically could not be recognized as members of Estonian nation by the majority of Estonians. As a result, in the 1990s systematic construction of political identity, uniting Russians and Estonians, was impossible because of unclarity of Russians’ role and place in Estonia, lack of dialogue between Russians and Estonian state, vagueness of national priorities, absence of a political force to propose attractive national ideology, capable of mobilizing and uniting the population of Estonia.

To conclude, in the 1990s both the heterogeneity and unity of the Russian-speaking community were reflected in the Russian-language media. The Russian ethnocultural identity constructed there was unsystematic and even ambiguous, either emphasizing cultural commonality with Russia, or some special ‘Estonian Russian’ cultural identity, reverting to 1918–1938 and even the 19th century, making local Russians ‘special’ and to some degree culturally uniting them with Estonians. The only systematically constructed identity was vague local Russian civic one, where the features shared with Estonians were territory, a number of political, economic and social institutions; and features uniting local Russian-speakers were the Russian-language, lack of Estonian citizenship and economic deprivation. Nevertheless, the Estonian citizens of Russian origin were not excluded from this entity, as the main criterion here is Russian language. On the one hand these traits are objectively conditioned by the political-economic situation, on the other this identity certainly responds to the Russian-speaking elite’s interests. It helped both to avoid open conflict with Estonians, which is very important for business, requiring political stability, and preserving some degree of estrangement between Russians and Estonians/Estonian state, which was expected to provide the so called Russian political forces with the support of the Russian-speaking electorate.

As to the political identity common to Estonians and Russians, the Russian-language media could not construct it at all.

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\(^2\) According to the Estonian Citizenship Law, adopted in February 1992, only ten percent of non-Estonians received Estonian citizenship automatically, the others had to go through a procedure of naturalization if they applied for citizenship, where the main obstacle was a language test. By 2000 only about 38% of non-Estonians possessed Estonian citizenship, 19% had Russian citizenship and 43% no citizenship at all (the latter applied for an alien’s passport) (Accession to the European Union and National Integration in Estonia and Latvia 2001, p.23).
4.2. Role of the Russian-language press in the integration of non-Estonians into the Estonian state and society

The dominant type of relations between Russians and Estonians in the Estonian Republic could be best described as a combination of separation, marginalization, integration and assimilation (after Berry 1992), where the dominant tendency is separation, rooted in the Soviet era, when Estonians and Russians worked in different economic branches, studied at different schools and groups at universities, attended different cultural events, consumed different media production and mostly did not have close friendly and family relations. In the 1990s these differences increased. Moreover, divisions appeared between Russians and Estonians on citizenship criteria, differentiated access to jobs depending upon possessing Estonian citizenship and Estonian language proficiency, etc (see Kruusvall 2000). The situation of separation seems not to be a result of the rational choice of the Russian-speaking community, but more of a wide range of objective conditions, among them 1) historical tradition of self-isolation of Estonians as a way of cultural preservation; 2) Soviet era tradition of co-existence of two communities in one territory; 3) treating by Russian-speakers the languages of non-Russian nationalities of the USSR as secondary and unnecessary (see Offe 1996); 4) set of Laws (Language Law, Citizenship Law), putting local Russian-speakers in the position of economic and political outsiders; 5) lack of possibilities to learn the Estonian language, especially for the older generation and in Russian-speaking enclaves in the North-East of Estonia, 6) lack of common informational and cultural space.

The intention to join the EU resulted in the necessity to stabilize national relations in the country. As a result, the nationalist-isolationist discourse of ‘balancing demographic situation’, ‘velvet re-emigration of Russians’ etc., prevailing at the beginning of the 1990s, changed into more a liberal official discourse of integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society.

In general, the modern understanding of integration as an alternative to assimilation is quite new in sociological and political practice. Until the 1960s integration was understood as a stage of assimilation. In Western Europe the search for an effective model of acculturation and adaptation of ethically non-homogeneous segments of the population started in the 1960s in connection with the import of foreign labour force. In the 1990s the intensification of global migration as well as the emergence of new nationalizing states and re-actualization of ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world including Europe actualized the search for such a model of ethnic relations which could preserve the old model of nation-state and at the same time diminish ethnic conflict. Integration seemed to be the magic wand which could solve the contradiction.

In a broad sense integration means uniting and structuring separate parts into the whole mechanism and optimisation of their interrelations. It is a mutually directed
process, which demands the clear definition of the place, function and role of every element. As a result the society becomes more stable, holistic and effective (Sotsiologichesky Slovar, 1989). This process has a number of aims and tasks on the level of society, groups and individuals. The participants in the process should have motivations to reach these aims, cognitive resources (results in expectation), confidence in their own potential for goal attainment as well as a conception of costs in relation to the particular goal situation (Esser 1980, after Diaz 1998, 204).

Berry (1992) sees integration as one of the possible options of acculturation, which implies both some maintenance of the cultural integrity of the group (that is, some reaction or resistance to acculturation pressures) as well as the movement to become an integral part of the larger societal framework (that is, some adjustment). Integration here is seen as a voluntary choice of acculturation strategy on personal and/or group level. In practice it is very important that for integration to be successful, the host society should offer individuals possibilities of a non-assimilative character (see Diaz 1998, 204). It is likely that otherwise the integration is not possible, as in order for the minority to become an integral part of the larger society, the majority/society in general should be ready to accept the minority, to provide some niche for it, to allow it into its communicational and informational space, system of social relations etc.

Today the term integration is often applied in connection with the concept of multiculturalism, which means co-existence of different cultural groups in one state and a high degree of their mutual tolerance. The opinions of different authors regarding means of achievement of an integrated multicultural state and society vary. The concept of a ‘politically multicultural state’ supposes granting minorities collective political rights (territorial and/or cultural autonomy, official status of the minority language, education in the minority language, probably quotas in political bodies etc.) in exchange for denial of primary political loyalty to their ethnic motherland (Linz, Stepan 1996, Kolstø 1996a). The model of ‘individual cultural integration’ means granting individuals equal political rights, the possibility of free choice of cultural and civic identity regardless of their cultural affiliation (Kymlicka 1997).

In Estonia one of the first steps on the way to integration has become the State Programme of Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society for 2000–2007, accepted by the Estonian Government in December 1999. It is stated there that ‘the task of the state is both to support the development of Estonian culture and guarantee minorities opportunities for cultural development,’ that as a result of integration will emerge a common Estonian language-communicative space, Estonian media will become the main source of information, Estonian culture will be in priority position compared to other cultures, but the minorities will have the right to preserve and develop their cultural identity, their members have the individual right to choose their national identity. The number of non-citizens should decrease and the
population of Estonia should become loyal to the Estonian Republic and acquire common national (supra-ethnic) identity. The economic position of the individual will not depend upon his/her nationality. Evidently, this model is close to the model of individual cultural integration, no collective political or cultural rights are granted by it. That is one of the reasons why this programme is heavily criticized by local Russian media and politicians for its assimilative character. To some degree this criticism is just, as ‘individual preserving of cultural rights’ of minority members along with the overall priority of Estonian language and culture in all spheres, plus lack of collective cultural rights for the Russian minority mean that the space for Russian language and culture will gradually diminish and the next generations of Russian-speakers’ children in such a situation will likely prefer actual cultural assimilation, as that alone will be able to guarantee them citizenship and positive career prospects. Besides, in spite of all the above mentioned declarations, a large amount of money spent on integration and the implementation of special institutions dealing with the problem of integration, such as the Presidential Roundtable on national minorities, the Minister of Ethnic Affairs Bureau, the Foundation for the Integration of non-Estonians, the actual situation is changing very slowly for the better. For example, the number of non-citizens 1999–2001 decreased very slowly (Accession to the European Union and National Integration in Estonia and Latvia 2001); Estonians’ negative attitudes towards Russian-speakers changed slowly, too (see different studies of Monitoring 2000); in the second part of 2001 in Paldiski, Jõhvi and Tallinn there were Estonian and Russian youth fights, presumably on national grounds.

On the other hand, in spite of criticism of state institutions, during the last ten years the Russian political parties, representing the interests of local Russian businessmen, have not actually taken any steps to help the majority of the Russian-speaking community to adapt to the existing reality and legislation, to improve their relations with Estonians, and at the same time to develop their education, culture and to help them feel pride for being Russians.

To conclude, compared with the first part of the 1990s, recognition of the problem by the state institutions, selection and approbation of some model, although debatable, is a step forward.

It is evident that in the process of rapid social changes the media could play a certain role, supporting some tendencies in the development of the relations between social and ethnic groups. In the 1990s the role of the media in interethnic relations thus became an object of lively discussion among researchers and politicians. A

3. To my mind, the Cultural Autonomy Law of 1996 could not be considered a vehicle providing minorities with cultural rights, as it includes in the notion ‘minorities’ only Estonian citizens, and gives them the right to develop their cultural institutions only at their own expense, which actually means a double financial burden for the economically least well-off section of the population.
number of researchers (Kirch, M. 1997, Raudsepp 1998, Vetik 1999) came to the conclusion that in the 1990s the Estonian and Russian print media produced different semantic fields and informational spaces. The media did not perform the task of organizing communication between the Russian-speaking population and the state institutions (Jakobson 1996). This situation is usual for minority media in Western Europe (see Riggins 1992). Nevertheless, if media activity targets the minority’s integration into society, it could undertake a number of actions directed at strengthening the horizontal connections within different segments of certain ethnocultural community and between certain groups of interests belonging to different communities. It could construct models of behaviour, teach objects of loyalty, i.e. create common identities and promote national integration. The audience should receive sufficient information for its adaptation and integration in all levels.

On the contrary, if some interested groups try to promote separation and marginalization of the minority using the media, the audience finds itself in an informational vacuum, ‘enemies’ take constructed, some groups and institutions will be ‘semiotically non-existent’ in the media. This was taking place with both Estonian and Russian language media in Estonia in the 1990s (Kirch, M. 1997, Raudsepp 1998, Vetik 1999, Jakobson 1996, Jakobson 2000, Jakobson & Iljina 2000).

Speaking about the role of the Russian-language press in integration (on the basis of Study 2), it is necessary to examine if the Russian press formed clear aims of integration, ideas about achieving these aims, motivations to achieve these aims, confidence in peoples’ own potential for goal achievement as well as a conception of the costs in relation to the particular goal situation, we come to the following conclusions.

First number of studies (Jakobson 1996, Jakobson, Iljina 2000, Kirch, M. 1997, Raudsepp 1998, Vetik 1999) and opinion polls (Saar Poll 2000) point out that the press informs its audience poorly about important events in Estonian political, economic and social life, so the idea about what society the audience should integrate into is vague and the basis for forming the attitude for integration is lacking.

Second, in the 1990s, in spite of heated discussion about the definitions and patterns of integration, the common opinion about the goals, ways of achieving them, subjects of integration and costs of integration for different subjects was not formed.

Third, the Russian-language press reflected Russians’ idealistic vision of an integrated Estonia as of a stable and tolerant society with 1) high quality of life and strong social security; 2) where all permanent population has secure legal status (citizenship or permanent residence permit); 3) where all the population can communicate in Estonian and at the same time ethnic groups preserve their language, education in their language and their church, - but has hardly shown any realistic ways to achieve it. Reflecting the interests of the Russian-speaking elite, the press
wrote that the Russian-speaking population is helpless, poorly informed, non-educated, i.e. unable itself to change something in their own destiny and thus obliged to delegate this job together with their trust to Russian-speaking politicians. The Russian minority was thus mainly treated as a passive object of governing by both the Estonian state and the Russian elite, and people could hardly have confidence in their own potential for goal attainment from the press. Then the proposed ways of reaching integration on the personal level were also mainly ineffective or unrealistic (for example, learning Estonian language at private language courses, getting higher education at expensive private high schools, which often have no accreditation of the Ministry of Education and where teaching of Estonian language is quite poor). Also, until 2000 there were only few positive examples of integrated persons belonging to the lower and lower-middle social strata (in 2000 the situation started changing a little). In general it is difficult to speak about creating confidence in peoples’ own potential for goal attainment as well as a conception of costs in relation to the particular goal situation.

Also, it was often underlined in press that Estonian society rejects ‘outsiders’ and the Estonian state discriminates against non-citizens and people who are not fluent in Estonian, so that the Estonian environment was mostly constructed as hostile to Russian-speakers.

Thus the Russian-language press mostly promoted patterns of social and national relations proposed by Russian politicians which were strongly based upon ethnocultural isolationism and paternalism of the elite. Accepting of this pattern would lead to the preservation of the existing informational and cultural barriers between Russians and Estonians / Estonian political institutions, leading to a decrease in Russians’ quality of life, as a non-integrated minority inevitably lacks social capital and finds itself in a subordinate position.

As a counter-reaction to all the above mentioned, there emerged a latent response of the Russian population (press audience). Some of its traits could be followed through readers’ calls and letters to newspapers. It could be shown, that the main features of the audience’s social ideal are civic equality, stable legal status (permanent residence permit or citizenship for one’s children), material stability, high level of information and constructive human relations. The legal ways of solving the problems proposed by population are independent actions and self-organisation. At the same time, practically all sources report that the population more often attempts illegal ways of reaching aims, probably, when the legal ones are too complicated. People rely only on themselves, hardly ever ask for help and rarely complain. Another counter-reaction is avoiding the influence of the media and preferring alternative sources of information (rumours, information obtained on an interpersonal level). In both cases the actual role of media in integration is minimal.

As the next two chapters of the overview will focus on the Russian-language press functioning in the 1990s, let us here make a brief review of the Russian-language media in Estonia 1853–1990 in order to see if there are historically prevailing regularities in its functioning and how they are connected with a change in the conditions of its functioning.

1853–1917

The first Russian-language newspapers in Estonia (‘Estlandskie Gubernskie Vedomosti’ and ‘Liflandskie Gubernskie Vedomosti’ launched by the local tsarist administration in 1853) were typical tools of distance regulation of the imperial administration. They carried out mostly utilitarian functions: informed local administrators, gentry, traders and entrepreneurs about new laws and regulations, published official advertisements, propagated desirable norms of behaviour. They were not interested in feedback and did not encourage dialogue between social groups and institutions. Society was constructed in the texts of the newspapers as deeply divided on a class basis, consisting on the one side of officials, landlords and burghers with German and Russian names and peasants who either had Russian names or no names at all on the other side. Estonians were semiotically non-existent in the texts, no cultural groups were mentioned there.

As a result of the economic and political reforms of the 1860s, industrial development in the Russian Empire received a new impetus. Factories appeared in Estonia, targeting the Russian market and owned by Russian entrepreneurs. Agricultural production also became more Russian-oriented. Gradually the number of educated Russian administrators and entrepreneurs in Estonia increased and started to form a thin layer of local Russian bourgeoisie. Its informational needs became more diverse. Thus, in the 1870s, the first private newspapers appeared in Narva and Reval, providing a wide range of information including economic aspects (trade, prices on the markets etc.) and local news.

In the 1890s, a political-commercial Russian press appeared in Estonia, which became regular and widespread. In general, its main task was to preserve administrative, cultural and economic links with the mainland, but the range of its functions widened. During this period there appeared the first translations of some articles from Estonian-language newspapers. Essays on the local cultural, historical and political context were occasionally published, such as translations of Estonian literature and poetry (e.g. the first translation of the Estonian epic poem ‘Kalevipoeg’ into Russian). Nevertheless, Estonians as a cultural group were seldom represented in this media. Russians, meanwhile, were construed not only as loyal citizens, but also as a cultural group with a rich history, traditions, specific national culture etc.
The local Russian press in the Empire period mostly socialized local Russians within an all-Russian cultural, political and economic context and only to some degree in the Estonian social and cultural context, providing very superficial knowledge of Estonia and Estonians. The role of the press as a public forum was bounded on one side by Tsarist censure, and on the other side by a limited set of sources of information and the composition of the audience (Russian nobility, merchants and intellectuals).

1918–1940
At this period the Russian-language editions’ circulation was quite low, the largest of them reached a maximum of 5000 copies (Tsassovskaja 2001). The majority of these newspapers survived less than a year (Isakov 1996). This press mostly informed the Russian population about the expectations of the state and gave the floor to different opinions within the Russian community, but did not provide two-way communication between the Russian minority and Estonian state.

The change of the circumstances and the Russians’ status in Estonia transformed the Russian-language press into a typical minority media. It has lost its regulative force, but did not become an effective public forum on an all-Estonian scale and in the socialization of the Russian minority, as it did not provide two-way communication between the Russian minority and the Estonian state. The Russian-language press helped to preserve Russians’ ethnocultural identity. Its predominant function was the transmission of culture, its informational and entertaining functions were reduced.

1940–1987
In 1940 all the Russian-language newspapers in Estonia were closed. Instead three official Russian-language newspapers were set up. They functioned until the German occupation. In autumn 1944 Soviet Russian-language newspapers were re-established, although their circulation was lower than that of Estonian papers. They were issued only in the towns with large enclaves of Russian-speaking population: in Narva, Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe, Jõhvi and only in 1987 in Tartu. These newspapers were financed and controlled by the local Communist Party Commitees, which combined the roles of media owner and organ of its control. The newspapers’ circulations were stable and quite high: in 1977 the circulation of ‘Soviet Estonia’ was 45 thousand copies and of ‘Molodozh Estonii’ 46 thousand copies (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalemm 1993, 343). During this period, the state combined the roles of a media owner and a controlling authority. It constructed a clear picture of the world and defined the USSR as the strongest and most developed country in it. Soviet citizens were the bearers of the most progressive ideology, whose main component was labour. The press constructed a certain political identity of the Soviet people, which co-existed with the ethnic identities of titular nations, local identities (such
as Soviet Estonian, where the main element uniting the population of Soviet Estonia was common labour) and various social identities (professional etc.).

The state was also interested in following the moods of the population and preserving a minimal veil of socialist democracy. Feedback from the population was therefore welcomed within a limited range of topics. The editorial correspondence departments registered all incoming mail. If there were complaints regarding the economic or daily life, the facts were sometimes verified. If journalists found that these complaints were well-grounded and somebody’s rights were violated, they could apply to the appropriate institutions with a demand for a solution to the problem. Soviet legislation required any institution to which the press inquired to respond within a month. Thus, the population had an instrument of influence over the state bureaucracy, used for solving daily life problems and to some degree for the protection of their rights.

In this period the media informative function diminished, information was carefully selected and also combined with misinformation. Different variations of the regulative function dominated as in Empire period in the 19th century. In spite of censorship the press to some extent performed a communicative function, involving governing institutions and population and to certain degree functioning as a means of their reciprocal influence. It also helped people and groups from different regions of the USSR to establish and maintain contact. It played an important role in socialization within the Soviet political and cultural context, spreading common norms, values, symbols and identities. For Russians it produced an illusion of being included in the local cultural context, symbolically uniting them with Estonians on the basis of their common labour and mutual economic interest. On the other hand, it also performed a segregating sub-function, isolating local Russian-speaking ‘Soviet people’ from both Estonians and their own ethnic Russian roots.

1988–1990
In the period 1988–1990 the media could still influence practical matters, but also enjoyed virtually unlimited freedom. Due to an increase of the variety of information, audience satisfaction increased and newspapers’ circulation rapidly increased. The high circulation of the press together with the Soviet system of state financial support provided the media with financial stability. At the same time, one could observe a gradual growth of disappointment with the functioning of the press as it ceased to be an instrument of solving daily and personal problems and did not offer satisfactory explanations for the new political and economic situation. By 1990 the authority of newspapers started to decrease. Journalists, whose status became even higher, started using the press for their personal interests as a starting point for political and business careers (Tolz 1992). The press was celebrated as a deconstructor of an old regime, but the break-up of old social networks caused a decline in its role as an
The importance of the informative function of press has increased during this period, but the information itself had an unsystematic character, often the quality of information was quite low. Information also assumed an entertaining character, the function of the transmission of culture at this period was reduced to entertainment. Its functioning during this period had a hybrid character, comprising traits of both Empire (Russian/Soviet) regulation as well as minority press. Additionally for the first time in its history it played the role of public forum, as the range of sources represented and topics discussed was fairly wide.

4.4. The Russian-language press in the 1990s: ‘agent of Moscow’ or ‘double loyalty’?

The inclusion of this chapter in this thesis is explained by the existing tradition of seeing the Russian-language press as an ‘extension of Russian Federation propaganda’ (Kirch M. 1997) or at minimum as purposly separatist and isolationist (Raudsepp 1998; Vetik 1999) in public discourse in Estonian press 1991–1997 and even in Estonian scientific discourse.

The aspects regarding constructing common political and civic identity with the Russian Federation were already described in Chapter 4.1. (on the basis of Study 1), where it was concluded that the press did not construct any political identity with Russia and not even the construction of Russian ethnocultural identity was very active. In order to investigate the role of the Russian-language press in forming attitudes to various subjects of Estonian-Russian discussion, I use the results of the Study 3, dealing with the conflict of the positions of official Russia and official Estonia on the ‘Chechenian case’, which were publicly expressed at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul 17–18 November, 1999.

Here we discovered that the Russian-language newspapers kept informing the audience about the positions of different sources, formally being loyal to both Estonia and Russia, and actually keeping aloof from the conflict. Although in articles relating to this topic Russian sources of information dominate (authors, quoted journalists and officials), quite a significant part of the articles coming from Russia are quite critical about the Russian official policy, also, the Russian-language press fully informs its audience about the Estonian state official position and makes hardly any evaluations of any of these positions.

Finally, the Russian-speaking community was not constructed as a participant in the discussion at all. At the same time the Estonian press definitely supported the official Estonian position. There is certainly a big difference between Estonian and the Russian-language press coverage of the Chechenian discussion, as of any discussion relating to Russia, but obviously the Russian-language press did not assume any definite position here.
The information brought to the Russian-speaking audience was contradictory. As people could not rely on other sources of information except the media, the audience could not consider itself to be informed. Forming an attitude towards the problem becomes problematic, the audience becomes estranged from the discussion. This estrangement reveals itself in silence, absence of any reaction.

This is a good example of how in many cases the Russian-language media did not accept a distinct supportive or oppositional position towards either the Estonian state or Russia. It tried to balance between 1) the Russian-speaking politicians cooperating with Russian political forces; 2) Estonian institutions, who often criticize the Russian-language press for disloyalty to the Estonian Republic; 3) the audience, whose interests and attitudes are on one hand terra incognita for the Russian-language press in Estonia (see Jakobson, Iljina 2000), on the other, are evidently formed by the Russian TV channels. To my mind, it is not a ‘double loyalty’, but ‘fear of suffering’, to call forth the dissatisfaction of the above mentioned groups which influence the functioning of the press. Evidently, in this case it is unjust to call the Russian-language press in Estonia a ‘Moscow loudspeaker’ or a ‘Russian propaganda extension’.

4.5. Role of the Russian-language press in informing the Russian-speaking population in the 1990s

The long-term effect of ethnic minority media is neither total assimilation nor cultural preservation, but some moderate degree of preservation that represents the compromise between two extremes… Usually in commercial media there are combined a dominant ideology, expressing the elite’s interests, and counter-ideology, opposing the elite’s interests. Additionally as a reaction to perceived neglect and mis-representation in mainstream media, ethnic journalism usually tends to be biased. Exercising considerable self-censorship, it concentrates on topics, flattering to the minority group. Thus ethnic minority media are characterized by an explicit counter-ideology in terms of ethnicity. Counter-ideology, use of minority language, the establishment of a minority news agenda, announcement of the community events promoting minority organizations activity oppose minority cultural assimilation. At the same time, wide use of information sources belonging to the dominant group, borrowing of styles and genres, words and names from the majority language and such phenomena as intellectual ghettoization, when the target audience becomes bored by content that does not seem to convey new information promote gradual and partial assimilation of the audience (Riggins 1992, 276–285).

The functioning of the Russian-language media in Estonia could be an excellent illustration of the foregoing quotation.
Since 1992 the representatives of the Estonian political elite regularly blamed the Russian-language press for so-called ‘disloyalty’, i.e. any criticism of certain politicians, laws, or the situation in general. These accusations should be seen in a more general context of Estonians typical distrust of the political loyalty of non-Estonians and suspicions that they are bearers of interests of Russia here (see Kolstø 1996, 625; Kruusvall 1997, 133–140; Kirh, A., Kirh, M, Tuisk 1997, 54–55; Haab 1998, 110, 113; Raid 1996, 130-131). Moreover, the boundaries and forms of expected loyalty were not demarcated. As a result, the Russian press strove to avoid any criticism of Estonian state institutions in many topics related to the whole population of Estonia, such as economic issues, corruption, conflicts between Estonian political parties, legislation in the social sphere etc. Some degree of self-censorship was therefore implied and the formal loyalty demands were performed by the Russian press. Besides that, the Russian-language press used news provided by the Estonian information agencies ETA and BNS, state and local political and social institutions, where the majority of sources are ethnic Estonians. According to the results of Study 2, by the end of the 1990s the Russian-language press started promoting an ‘official’ version of the Estonian Republic planned future, where the ER becomes an EU and NATO member, the whole population of Estonia speaks Estonian and knows Estonian culture, there is co-operation between Estonians and Russians in common state and municipal institutions etc.

On the other hand, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Estonian state institutions and politicians had nearly refused to use the Russian-language press for a dialogue with the population, for explaining their position etc. (Jakobson 1996) and declared that those Russians who remain in Estonia, should follow the Estonian media.

In a situation when the production expenses rapidly increased while the circulation of all newspapers was gradually falling, the privatized press (Russian and Estonian) started searching for new sources of finances and information. While the Estonian media-market was shared between Estonian, Swedish and Norwegian owners, the Russian newspapers were provided with finances and information by local Russian businessmen and politicians. In 1996 the newspaper ‘Estonia’ was privatized by ‘Rukon-info Ltd’ and ‘Molodozh Estonii’ was officially privatized by the liquor producing company ‘Onistar Ltd’ in September 2000. These companies as well as some of those who published their advertisements in these newspapers were openly or latently sponsoring so-called Russian political parties/movements, so that usually these media supported political parties of Russian-speakers, especially during the election periods (on the basis of the Study 2).

It is therefore no surprise that the share of ethnic counter-ideology in the Russian-language press in Estonia is quite significant. For example, the Russian politicians and journalists supporting them demanded legal equality (citizenship) for Russians and Estonians, the status of the second official state language for the Russian language, state support for Russian culture, proportional representation in governmental and
municipal bodies for the Russian parties, increase of co-operation with Russia in both economic and social spheres. The main method proposed to the Russian audience to achieve these aims was to support the Russian politicians. The latter were constructed as the only actors, able to solve the problems of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. In this framework, politically and socially minor news regarding small and considerably weak Russian Parties were constructed as main political news, while many events important for the development of the Estonian Republic development were mentioned in a brief and fragmented way. Russians consuming only the Russian-language media therefore were poorly informed about Estonian political and social life. In spite of a certain reasonableness of the demands mentioned above, the ways of presenting them and the proposed methods of achievement in the media obviously led to the intellectual ghettoization of local Russian-speakers.

Moreover, as these newspapers were actually serving not the interests of the audience, but mainly the interests of the local Russian-speaking political elite, this counter identity is marked not only on an ethnic, but also on a class basis – it is Russian middle and higher class’ counter-ideology. Unfortunately, over 50% i.e. the majority of Estonian Russian-speakers belong to the lower class in an economic sense and their interests are poorly considered in the media. This media strategy has short-termed reasonable explanations, such as economic dependence upon elites, which are their direct supporters and main consumers of advertised goods. Nevertheless in the long-term perspective this strategy caused the estrangement and distrust of the mass audience in Russian-language print media. As a result, the population started producing its own counter-ideology, which is only partly reflected in the media. It could not be opposed or disputed and thus could cause unpredicted effects.

Looking at the Russian-language press from the point of view of its functions, one could conclude that in the 1990s its informative function began to decline. The press was compensating need for information instead of satisfying it, as only 20% of non-Estonians in 1996 and 30% of non-Estonians in May 2000 considered themselves well-informed (Saar Poll 2000). Consequently, the performance of the sub-function of orienting the population to the environment and adapting it to changing conditions was limited. Its effectiveness for socialization, especially of young people, diminished. It remained unused as a tool of integration of society. Instead, it performed such sub-functions of regulative function as limiting the information and segregating the Russian population from Estonians and institutions of the Estonian state.

Also, analysis shows that until 2000 the media did not perform an activization function. Here I do not mean that the press ought to be organizer and mobilizer of the masses in Lenin’s sense. Certainly, journalism favours the emergence of social identities which are not hostile to the dominant social and political order, or at least
to capitalism in general and deconstructs social and political identities hostile to capitalism (Chalaby 1998, indirect citation). This task could be performed successfully if in some spheres media activates the audience (for example before elections) and somewhere inhibits citizens’ activity, i.e. if there is a balance between these functions. Otherwise its functioning in general is not effective enough: nor can it activate the audience where it is planned. On the contrary, the planned social processes are not inhibited and activity just spreads in the channels not controlled by the media. As a result, it could lead to a number of destructive effects, as is taking place in many post-Soviet countries, including Estonia.\(^4\)

The result of this functioning was the performance by the press of the role of damper. In connection with political struggle in general and local elections in particular, the press also played a role of ‘trader-mediator’, trying to ‘sell’ votes and trust of the voters to political elites. At the same time, in order to maintain political correctness, it was ‘selling’ Russians’ loyalties to the state and officials, giving place for numerous explanations of their aims, calling for patience. The performance of these roles was quite effective up to 1996, the press was an effective damper, especially in 1992-1993, when it helped to mitigate ethnic conflict, but in the second part of the 1990s the intensification of integration of the population was reported. Press was also losing its effectiveness as a propaganda tool for both the Estonian state and the Russian-speaking political elite.

One of the proofs of this ineffectiveness is the data about media consumption, mentioned in Chapter 2.3. Usually the decrease of circulation is explained by deterioration of the economic situation. Besides that, while in 1987–1990 the dialogue between media and audience; audience and state / municipal institutions via media was very intensive, since 1992 local print Russian press actually ceased to be a tool of communication between the Russian-speaking audience and state institutions (Jakobson 1996).

The press was therefore not helping the Estonian Russian-speakers to feel well informed; it was reflecting narrow political groups’ interests or demonstrating formal loyalty to the Estonian state; it could not be used as a vehicle for solving the daily and personal problems of the audience, as it used to in Soviet period; it did not propose achievable ways to solve the most acute problems of the Russian-speaking population. Saar Poll surveys made between May 1997 and November 2000 have shown that the trust of the population, especially Russian-speakers, into the objectivity of journalism in reflecting the power institutions activity had tendency to decrease: in November 2000 only 34% of Russians (46% of Estonians) believed that the journalism was objective or probably objective. As a result, a significant

\(^4\) Here I mean such destructive forms of social protest as criminality, drug addiction, suicides, homicides, vagrancy etc., whose permanent growth means massive refusal to accept existing social orders and rules. (see Estonian Statistical Books issued in 1992–2000)
part of the audience abandoned using the press at all or used it mainly as a means of entertainment and as a pastime. The effectiveness of the performance of the press’ roles decreased as they ceased to be a trustworthy source of information for the potential audience. Searching for alternative ways of getting the information, the latter were choosing not the other language media, but the rumours and information obtained on an interpersonal level. As a result, the Estonian state and society found itself in danger of losing the local Russian press as a tool for the regulation of the social processes in the Russian-speaking section of the Estonian society, which could not but affect the Estonian society and state in general.
1. As to the role of Russian-language press in constructing group identities of Estonian Russian-speakers (on the basis of Study 1):

1.1. In the Soviet era the Soviet supranational identity was actively constructed and dominated in the Russian-language press. It could be described as a combination of political and civic identities, relying on a certain ideology and value system, common experience, history, traditions, symbols and norms, semantic space and communicational tools. It defined the place and role of the Soviet nation among others. The state was described as strong and economically developed, making people to feel pride in belonging to its citizenry and making Soviet identity attractive to some degree (in spite of any drawbacks which could take place in the reality).

1.2. The Soviet identity was constructed together with the ethnic identities of indigenous nationalities (Estonian), local civic identities and various social identities (professional etc.). Thus, in the Soviet era the Russian-language press in Estonia constructed multiple identities.

1.3. In the Soviet era, the Soviet Estonian identity served as a constructed civic identity, seeking to unite the population on the basis of common territory and economic interests. In the 1990s the only systematically constructed group identity in the Russian-language press was a vague local Russian-speakers civic identity, where the common features shared with Estonians were territory, a number of political, economic and social institutions; and features uniting local Russian-speakers were Russian-language, lack of Estonian citizenship and economic deprivation. Nevertheless, the Estonian citizens of Russian origin were not excluded from this entity, as the main criteria here is Russian language.

1.4. Russian ethnocultural identity, constructed in the Russian-language press, was unsystematic, either emphasizing local Russians’ cultural commonality
with Russia, or some special ‘Estonian Russian’ cultural identity, going back to 1918–1938 and even the 19th century, making local Russians ‘special’ and to some extent culturally uniting them with Estonians. The political identity with the Russian Federation was not constructed at all.

1.5. Due to the lack of a clearly articulated state position towards Russian-speakers in the 1990s, heterogeneity of the Russian-speaking community and low degree of its political mobilization (Vihalemm, P. 1997, Vihalemm, T. 2000b), the Russian-language media did not form any distinct pro- or counter political identities with the Estonian state and Estonians.

2. In the 1990s the Russian press mostly propagated the model of integrated Estonian society and means of its achievement convenient for the local Russian-speaking counter-elite, based on the elements of national exclusiveness. The Russian-speaking population was described there as helpless, poorly informed, uneducated, i.e. unable themselves to change something in their own destiny and thus obliged to delegate this job together with their trust to Russian-speaking politicians. The Russian minority was mainly treated as a passive object of governing by both the Estonian state and the Russian elite, and people could hardly have confidence in their own potential for goal attainment through the press. Then the proposed ways of integration on the personal level were also mainly ineffective or unrealistic: for example, learning Estonian language at private courses, getting higher education at expensive private high schools, which often have no accreditation from the Ministry of Education and where the teaching of Estonian language is quite poor. At the same time the official version of integrated Estonian society, where the ER becomes an EU and NATO member, the whole population of Estonia speaks Estonian and knows Estonian culture, there is cooperation between Estonians and Russians in common state and municipal institutions, was also reflected (Study 2).

3. In the “imperial” times when the Russians were a state majority, the media had to serve first as an instrument of regulation and preservation of political and cultural unity between center and periphery. Its circulation was quite high, its position was stable. Being purely minority media, the functions of the local Russian press’ functions were limited, circulations were low and functioning was unstable. Its role in informing Russian-speakers and forming their group identities was decreasing in the 1990s (Article 1).

4. In various conflict situations the Russian-language press did not assume any distinct supportive or oppositional position towards Estonian state in general or on the majority of politically important issues in particular (except the citizenship
issue), but preferred to preserve formal loyalty to both: Estonian state institutions and Russian political parties (Studies 2, 3), to give them a voice and not to take any position of its own.

5. As a counter-reaction to all the above mentioned, there emerged a latent response of the Russian population (press audience). Some of its traits could be followed through readers’ calls and letters to newspapers. It could be seen, that the main features of the audience’s social ideal are civic equality, stable legal status (permanent residence permit or citizenship through one’s children), material stability, high level of information and constructive human relations. The legal ways of solving the problems, proposed by population, are independent actions and self-organisation. At the same time, practically all sources report that the population more often attempts illegal ways of reaching aims, probably, when the legal ones are too complicated. People rely only on themselves, seldom ask for help and rarely complain. Another counter-reaction is avoiding the influence of the media and preferring alternative sources of information (rumours, information obtained on an interpersonal level) (Article 1, Study 2)

Thus the studies have justified the hypotheses raised in the Introduction.

In the content of the Russian-language press of Estonia there occur both oppositional and integrating elements, and the result of its activity was really ‘neither total assimilation nor cultural preservation’ of the Russian-speaking minority. Nevertheless, due to the lack of contact with the nationally concerned state 1991–1996 and the difference of interests and ideologies of the national minority population and elite, it could not become an effective tool for the integration of the Russian-speakers into Estonian society, their informing, adaptation to a changing environment, forming their group identities, nor for their mobilization and effective struggle for their rights and position in the Estonian Republic.
6. REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1

Construction of National Identities in the Russian Press of Estonia Since 1947
Coding instruction

1. Material: general variables

0. Number

1. Timespots

2. Celebration days
1. New Year
2. Independence Day (February 24, since 1987), Anniversary of the Soviet Army (February 23, 1947–87)
3. May 1
4. Midsummer Day (June 24), Victory Day (June 23, since 1989)

3. Newspapers
2. Molodozh Estonii (since 1969)

4. Article type
1. news story
2. longer informational article, review
3. interview, discussion
4. reporting
5. commentary, column
6. editorial
7. analytical article
8. feature
9. educative stories, memoirs
10. other ….

5. Criteria for selection of articles
1. all editorials and commentaries on the theme
2. all articles mentioning in the title national vocabulary (Estonian, national, Estonia etc.)
3. articles that deal with national celebration day
4. articles that deal with own army or border
5. articles that mention Estonia as part of the SU or the relations between Estonia and the SU/Russia
6. articles that deal with major political problems and disputes in Estonian/Soviet.
   6.1. economy
   6.2. political and law system
   6.3. culture, science, education, nature
   6.4. language
   6.5. citizenship
7. articles that deal with the relations of Estonia with Europe and/or international organizations
8. articles that deal with asylum seekers, refugees or other foreigners (Russians) in Estonia and Estonians abroad
9. articles about national history
10. articles that deal with relations with the Baltic States or where Estonia is mentioned as the Baltic State
11. articles that deal with relations with the Nordic countries

Excluded are
- verbatim prints of speeches
- letters to the editor
- novels and other artistic writings
- local news, reports on local events without any essential statements
- short news stories (4 sentences and less)
- clippings of editorials or commentaries from other newspapers
- rubrics ‘crime news’, ‘sports’
- platforms of political parties, election campaigns

All articles that belong to the sample are read through. Two articles from each newspaper for every timespot are selected for quantitative analyses that *include most numerously issues/themes relevant for the study*
*are of major editorial importance*

The unit of coding is an article

2. Content

A. Variables and categories in statements

1. Mentioning of the statement
0 = not mentioned
B. Themes and variables

2. Patriotism
2.2. + Pride to be the citizen of the S.U. / Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia.
2.2. - Shame/ discomfort to be the citizen of the S.U. / Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia
2.3. + Positive: Achievements of the own political system are mentioned (social, economic, ecological, political)
2.3. - The crises of the own political system are mentioned (scandals, danger to the democracy etc.)
2.4. + Statement about (too) weak national identification, containing insufficient, vague patriotism
2.4. - The expression on national self-criticism, for instance unrealistic patriotism or euphemistical description of history
2.9. + Mentioning of the cultural achievements
2.9. - Mentioning of the backwardness of culture

3. Historical aspects
3.8. + International history: Mentioning of periods of fruitful cooperation with other states and/ or definition and description of unnecessary wars and conflicts with other states (complementarism)
3.9. + International history: Emphasis on conflicts and wars (as a means of securing own rights) and/ or definition and description of national enemies and/or demand for foreword and revenge (antagonism).

4. Militarism
4.1 + Military competence and power of the own army is emphasized.
4.1. - The army is too weak/ not strong enough.
4.2. + Presentation of an external danger.
4.2. - We don’t have to defend ourselves.
4.3. + Nuclear disarmament is a guarantee of peace and/ or that is necessary.
4.3. - As the others have nuclear missiles, we need them too.
4.4. + The international commitments of the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia, co-operation and mutual assistance, are important for the national security and/ or oblige the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia to have credible defense forces.
4.5.+ The only task of the military is to defend the own country.
4.6.+ Military expenditures are too high and/or that they could be reduced, military matters get too much publicity.
4.6.- Military expenditures are reasonable and necessary.
4.9.+ Political and/or cultural co-operation is more important than weapons to secure the nation’s existence/welfare.
4.10.+ We have to respect the veterans of our wars and their memory.
4.12.+ Mentioning (generally) of the Estonian defense forces.
4.12.- Mentioning Estonian defense forces in negative context.

5. Multiculturalism
5.1.+ Offences against citizens of other nations/ethnic groups are stupid or shameful.
5.2.+ Offences against foreigners damage image of the state.
5.3.+ Description of similarities/equality between members of the own nation and foreigners.
5.5.+ First of all state has to take care of its citizens and that it is necessary to protect nation from the flow of foreigners.
5.6.+ It is said that genetic heritage is the basis to decide.
5.6.- The basis of nationality is something else (for example, common language).
5.7.+ Humiliation of foreigners, also indirect.
5.9.+ Description of the necessity to integrate foreigners/Russian minority into Estonian society.
5.9.- All Russians must leave etc.
5.12.+ There is a friendship and cooperation between different nationalities.
5.12.- Mentioning of tensions between different nationalities.

6. Estonia’s relation to Europe/the EU: (Economic internationalism).
6.2.+ Description of the integration of Estonia into the different structures of Europe.
6.3.+ Positive evaluation of this integration (reasonable, necessary, useful etc.).
6.3.- Why would we need a new union?
6.4.+ Abandonment of certain aspects of national sovereignty (for instance currency, border control) is described as reasonable/desirable on the European context.
6.6.+ Construction of a political linkage between economic and military unification in Europe.
6.7.+ Notion that the European states (or at least some of them) should know each other better.
6.7.- “Yes” to stereotypes?
6.10.+ Claim that the “Euro-scepticism” of the Estonian people is caused by/ justified) fear and uncertainties.
6.13.+ Claim that integration of Estonia into the European structures is endangering its relations with the Soviet Union/Russia / its role as a neutral country.
6.13.- Estonia has to join Europe, it would increase the stability of the relations.
6.15.+ Estonia has to join the EU not to stay in the sphere of influence of Russia.
6.15.- Estonia should join Europe for other reasons.

7. Production of national identities
7.1.+ Members of the own nation are described by using positive attributes.
7.2.+ Members of the own nation are described by using negative attributes.
7.3.+ Construction of counter identities (implicit self-definition by describing out-group negatively or explicit statement that “we are not like” etc.).
7.3- Mentioning of similarities with out-group.
7.4.+ Text refers to uniting factors of the nation.
7.4.1.+ Text refers to common history, native origin, national traditions.
7.4.1.1.+ Demand for national brotherhood and solidarity. Emphasis on common factors (feelings) which keep the nation together. National unity.
7.4.1.1.- Mentioning of counter-opinions among the nation.
7.4.2.+ Language and culture are mentioned as markers of nationality.
7.4.4.+ Emphasis on the relations with the ground/land, territory, nature.
7.5.+ Text refers to nationally rewarded/appreciated behaviour.
7.5.- “Punishment” for nationally undesirable behavior.
7.6.+ It is said that somebody personifies/embodies the virtues, national values of the people of USSR/ Estonians/ people of ESSR/ Russians, and is model for the nation.
7.6.- Description of the enemies among nation.
7.7.+ Text refers to emotionally loaded and binding behaviour connected to national symbols (flag, national anthem).
7.8.+ Text produces counter-identification by referring to negatively evaluated previous periods of national history.
7.8.- Continuity of historical traditions is mentioned
7.9.+ Compatriots living abroad are mentioned
7.9.- They are mentioned in negative context
7.10+ Mentioning religion

8. Content of the national identity
8.1+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "humanity/ social behaviour/ social attitudes" (diligent, polite, friendly, sociable, peace loving etc.).
8.1.1.+ Self-presentation contains negatively evaluated qualities in the context of social behaviour and social attitudes.
8.1.1.-
8.2.+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "culture/ sports/ science" (wise, educated, intelligent, musical etc.).
8.3.+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "economy" (wel-off etc).
8.4.+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "military/ security" (strong, powerful).
8.5.+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of politics/ history (wise etc).
8.5.- Self-presentation contains negatively evaluated qualities in the context of politics/ history.
8.6.+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "society" (democratic, just, socialist),
8.8.+ The self-estimation of a nation is mentioned
8.9.+ Country/ nation is small.
8.9.- Country/ nation is big.

11. Basic national orientation and the state/citizen relation
11.1.+ The SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR./ Russia is a success story
11.1.- The SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR./ Russia has suffered lot in its history
11.2.+ The future of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR./ Russia contains mainly big opportunities and hopes (optimism).
11.2.- The future of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia contains mainly big dangers and risks (pessimism).
11.3+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to the functioning of democratic institutions (unity, equality etc).
11.4.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to foreign political questions.
11.5.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to economy.
11.6.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to culture, language.
11.7.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to its bureaucratic/ corporativistic/ non-elastic structure of administration and/ or labour markets
11.10.+ Citizenship obliges individuals to defend the country and/or work hard for the country and obey, be loyal to authorities.
11.11.+ The state authorities are obliged to ensure democratic and social rights for individual citizens.
11.11.-
11.13.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to its international relations.
11.14.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to Russian minority.

12. International orientation
12.1.+ Estonia/the Soviet Estonia has to create and/ or maintain good economic/political/cultural relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.
12.1.- Estonia/Soviet Estonia does not need to create/maintain good economic/political/cultural relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.
12.3.+ Estonia can be a bridge between the East and the West.
12.3.- Estonia cannot be a bridge between the East and the West.
12.6.+ the S.U/ Estonia/ the S.E has to adapt to the political/ economic/ cultural circumstances created by the big powers/ development in international economy.
12.6.- the S.U/ Estonia/ the S.E does not have to adapt, it is able to have an active/ creative/ independent role in international politics/ economy/ culture.

13. Estonia’s relations with the Soviet Union / Russia
13.2.+ Sovereignty/ independence of the Estonian state is a political goal.
13.2.- The union with the Soviet Union was the goal, independence is not necessary.
13.3.+ the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia is described as a sovereign independent nation.
13.3.- Soviet Union/ Estonia/ Soviet Estonia is not a sovereign independent nation.
13.4.+ Evaluation of Soviet/ Estonian/ Soviet Estonian political system as free, peace willing, human etc.
13.4.- Evaluation of Soviet/ Estonian/ Soviet Estonian political system as military, inhuman etc.
13.6.+ Capitalism/ free market economy is described as a basis for welfare and economic security
13.6.- Socialism and planned economy are described as a basis for welfare and economic security.
13.9.+ Estonia should be flexible in its relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.
13.9.- Estonia should be inflexible, rigid in its relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.
APPENDIX 2

RESULTS OF PROCESSING DATA BY LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS (LCA) PROGRAMM (LACORD33)

Theme: patriotism.

2.2.+ Pride to be the citizen of the S.U. / Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia.
2.2- Shame/ discomfort to be the citizen of the S.U. / Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia.
2.3.+ Positive: Achievements of the own political system are mentioned (social, economic, ecological, political)
2.3.- The crises of the own political system are mentioned (scandals, danger to the democracy etc.)

description of history

2.9. + Mentioning of the cultural achievements
2.9.- Mentioning of the backwardness of culture

File contains raw data.
Persons : 204 Variables : 6
Categories : 5 From N. of classes : 1 to : 6
Iterations max,: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010 START-VALUES : 8
DATA FORMAT : (3x,i1,1x,i1,1x,i1,1x,i1,5x,i1,1x,i1)

PATTERNS:
* 3 0 3 2 0 0
* 1 0 1 0 1 1
* 3 0 1 0 0 0
* 1 0 1 0 0 0

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS : 64
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS : 15625

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -966.968/ 1981.936
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -872.201/ 1842.402
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -837.683/ 1823.367
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -815.336/ 1828.672
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -793.593/ 1835.185
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood =-796.905/ 1891.809

Number of classes = 3
SEARCH FOR THE BEST START VALUES: NRRAND = 896 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED : 76

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>2.3+</th>
<th>2.3-</th>
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<th>2.9-</th>
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</table>
Theme: militarism

4.1 + Military competence and power of the own army is emphasized.
4.2.- We don’t have to defend ourselves.
4.4.+ The international commitments of the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia, co-operation and mutual assistance, are important for the national security and/ or oblige the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia to have credible defense forces.
4.5.+ The only task of the military is to defend the own country.
4.6.+ Military expenditures are too high and/ or that they could be reduced, military matters get too much publicity.
4.12 - Mentioning Estonian defense forces in negative context.

File contains raw data.
Persons    :  204  Variables  :  6
Categories :  3  From N. of classes :  1  to :  6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010    START-VALUES :  8
DATA FORMAT : (3x,6i1)

PATTERNS:
* 0 0 0 0 0 0
* 0 0 0 0 0
* 0 0 0 0 0
* 1 0 0 0 0
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS : 16
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS : 729
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -251.041 / 526.083
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -211.930 / 473.861
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -198.776 / 473.553
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -194.803 / 493.606
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -194.415 / 516.829
Number of classes = 1
LOG-likelihood = 1/ -194.799 / 543.597

Number of classes = 3
NRRAND = 893 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED : 27

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

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<th>4.5+</th>
<th>4.6+</th>
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<td><em>2</em></td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.200</td>
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</table>

LOG-likelihood : -198.776
Goodness of fit statistics:
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC
********************************************
9 * -198.776 * 38 * 10.204 * 690 * 473.553
Saturated model : * -193.674
Theme: multiculturalism

5.1. Offences against citizens of other nations/ethnic groups are stupid or shameful.
5.2. Offences against foreigners damage image of the state.
5.3. Description of similarities/equality between members of the own nation and foreigners.
5.5. First of all state has to take care of its citizens and that it is necessary to protect nation from the flow of foreigners.
5.7. Humiliation of foreigners, also indirect.
5.9. Description of the necessity to integrate foreigners/Russian minority into Estonian society.
5.12. There is a friendship and cooperation between different nationalities.
5.12. Mentioning of tensions between different nationalities.

File contains raw data.
Persons: 204
Variables: 12
Categories: 5

From N. of classes: 1 to: 6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation: 0.0010 START-VALUES: 8
DATA FORMAT: (3x,8i1)

PATTERNS:
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* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
* 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
* 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS: 55
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS: 390625

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -697.802/1459.604
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -646.331/1422.663
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -622.501/1441.002
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -608.150/1478.299
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -600.758/1529.517
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -586.157/1566.314

Number of classes = 2
NRRAND = 894 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED: 36

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

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<th>5.5+</th>
<th>0.905</th>
<th>5.7+</th>
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Theme: production of national identities 1.

As nearly all variables of this dimension (tools of production of national identity) were statistically representative, we could not limit ourselves with 12 variables. So we divided them into 2 parts, which were conditionally called “cultural-historical tools” (1) and “normative-behavioral tools” (2).

7.1.+ Members of the own nation are described by using positive attributes.
7.2.+ Members of the own nation are described by using negative attributes.
7.3.+ Construction of counter identities (implicit self-definition by describing out-group negatively or explicit statement that “we are not like” etc.).
7.3- Mentioning of similarities with out-group.
7.4.+ Text refers to uniting factors of the nation.
7.4.1.+ Text refers to common history, native origin, national traditions.
7.4.1.1.+ Demand for national brotherhood and solidarity. Emphasis on common factors (feelings) which keep the nation together. National unity.
7.4.1.1.- Mentioning of counter-opinions among the nation.
7.4.2.+ Language and culture are mentioned as markers of nationality.
7.4.4.+ Emphasis on the relations with the ground/land, territory, nature.

File contains raw data.
Persons  :  204
Variables :  5
Categories :  5
From N. of classes :  1 to :  6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010  START-VALUES : 8
DATA FORMAT : (3x,10i1)

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Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -1053.503/ 2187.006  
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -969.633/ 2101.265  
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -915.930/ 2075.860  
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -888.851/ 2103.703  
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -869.474/ 2146.947  
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -857.169/ 2204.337  
Number of classes = 4  
NRRAND = 892 WAS CHOSEN  
Model 9  
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED : 20  

**CATEGORY PROBABILITIES**

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LOG-likelihood : -888.851  
Goodness of fit statistics:  
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC  
*************************************************************************  
9 * -888.851 * 163 * 404.768 * 9765461 * 2103.703  
Saturated model : * -686.467  

**Theme: production of national identities 2.**

7.5.+ Text refers to nationally rewarded/ appreciated behaviour.  
7.5.- “Punishment” for nationally undesirable behavior.  
7.6.+ It is said that somebody personifies/embodies the virtues, national values of the people of USSR/ Estonians/ people of ESSR/ Russians, and is model for the nation.  
7.6.- Description of the enemies among nation.  
7.7.+ Text refers to emotionally loaded and binding behaviour connected to national symbols (flag, national anthem).  
7.7.- Text produces counter-identification by referring to negatively evaluated previous periods of national history.  
7.8.- Continuity of historical traditions is mentioned  
7.9.+ Compatriots living abroad are mentioned  
7.9.- They are mentioned in negative context
7.10+ Mentioning religion

File contains raw data.
Persons : 204
Variables : 10
Categories : 5
From N. of classes : 1 to : 6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010 START-VALUES : 8
DATA FORMAT : (13x,10i1)

PATTERNS:
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*  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
*  0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS : 65
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS : 9765625

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -919.914/ 1919.828
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -847.297/ 1856.594
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -796.001/ 1836.002
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -772.910/ 1871.820
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -750.330/ 1908.659
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -733.709/ 1957.418

Number of classes = 4
NRRAND = 901 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED : 35

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

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LOG-likelihood : -772.910
Goodness of fit statistics:
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC
*************************************************************************
9  * -772.910  * 163  * 298.826  * 9765461 * 1871.820
Saturated model :  *  -623.497
8.1+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "humanity/ social behaviour/ social attitudes" (diligent, polite, friendly, sociable, peace loving etc.).
8.2+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "culture/ sports/ science" (wise, educated, intelligent, musical etc.).
8.3+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "economy" (wel-off etc).
8.4+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "military/ security" (strong, powerful).
8.5+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of politics/ history (wise etc).
8.5- Self-presentation contains negatively evaluated qualities in the context of politics/ history.
8.6+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "society" (democratic, just, socialist),
8.8+ The self-estimation of a nation is mentioned
8.9+ Country/ nation is small.
8.9- Country/ nation is big.

File contains raw data.
Persons : 204
Variables : 10
Categories : 5
From N. of classes : 1 to : 6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010 START-VALUES : 8
DATA FORMAT : (13x,10i1)
PATTERNS:
*  0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS :  60
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS    :    9765625

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -704.041/ 1488.082
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -650.498/ 1462.995
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -635.751/ 1515.503
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -625.502/ 1577.003
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -614.401/ 1636.801
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -609.691/ 1709.383

Number of classes = 3
NRRAND =  901 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED :    36

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>8.2+</th>
<th>8.3+</th>
<th>8.4+</th>
<th>8.5+</th>
<th>8.6+</th>
<th>8.8+</th>
<th>8.9+</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

8.1+ Self-presentation contains positively evaluated qualities in the context of "humanity/ social behaviour/ social attitudes" (diligent, polite, friendly, sociable, peace loving etc.).
LOG-likelihood : -635.751
Goodness of fit statistics:
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC
*************************************************************************
9 * -635.751 * 122 * 177.206 * 9765502 * 1515.503
Saturated model : * -547.148

Theme: basic national orientations and state/citizen relations

11.1.+ The SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia is a success story
11.1.- The SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia has suffered lot in its history
11.2.+ The future of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia contains mainly big opportunities and hopes (optimism).
11.2.- The future of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia contains mainly big dangers and risks (pessimism).
11.3+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to the functioning of democratic institutions (unity, equality etc).
11.4.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to foreign political questions.
11.5.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to economy.
11.6.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to culture, language.
11.7.+ The problems and challenges of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to its bureaucratic/ corporativistic/ non-elastic structure of administration and/or labour markets.
11.10.+ Citizenship obliges individuals to defend the country and/or work hard for the country and obey, be loyal to authorities.
11.11.+ The state authorities are obliged to ensure democratic and social rights for individual citizens.
11.13.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to its international relations.
11.14.+ The problems of the SU/ Estonia/ the ESSR/ Russia in the future are connected to Russian minority.

File contains raw data.
Persons : 204
Variables : 12
Categories : 5
From N. of classes : 1 to : 6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation : 0.0010
START-VALUES : 8
DATA FORMAT : (3x,12i1)
PATTERNS:
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*  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
*  1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
*  1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS : 71
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS : 16777216

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -1160.507/ 2329.014
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -1061.502/ 2269.004
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -1013.540/ 2247.080
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -995.131/ 2284.263
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -979.250/ 2326.500
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelihood = -957.471/ 2356.941

Number of classes = 3
SEARCH FOR THE BEST START VALUES: NRRAND = 896 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9

NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED : 100

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

11.1+  11.1-  11.2+  11.2-  11.3+  11.4+  11.5+  11.6+  11.7+  11.11+  11.13+
1. CLASS 0.408 *0* 0.780 0.789 0.856 0.952 0.928 0.832 0.859 0.940 0.916 0.948
*1* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*2* 0.220 0.211 0.297 0.144 0.048 0.072 0.168 0.019 0.060 0.072 0.084
*4* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000

2. CLASS 0.082 *0* 0.862 1.000 0.794 0.284 0.715 0.881 0.821 0.804 1.000 0.523
*1* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*2* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.060 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000
*4* 0.138 0.000 0.206 0.716 0.226 0.060 0.179 0.131 0.000 0.477 0.119

3. CLASS 0.510 *0* 0.718 0.794 0.636 0.933 0.931 0.914 0.904 0.933 0.942 0.971
*1* 0.259 0.163 0.336 0.067 0.067 0.086 0.096 0.067 0.058 0.029 0.029
*2* 0.016 0.043 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015
*4* 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

The computing selected 3 styles.
LOG-likelihood: -1013.540
Goodness of fit statistics:
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC
*************************************************************************
9 * -1013.540 * 110 * 491.057 * 16777105 * 2247.080
Saturated model: * -656.590

Theme: Estonia’s relations with Soviet Union / Russia

13.2.+ Sovereignty/ independence of the Estonian state is a political goal.
13.2.- The union with the Soviet Union was the goal, independence is not necessary.
13.3.+ the Soviet Union/ Estonia/ the Soviet Estonia is described as a sovereign independent nation.
13.3.- Soviet Union/ Estonia/ Soviet Estonia is not a sovereign independent nation.
13.4.+ Evaluation of Soviet/ Estonian/ Soviet Estonian political system as free, peace willing, human etc.
13.4.- Evaluation of Soviet/ Estonian/ Soviet Estonian political system as military, inhuman etc.
13.6.- Socialism and planned economy are described as a basis for welfare and economic security.
13.9.+ Estonia should be flexible in its relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.
13.9.- Estonia should be inflexible, rigid in its relations with the Soviet Union/ Russia.

File contains raw data.
Persons: 204 Variables: 9
Categories: 5 From N. of classes: 1 to: 6
Iterations max.: 9999
LogLik-deviation: 0.0010 START-VALUES: 8
DATA FORMAT: (3x,9i1)

PATTERNS:
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* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
* 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATTERNS: 69
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PATTERNS: 1953125

Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -939.784/1951.569
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -876.426/1880.851
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -827.522/1875.044
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -814.329/1922.658
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -785.000/1937.999
Number of classes = 1/LOG-likelyhood = -776.322/1994.643

Number of classes = 3
SEARCH FOR THE BEST START VALUES: NRRAND = 896 WAS CHOSEN
Model 9
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED: 100

CATEGORY PROBABILITIES

1. CLASS 0.080
13.2- 0.800 0.336 0.663 0.803 0.161 0.699 0.815 0.389 0.877
13.2+ 0.062 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.063 0.000 0.120 0.000
13.3- 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.061 0.000 0.000
13.3+ 0.138 0.490 0.337 0.197 0.504 0.000 0.124 0.491 0.123
13.4- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13.4+ 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.008 0.004
13.6- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13.6+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13.9- 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13.9+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

2. CLASS 0.597
0* 0.977 0.974 0.876 0.985 0.833 0.862 0.959 0.881 0.999
1* 0.008 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.144 0.055 0.025 0.091 0.000
2* 0.000 0.018 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.001
3* 0.014 0.000 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.000 0.008 0.025 0.000
4* 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.008 0.004 0.000

3. CLASS 0.323
0* 0.712 1.000 0.190 0.955 0.788 0.677 0.939 0.977 0.850
1* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

LOG-likelihood : -827.522
Goodness of fit statistics:
Model * LOG-Like. * Npar. * LIK.ratio * DF. * AIC
*************************************************************************
9 * -827.522 * 110 * 341.864 * 1953014 * 1875.044
Saturated model : * -656.590

Est - USSR/Russia relations, style 1

Est - USSR/Russia relations, style 2

Est - USSR/Russia relations, style 3
The main purpose of this chapter is to reveal the roles and functions of the Russian-language press in Estonian society, concentrating on the period 1991-1999. However, in order to get an idea about the historical roots of the present situation, the chapter also includes a brief review of the Russian-language press in Estonia since the second half of the 19th century. This review is based on various studies conducted from 1996 to 2001 (Jakobson 1996, Jakobson & Iljina 2000).

The basis of this analysis is the functionalist approach to the concept of the “role of media,” which observes it as dependent upon the type of society (De Fleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989) and as a result of performing its functions (Wright 1974). The social role of the press is understood as a result of its interaction with the environment in which it functions, which includes the interests of the owners/sources of finance, system of control (overt or latent censorship/control/regulations etc.), their own workers and the mass audience.

A fundamental issue is what the minority media role in society should be. Authors who have studied the role of minority media underline its importance in preserving minorities’ ethnic and cultural identities, maintaining connections with the historical motherland and at the same time in facilitating their integration into the host society and providing them with information about its institutions (Levkovic 1986: 66–67, Togora 1986: 52–54, McQuail 1984: 204). This chapter also reviews how the press depicts social reality in general, and the minority/majority role in the state and society in particular. This is accomplished by assessing what qualities the press attributes to it, what interrelations it constructs, and how it influences the socialization of the minority in the host state and society. Finally, the media is often viewed as a public forum. This chapter assesses how effectively it performs this role in Estonia.
1. The Russian-language Press in Estonia – Historical review

1.1. 1853–1917

Although the territories composing the present-day Estonia and Latvia were incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1721, until the second half of the 19th century this region was actually governed by German landlords. The local potential audience of Russian print editions was very small until the end of the 19th century and its cultural needs were fulfilled by St. Petersburg magazines (Isakov 1999: 26). As a result, regular Russian-language newspapers only appeared in Estonia nearly 150 years after they emerged in Russia (for example, early failures of local Russian-language magazines in Estonia were the “Raduga” magazine, issued in Tartu in 1832–1833 with a circulation of 207–260 copies and the “Uchebny matematicheski” journal, issued in Reval (Tallinn) in 1833–34 with a circulation of 467 copies).

By the middle of the 19th century, the Tsarist government became interested in increasing the effectiveness of its administrative work and the influence of the central government in the peripheral districts of the Empire. It thus began a project in which local Russian-language newsletters (“Vedomosti”) were launched in many regions. Two were launched in Estonia in 1853: “Estlandskie Gubernskije Vedomosti” and “Liflandskie Gubernskije Vedomosti,” both publishing information in both Russian and German. The structure of these editions was prescribed by law. They carried out mostly utilitarian functions: informed local administrators, gentry, traders and entrepreneurs about new laws and regulations, published official advertisements, propagated desirable norms of behaviour. They were not interested in feedback and did not encourage dialogue between social groups and institutions. Society was constructed in the texts of the newspapers as deeply divided on a class basis, consisting on the one side of officials, landlords and burghers with German and Russian names and peasants who either had Russian names or no names at all on the other side. Estonians were semiotically non-existent in the texts, no cultural groups were mentioned there.

As a result of the economic and political reforms of the 1860s, industrial development in the Russian Empire received a new impetus. Factories appeared in Estonia, targeting the Russian market and owned by Russian entrepreneurs. Agricultural production also became more Russian-oriented. Gradually the number of educated Russian administrators and entrepreneurs in Estonia increased and started to form a thin layer of local Russian bourgeoisie. Its informational needs became more diverse. Thus, in the 1870s, the first private newspapers appeared in Narva and Reval, providing a wide range of information including economic aspects (trade,
prices on the markets etc.) and local news. Both private and state-owned media started to inform audiences about the local cultural life, Estonian history, literature and culture, and to publish local private advertisements. These years also saw the first appearance of translations of Estonian poetry into Russian.

In the 1890s, a political-commercial Russian press appeared in Estonia, which became regular and widespread. In general, its main task was to preserve administrative, cultural and economic links with the mainland, but the range of its functions widened. During this period there appeared the first translations of some articles from Estonian-language newspapers. Essays on the local cultural, historical and political context were occasionally published, such as translations of Estonian literature and poetry (e.g. the first translation of the Estonian epic poem ‘Kalevipoeg’ into Russian). Nevertheless, Estonians as a cultural group were seldom represented in this media. Russians, meanwhile, were construed not only as loyal citizens, but also as a cultural group with a rich history, traditions, specific national culture etc.

As in previous years, Estonians and their interrelations with Russians were nearly non-existent in the Russian press. In Revelsky vestnik of 1915, a discussion was held about the language of municipal government (Tallinn Town Duma). Some contributors insisted that Russian, being the state language in the Russian Empire, could be the only language used in the debates at the Tallinn City Council. Others opposed this, saying that for decades both Russian and Estonian had been used. The newspaper did not take a particular side, but it is important to note that the latent tensions became overt and that the language of conflict is rooted here. Also, a very visible image of an enemy appears – it is Germany, the German army and the local Germans, who sometimes have to pay penalties for “demonstratively speaking German in public.”

The local Russian press in the Empire period mostly socialized local Russians within an all-Russian cultural, political and economic context and only to some degree in the Estonian social and cultural context, providing very superficial knowledge of Estonia and Estonians. The role of the press as a public forum was bounded on one side by Tsarist censorship, and on the other side by a limited set of sources of information and the composition of the audience (Russian nobility, merchants and intellectuals).

1.2. 1918–1940

Before 1940 non-Estonians accounted for 12% of the population of Estonia. Two thirds of these (91 thousand) were Russians of two definite groups: 73 thousand peasants who had lived in Estonia since 1915, and 18 thousand political emigrants. The majority of them belonged to the poorest part of the Estonian population. Russians were disassociated, mainly passive and estranged from politics. They were
poorly represented in the administrative and power structures (Isakov 1996, p.7–9, 52-55). Estonian foreign trade re-oriented to Western Europe, such that Russians did not play an important role in economic life. The majority of them belonged to the poorest part of the Estonian population and were interested in personal survival and preserving their cultural identity.

In these conditions, the Russian-language press helped to preserve Russians’ cultural identity with Tsarist Russia. Its predominant function was the transmission of culture, its informational and entertaining functions were reduced. It also performed limited educational and entertainment roles for the audience, and some administrative and political information was also published. As the potential audience of these newspapers belonged to the poorest social strata, their circulations were quite low; the largest of them reached a maximum of 5000 copies (Tsassovskaja 2001). The majority of these newspapers survived less than a year (Isakov 1996).

In the Russian-language press in Estonia, Russians were mostly construed as 1) peasants, worrying mainly about agricultural issues; 2) urban intelligentsia, poor but carefully preserving Russian culture in Estonia; 3) criminals; and 4) deprived people, including refugees from the USSR. Estonians were construed as a state nation, while Russians mostly as a cultural and language minority.

As this press did not provide two-way communication between the Russian minority and the state institutions, and even between the different sectors of the Russian diaspora, it can be concluded that the press did not become an effective public forum on an all-Estonian scale and in the socialization of the Russian minority.

1.3. 1940–1987

After the Second World War, when Estonia was annexed by the USSR, major changes took place in Estonia’s economy, politics, structure of population, etc. Very quickly the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR), especially its north-eastern region and Tallinn, became an industrial outpost of the USSR. Several ports were built and railway communications were developed, which had a significant economic impact on the USSR in general.

After the war, cities in the North-East of Estonia were rebuilt and repopulated mostly by the newcomers from the Slavic Republics of the USSR, who considered migration to Estonia as moving within the borders of the unitary state. By 1989 the share of non-Estonians in the Estonian population reached 38% (over 602 thousand people). Many Russian-speakers worked at so-called “Union factories,” which served the economic needs of the USSR in general and where the working collectives consisted mostly of Russian-speakers. Their Estonian language proficiency was low: according to different estimates, in 1990 only thirteen percent of non-Estonians could communicate in Estonian, and forty-four percent of non-Estonians
reported in 1991 that they did not speak Estonian at all (Arutunjan 1995). Since their contact with Estonians was limited, the Russian-speakers developed their ideas about Estonians, their culture, and their attitudes towards Russians mostly from the Russian-language newspapers.

In 1940 all previously existing Russian-language newspapers in Estonia were closed down. Instead three official Russian-language newspapers were set up, which existed until the German occupation. In autumn 1944 Soviet Russian-language newspapers were re-established, although their circulation was lower than that of the Estonian papers. They were issued only in the towns where large enclaves of Russian-speaking population developed: in Narva, Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe, Jõhvi and only since 1987 in Tartu.

These newspapers were financed and controlled by the local Communist Party Committees, which combined the roles of media owner and organ of its control. The newspapers’ circulations were stable and quite high: in 1977 the circulation of ‘Soviet Estonia’ was 45 thousand copies and of ‘Molodozh Estonii’ 46 thousand copies (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalemm 1993, 343). During this period, the state combined the roles of a media owner and a controlling authority. It constructed a clear picture of the world and defined the USSR as the strongest and most developed country in it. Soviet citizens were the bearers of the most progressive ideology, whose main component was labour. The press constructed a certain political identity of the Soviet people, which co-existed with the ethnic identities of titular nations, local identities (such as Soviet Estonian, where the main element uniting the population of Soviet Estonia was common labour) and various social identities (professional etc.).

The Estonian ethnic identity was recognized and supported in the Russian-language press. The press wrote about events in Estonian culture, usually portrayed Russians and Estonians as working together and communicating in Russian. Nevertheless, the history of Estonia was taught in the media in a sanitized way, with the result that Estonians (relying not only on the official version, but also on collective memories) and non-Estonians knew different versions of Estonian history. Russian-speakers thus had the illusion of “being informed” about Estonian culture and history, experiencing “international friendship” with Estonians and lacking the necessity to learn the Estonian language. Russian-speakers were construed as the national majority and Estonians as one of the Soviet Peoples. In the 1940s and 1950s, it was also emphasized that Russians are “older brothers” and the other nations are “younger” ones. Local Russian cultural life was not mentioned and supported until the 1980s: the word “Russian” was virtually non-existent in the Russian-language press until 1987. These editions were directed at the Soviet people, who spoke the Russian language and lived in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The state was also interested in following the moods of the population and preserving a minimal veil of socialist democracy. Feedback from the population
was therefore welcomed within a limited range of topics. The editorial correspondence departments registered all incoming mail. If there were complaints regarding the economic or daily life, the facts were sometimes verified. If journalists found that these complaints were well-grounded and somebody’s rights were violated, they could apply to the appropriate institutions with a demand for a solution to the problem. Soviet legislation required any institution to which the press inquired to respond within a month. Thus, the population had an instrument of influence over the state bureaucracy, used for solving daily life problems and to some degree for the protection of their rights.

In this period the media informative function diminished, information was carefully selected and also combined with misinformation. Different variations of the regulative function dominated as in the Empire period in the 19th century. In spite of censorship the press to some extent performed a communicative function, involving governing institutions and population and to a certain degree functioning as a means of their reciprocal influence. It also helped people and groups from different regions of the USSR to establish and maintain contact. It played an important role in socialization within the Soviet political and cultural context, spreading common norms, values, symbols and identities. For Russians it produced an illusion of being included in the local cultural context, symbolically uniting them with Estonians on the basis of their common labour and mutual economic interest. On the other hand, it also performed a segregating sub-function, isolating local Russian-speaking ‘Soviet people’ from both Estonians and their own ethnic Russian roots. Also, in some spheres the media were used by the populace as the tool in the struggle with the bureaucracy and as a public forum for discussing a limited range of daily economic problems.

1.4. 1988–1990

In the period 1988–1990 the media could still influence practical matters, but also enjoyed virtually unlimited freedom. Due to an increase of the variety of information, audience satisfaction increased and newspapers’ circulation rapidly increased. The high circulation of the press together with the Soviet system of state financial support provided the media with financial stability. At the same time, one could observe a gradual growth of disappointment with the functioning of the press as it ceased to be an instrument of solving daily and personal problems and did not offer satisfactory explanations for the new political and economic situation. By 1990 the authority of newspapers started to decrease. Journalists, whose status became even higher, started using the press for their personal interests as a starting point for political and business careers (Tolz 1992). The press was celebrated as a deconstructor of an old regime, but the break-up of old social networks caused a decline in its role as an organizer.
After years of stagnation, radical changes started to occur in 1988 in the Soviet economy and political structure. The state was interested in promoting economic development as well as in preserving the existing political system and the integrity of the state. At the same time, the Republics’ Party Committees, who owned the local media channels, were interested in increasing the economic and political independence of the Republics. Also, when the Estonian People’s Front declared its goal of regaining national independence for the Estonian Republic, many local Russian-speakers (especially workers in the Union factories) felt threatened.

The media during this period had virtually unlimited freedom to inform the audience about nearly all aspects of social and political life, because the political control over their content was abandoned. This led to a greater variety of content. Information finally appeared about the Estonian Republic and USSR history, and about the Russian-speaking community in Estonia. Discussion started about the Russian-speaking community’s place and role in Estonian society, whether Russians had obligations towards native Estonians and rights as inhabitants and citizens of Estonia (for example, were they obligated to study the Estonian language and culture, did they have the moral right to make decisions regarding the future of Estonia, etc.). Discussion also started about the future of the Russian language, culture and education in Estonia. It should be pointed out that the press at this time tried to fulfil two contradictory roles: it was concerned about increasing the separation between non-Estonians and Estonians, while at the same time trying to preserve their ideological and political proximity with the USSR in general. In order to do this, the press had to soften the existing contradictions and differences of opinion between supporters of state independence and USSR unity. The information in Estonian and Russian-language newspapers at this time was thus very different. In the Estonian newspapers of this period, there was negative feeling towards Russian-speakers, offensive labels, demands to leave Estonia, etc. In the Russian-language newspapers, there could be found only limited reflections of these moods together with calls for international friendship, co-operation and peace. The traditional Soviet period roles of Russians and Estonians were deconstructed. In the opinion of many Estonians, which was reflected in the Russian-language media, Estonians as an ethnic group were the victims and Russians were the bearers of collective guilt for their deportations, inhibition of the development of Estonian culture, Estonian-language extinction, etc. On the contrary, the Russian-language sources blamed Stalin’s policy for the deportations of Estonians in the 1940s and “nationally-minded politicians” for the present tensions, but not those Russians who were living in Estonia. In short, the Russian and Estonian views of each other’s group, national relations and social reality in general were diametrically opposed during this period.

On the one hand, the situation of unclarity and disinformation increased stress and tension between Russian-speakers. On the other hand, the Russian-language media tried to some degree to decrease the social tension and prevent overt conflict,
which took place in many other regions of the collapsing Soviet Empire. This latter view was repeated in many articles of the period: “Would you like Estonia to be like Pridnestrovje or Karabach?” Russian journalists, public actors, businessmen and others stated that they strove to preserve stability and prevent conflict. It is likely that the efforts of these participants as well as the position of the press combined to play an inhibiting function in this period and avert conflict development.

The importance of the informative function of press increased during this period, but the information itself had an unsystematic character, often the quality of information was quite low. Information also assumed an entertaining character, the function of the transmission of culture at this period was reduced to entertainment.

The press for the first time in its history played the role of public forum, as the range of sources represented and topics discussed was fairly wide. Due to an increase in the variety of information, the satisfaction of the audience rose and the newspapers’ circulation reached eighty to ninety thousand copies. At the same time, there was the gradual growth in disappointment in the press, as it ceased to be an instrument of solving daily and personal problems and did not provide satisfactory explanations for the new political and economic situation. Thus by 1990, the authority of newspapers started decreasing.

2. The Role of the Russian-language Press in Estonia in the 1990s

2.1. Social Background

The break-up of the USSR and the restoration of state independence for the Estonian Republic caused a change in the position of the ethnic minority and majority. In 1991, Estonians from the ethnic minority turned into a state-nation. Conversely, Russians turned into a national minority, their political and civic status rapidly changed. A number of laws (e.g., the Language Law, the Citizenship Law, the Local Elections Law, the State Service Law) subsequently legitimised the situation in which access to citizenship, many jobs and positions, and to political activity depended upon a person’s Estonian language proficiency. According to the Estonian Citizenship Law, adopted in February 1992, only ten percent of non-Estonians received Estonian citizenship automatically, the others had to undergo a procedure of naturalization if they applied for citizenship. The legal status of non-citizens was indefinite until July 1993, when the Law on Foreigners was adopted. According to this law, non-citizens were declared to be foreigners who had to apply for temporary residence and working permissions, even if they were born in Estonia. Non-citizens possessing residence permits preserved their social guarantees but they were deprived of the
right to be members of political parties, to vote in Parliamentary elections, to take positions in state and municipal administrations, to serve in the Estonian army, etc. In 1992, non-Estonians were not represented or were weakly represented in the Parliament and other power and administrative structures of the Estonian Republic, although since 1996 their number in local administrations has grown.

The decline of the old system of economic and political relations in the post-Soviet era resulted in a rapid decrease of industrial output and agricultural production in Estonia, especially from 1992 to 1994. A new network of social status emerged, in which new social groups were formed on the basis of legal status, nationality, income and other criteria.

The crisis in industry (which employed many local Russian-speakers), poor knowledge of the Estonian language and a limited labour market has left Russian-speakers in Estonia with a generally low level of income, higher unemployment, a decrease in social status, and a high degree of dissatisfaction (Pavelson 2000).

From 1991 to 1993 segregation and confrontation were the predominant tendencies in inter-ethnic relations and especially in relations between the Estonian state and the Russian population. Since the second half of the 1990s, many studies have noted the beginning and strengthening of the process of integration at the societal level and the growth of mutual tolerance between Estonians and non-Estonians (see Kruusvall 1997, etc.). In 1998 the state launched the politics of national integration, as political stability and the absence of national conflict are mandatory requirements for joining EU.

2.2. Control Over the Media or Loyalty Demands

Since 1991, the Communist Party Committee has officially lost the function of control of media content. A logical expectation would be the rapid democratisation of the Russian media. Surprisingly, the next development was a new demand of “loyalty,” imposed in the Russian-language press 1992–1996 by Estonian politicians and journalists. Russian-speaking newspapers and journalists were accused of “disloyalty.” Any criticism of certain politicians or laws was interpreted by the Estonian authorities and media as disloyalty on the part of Russians. These accusations should be seen in a more general context of Estonians’ typical distrust of the political loyalty of non-Estonians and suspicions that they promote the interests of Russia here (see Kolsø 1996, 625; Kruusvall 1997, 133–140; Kirh, A., Kirh, M, Tuisk 1997, 54–55; Haab 1998, 110, 113; Raid 1996, 130–131). Moreover, the boundaries and forms of expected loyalty were not demarcated. As a result, the Russian press strove to avoid any criticism of Estonian state institutions on many topics related to the whole population of Estonia, such as economic issues, corruption, conflicts between Estonian political parties, legislation in the social sphere.
etc., except for questions regarding the political and cultural rights of Russians and non-citizens.

### 2.3. Owner’s Interests

After the Estonian Communist Party Committee ceased in 1991, the former party newspapers were privatised. The largest Russian dailies, *Estonia* and *Molodozh Estonii*, were privatised by their own journalists. Gradually their editors became the main shareholders. After 1992 the financial situation of these newspapers grew perilous, as the production expenses rapidly increased while the circulation of all newspapers was gradually falling. The newspapers in this period realized that they could not be financially independent and had to seek additional sources of financing such as advertising and outside investment. In 1996 the newspaper *Estonia* was privatised by Rukon-Info Ltd. and *Molodozh Estonii* was officially privatised in September 2000 by the liquor-producing company Onistar. These two companies, as well as some companies that published advertisements in these newspapers, were also openly or latently sponsoring so-called Russian political parties/ blocks/ movements.

The question thus arises as to whose interests were represented in the press in this period. A brief analysis of the Russian-language newspapers during the Parliamentary elections of 1996 and the local government elections of 1999 is useful in determining the answer.

During the Parliamentary elections of 1996, the Russian-language newspapers mostly gave column space to the representatives of the Russian parties. The parties stressed the necessity “to protect people’s (non-citizens’) rights.” They formulated the main problem of non-citizens as “difficulties in participation in the elections,” although an analysis of reader feedback (see below) has shown that the readers themselves did not see any problems on this subject. In fact, all residents, including non-citizens with temporary residence permits, were allowed to vote in the municipal elections. Representatives of the Russian parties tried to create the illusion that the situation in Estonia could be quickly and radically changed if they were elected (they often used such expressions as *it looks like, as if, like*, etc.). They shifted the responsibility for the present problems on to Estonian politicians. Until 1999, the latter were also construed as enemies of Russians.

Somebody finds pleasure in looking into the hungry eyes of Russian children…
The inhabitants of Toompea are hostile towards the non-Estonian majority of Ida-Virumaa. (*Estonia*, 09.05.1996)

In the autumn of 1999, the strategic political aim was changed from citizenship and “protection of people’s rights” to the creation of a welfare society.
It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the heating systems of the district, which will help to decrease expenses for communal services... to plan concrete measures in order to decrease unemployment, alleviate social problems... to build municipal living blocks for poor people... to organize local cultural and integration centres, to work out and accept the plan of co-operation of municipal council and government, NGOs, schools. (Molodozh Estonii, 11.10.1999)

Russian politicians also promised to fight for the legal equality of Russians and Estonians, the status of Russian as a second official language and the preservation of Russian culture. To achieve this, it would be necessary for Russian voters to support the Russian politicians:

Estonian parties will not solve your problems. They have a detailed plan for eliminating the Russian population, aiming at the restoration of mono-ethnic state. … Russian-speakers do not trust Estonian deputies to solve their problems. They seek support from the Russian Party and have the right to be represented in legislative bodies of the town and country. (Molodozh Estonii, 13.10.1999)

In general, in the election periods in 1996 and 1999, the Russian newspapers mainly supported Russian political parties and blocks. The methods used by Russian politicians, business leaders and journalists in 1996 and 1999, show that on the one hand they were interested in preserving a certain stability or at least avoiding social outburst, as it could harm their business and social position. In order to reach this goal, the Russian language press often softened the information in crisis periods with calls for patience, expectation, peace: one should be patient, there is no sense in complaining, all the difficulties are determined by the stars, let’s think, let’s stop, don’t hurry, etc. On the other hand, the Russian-language press was trying to maintain some degree of social tension, so that Russians would feel the need to view Russian politicians as saviours and advocates. The strategic aims of such behaviour were: 1) to inhibit the social processes; 2) to segregate the Russian population from the Estonian population and institutions; 3) to shift the responsibility for failures and problems on the others; and 4) to attract and keep the Russian-speaking voters. The underlying motive of these aims was apparently the preservation or improvement of the social status of the current leaders of the Russian community.

2.4. The Audience and Its Interests

On the basis of studies of published readers’ letters and telephone calls published at the newspapers for 1991, 1996 and 1999, it is possible to compare the topics prevalent during these years and to make a comparative table about how the audience
used the press in 1991–1999. Only texts produced by people on their own initiative were considered.

Two topics were dominant in 1996: 1) problems connected with legal status of non-citizens (thirty-one percent of letters); and 2) the decrease in the quality of life in general (thirty percent of letters). The topics of other letters were connected with these two (a decrease in the quality of medical service, the growth of unemployment and the crime rate, family problems connected with the lack of documents or residence permits in Estonia by one member of the family, etc.). In 1999 the main topics were the necessity of improving the quality of life in different spheres, social care, and the need for information necessary to protect peoples’ rights in the economic daily sphere (sixty-three percent). Thus, the topics connected with the decrease in living standards and daily economic problems dominated these years and their importance increased as time passed.

It is also important to compare the ways the press was used by its audience during these years. Table 1 shows the ever growing tendency of using the press as an “infodesk” (readers ask for information from the newspaper or its lawyer). Using the press for solving personal problems in 1999 became very similar to its usage as an “infodesk” (here a reader asks a journalist for help in getting information from a certain institution). Also, the content of a category such as “expression of opinion and constructive proposals” changes, as in 1991 those proposals were addressed primarily to society in general, yet in 1999 were focused on certain addressees (for example, members of residents’ cooperatives, management of a factory, administration

Table 1. Types of Readers’ Letters to the Russian-language Press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of letter</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complaints</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of opinion (contains constructive proposals)*</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using as a channel of communication with politicians</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>&gt;1.0%</td>
<td>10.5%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appealing to newspaper as to collective board</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using as an “Infodesk”</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using for solving personal problems</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In 1999, data was collected only a week before the elections, while in 1991 and 1996 a content-analysis of all letters was carried out for 6 months.
of a district, specialists working out the programme of teaching Estonian to Russians etc.).

During the 1990s, the same primary traits of the “social ideal” of the audience could be observed: civic equality, stable legal status, financial stability and a high level of information. While in the period 1991–1996, the population expected that state and municipal institutions would help them reach this ideal, by 1999 the main methods proposed by representatives of the population had changed to the independent solving of problems, activity and self-organisation. At the same time, practically all other sources of information reported that the population increasingly turned to illegal ways of achieving their aims, probably because the legal means were too complicated. People relied mainly upon themselves, and did not ask for help or complain. In 1999, people mostly asked the press questions of where to go or where to get additional information to solve a problem, but not how to solve the problem. Searching for ways of achieving aims, people seldom applied to the media and preferred alternative sources of information (rumours, or information obtained on an interpersonal level – Jakobson 1996, Pettai 2000).

2.5. Constructing the Russian and Estonian Communities and Their Interrelations

In 1999 the Russian community was described in the Russian-language press as mostly consisting of poor Russian voters, having no citizenship, and it was mostly differentiated on the basis of age and sex. The dominant definitions were connected to various forms of deprivation, including moral and intellectual (passive, frightened, distressed, uninformed, unaware, offended, marginalized), economic (poor, deprived), and legal deprivation (non-citizens, discriminated). In cases where youngsters were mentioned, they were most often characterised by some form of deviance (drug-addicts, criminals, drunkards, poor). Only in a few articles was the audience was described as active (house dwellers). In 2000 the situation had changed. In a large number of articles (forty-five percent for Estonia and seventy percent for Molodozh Estonii), representatives of the Russian community were described as active (town dwellers, successful high school students, Russian politicians, Russians as a cultural minority, simple readers). In other materials, the old paradigm is preserved: passive Russians are described as victims of discrimination (former KGB-officers, non-citizens, Orthodox believers, youngsters, Russians in Estonia, deceived, children). It is necessary to note that such different behaviours of the two dailies could be explained by the difference in their position. As Estonia is more middle class and local Russian elite-oriented, the old paradigm still prevails. At the same time, Molodozh Estonii, whose circulation has dramatically fallen, desperately needs to attract readership in order to become an effective instrument for its owners, and tries to come closer to the audience.
During the period 1992–1996, Estonians were construed in the Russian press as consisting of two main groups: 1) “simple people,” friendly to Russians and oppressed by the state; and 2) “national-radicals” (nationalist-minded politicians), hostile towards Russians. Under this construct, it was the Soviet regime or of its certain institutions, the pro-Soviet Intermovement or Estonian nationalist-minded politicians, who were guilty of creating tensions and misunderstanding, but not the Estonian Russian speakers or Estonians as ethnic groups. In 1998-1999, these images practically disappeared from the Russian press. The two main images presented in the Russian-language press were: 1) the Estonian official, polite and neat, not overtly hostile towards Russians, but indifferent to the needs and problems of “simple people” and estranged from them; and 2) Estonian intellectuals and enthusiasts – teachers, scientists, bringing Estonian culture to Russians, helping them to integrate into Estonian society. In many cases the Estonians were represented as “looking down from above,” “teaching and civilizing,” and “tolerant” towards Russians. Thus, these images could hardly be accepted by representatives of the audience as “their own.”

In the 1990s the Russian-language press informed its audience about the main events of Estonian political, economic, social and cultural life, published essays on Estonian history, etc. It was certainly a difficult problem to select the proportion and combination of materials to both bind the diasporal community with the major society and its historical motherland, and cover the life of this community in particular. Nevertheless, the press could evidently play a more important role in integrating the Russian-speaking community into Estonian society, as according to many reports, local Russian-speakers (even those who have learned the Estonian language) entering into the Estonian environment feel a cultural shock. It is more likely that throughout the Russian-language press non-Estonians were given the illusion of “being informed” about Estonians, the Estonian state and society.

Conclusions

Compared to the Perestroika period, the 1990s saw a reduction in the informative function of the Russian press. The performance by the press of the sub-function of orienting the population and adapting it to the changing environment was limited. Its role in socialization diminished, especially with regards to young people, and it remained unused as a tool of integration of society.

The minority press instead, performed such sub-functions of the regulative function as filtering, i.e. limiting information and segregating the Russian population from Estonians and the institutions of the Estonian state. The press compensated for the need of information instead of satisfying it, as only twenty percent of non-Estonians in 1996 and thirty percent of non-Estonians in May 2000 considered
themselves to be well-informed (Saar Poll 2000). Also, the sub-function of activation declined throughout this period. The result of this functioning led to the performance by the press of the role of social damper.

In connection with the political struggle in general, especially during the elections periods, the press also played a role of “trader-mediator,” trying to “sell” votes and the trust of the voters for the political elites. Nevertheless, it was not a very successful agent, as despite aggressive propaganda campaigns, in October 1999 more than fifty percent of non-Estonians did not participate in municipal elections and over one third of the voters voted for “Estonian” parties. Also, in order to maintain political correctness, it was “selling” to the state and officials the loyalties of Russian-speakers, giving column space to numerous explanations of their aims and methods, and promulgating calls to be patient and wait.

The performance of these roles was effective until 1996. The press was a particularly effective “damper” in the years 1992–1993, when it helped to alleviate inter-ethnic conflict. Since 1997, however, an intensification of the integration process between the population groups has been observed. Poor quality information, the lack of analysis and constructive proposals instigate a further rejection of the press by the readership, as well as a preference for alternative sources of information (primarily interpersonal communication).

The importance of the press to its potential audience decreased. This tendency is illustrated by the fact that only thirty-three percent of non-Estonians regularly read local Russian-language dailies and fifty-six percent do it as little as once per week (Vihalemm 2000). It also reveals itself in the permanent decrease of press circulation from 68,000 (Estonia) and 95,000 (Molodozh Estonii) copies in 1989 to 22,000-25,000 copies in 1992 and only 8,000 copies in 2001. Thus, the effectiveness of the performance of its roles has also decreased and as a result, the role of the Russian press in Estonia is fast becoming superfluous.

References


Since the beginning of the 1990s the Russian press in Estonia and its role in the development of inter-ethnic relations and the formation of collective identities has become a subject of keen interest and intense discussion among Estonian and Western researchers and politicians. This chapter concentrates on many questions: Which political, cultural and civic loyalties have been constructed by the Russian press in Estonia since 1947? Which means were used in this process? Who was included and excluded from the collective ‘We’? Here I wanted to check: (1) If the press had participated in forming a kind of local identity, which is different from the core Russian one (see Kolstø, 1996: 626; Laitin, 1998; Pilkington, 1998; Subbotina, 1997); (2) If the press had promoted a strong Russian ethnic and state identity, or vice versa, and whether it had promoted weakness of the identity of the new-born Russian state (see Aasland, 1996; Kolstø, 1996; Linz & Stepan, 1996: 410–411).

Profiles of collective identities

Herein are presented some main ‘identities’ constructed by the Russian press in Estonia, revealed through the process of content analysis and further LSA analysis. The indices below are defined as: 1 – Soviet identity; 2 – Estonian identity; 3 – Soviet Estonian identity; 4 – Estonian (local) Russian identity, 5 – Russian ethno-cultural identity (Figure 8.1).

1. Method: the main method of processing data was Latent-Structural Analysis. Our selection consisted of 204 articles from 14 years (1947, 1956, 1969, 1977, 1987–1996) from two newspapers (Sovetskaya Estonia/Estonia and Molodozh Estonii). Four national celebrations were selected. The coding scheme of content analysis contained generalised statements, positive and negative, selected from the content of the press. Eight themes were selected for further processing, where the statements’ frequency was statistically significant (these were ‘patriotism’, ‘militarism’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘Estonia’s relation to Europe/the EU’, ‘production of national identities’, ‘content of the national identity’, ‘basic national orientation and the state/citizen relations’, and ‘Estonia’s relations with the USSR/Russia’). Processing of the data produced latent classes and enabled us to establish the weight of different classes in different years.
The Soviet identity from 1946-1987 was intensively constructed, which Jadov (1994) has called ‘all-embracing’. It structured other identities and defined their place and role. It constructed a clear picture of the world and defined a certain place within for Soviet citizens (the common ‘We’). They were described as bearers of the most progressive ideology (where one of the most important and valuable components was labour) who opposed bearers of capitalist/fascist ideologies - ‘Them’ (see Figure 8.1).

‘We step into a new year enriched by the friendship of fraternal new democracies. A bunch of capitalists, possessing a million incomes and dreaming about enslaving the world, look at us with hatred, lies, provocations’ (Sovetskaja Estonia, January 1, 1948).

The Soviet State was described as human, peaceful, democratic, and progressive. It had a strong army ready to protect people from enemies.

‘The Soviet Army protects the human and just aims of socialism and the ideas of peace, relying on the support of working people … The Soviet Army … possesses modern weapons and equipment and has well-prepared and devoted officers. The Soviet Army is ready to stand against nuclear aggression’ (General Ivanovskii, TASS, Sovetskaja Estonia, February 22, 1987).

Citizens of this state (‘We’) belonged to different nationalities, but were united by friendship and common Communist and internationalist ideology. ‘We’ were described as friendly, peace-loving, intelligent, industrious, economically and military strong, ready to protect the Motherland and to sacrifice our lives for it.

Thus the Soviet identity was constructed as a civic and political identity with a strong state, which prescribed for citizens certain norms and values. It guaranteed their security, a high status among other nations, and freedoms and well-being, so
that citizens could trust the state and delegate to it the decision-making for the majority of the spheres of life (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2. “Picture of the world” in Soviet Estonian press in 1947–1987

From 1987–1991 the deconstruction of the Soviet identity took place in the press. First it took place in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations and the military strength of the state. The division between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ became vague. Inter-ethnic relations were described as worsening, and there appeared a great number of boundaries: between Estonians and non-Estonians, supporters and opponents of the USSR, partisans of different political movements, etc. In 1990–1991 economic difficulties wiped out the illusion of the ‘well-being’ of the ‘Soviet people’. After 1991 the ‘Soviet identity’ was mostly presented as a ‘counter-identity’:

‘The Soviet Union managed to demonstrate to everyone how and what should not be done’ (Kekelidze, Sovetskaja Estonia, February 2, 1991).

Nevertheless, some stalwart believers in the nostalgic Soviet times also survived.

‘If I were offered the opportunity to leave Estonia and given a globe to choose any country I’d like to go to, I’d reply that I’d like to go to the USSR. There is no such country on the globe? Don’t you have another globe? If you don’t, then it doesn’t matter to me where to stay and die...’ (Saveljeva, Molodozh Estonii, December 31, 1995).

It was never said that the old regime should or could be restored.

‘Please, do not include me in the group of retrogrades and the empire’s admirers – I do not call for the reconstruction of the empire and for the uniting of everyone and everything. It could not be reconstructed. … It would be a different country, not the one I miss’ (Saveljeva, Molodozh Estonii, December 31, 1995).
Besides a Soviet identity, from 1947 to 1991 a civic identity within the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed. Until 1988 the ESSR was described as a successor of the Estlander Labour Commune of 1917 and as an antipode of the Estonian Republic of 1918-1940. People of the Estonian Republic were saved by the Soviet regime from extinction and poverty. A ‘planned economy’ was described as the basis for the welfare of the Estonian nation, Soviet internationalist politics as a guarantee of successful cultural development of the Estonian nation, and Soviet military protection as a security guarantee.

‘The parade on the Victory Square once more demonstrated the desire of the Estonian people to do everything under the leadership of the Communist Party in order to provide for the enormous flourishing of the Republic … There are actors, musicians, artists on the square. They are working hard to prepare for the upcoming Estonian National Song Festival’ (ETA, Sovetskaja Estonia, May 4, 1956).

The people of the ESSR were described as possessing a high cultural level and some degree of social responsibility, but united neither by language nor common culture, but only by some symbolic episodes of ‘common’ history (the Victory of the Estonian Workers Commune in 1917, which was never experienced by the post-war generation) and common labour for the sake of Estonia. However in 1988-1991 this picture dramatically changed: the ESSR was constructed as a state, striving for full political sovereignty, and the right to be the successor to the Estonian Republic of 1918-1940. Inter-ethnic relations in the ESSR were presented as being less smooth than in the USSR in general. After 1989 the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was more and more often called the ‘Estonian Republic’ and behaved as an opponent of the Soviet Union (Republic vs. Soviet Centre).

From 1988 to 1991, within the ‘Soviet Estonian’ identity, an attempt occurred to construct a new ‘Estlanders’ civic identity’ (estonozemeltsy, eestimaalased, meaning people of all nationalities, living on the Estonian territory). Nevertheless, this project failed. This concept was too much connected with the notion of ‘soil’, and the majority of Russians were urban inhabitants and felt themselves mostly connected with the tools and results of their labour, such as factories, ports, etc., and with local social networks of family and friends. Nevertheless, civic identities of Estonians and Russians did not coincide at this period. Bearers of Estonian culture considered themselves to be the only true ‘Estonians’ and the only historically legitimate owners of Estonian land. For them the notion of Estonian land was connected with the idea of its preservation. In 1989 on the day when the Estonian national flag was first raised on the Long Hermann Tower (residence of the Parliament and the government), Lennart Meri (writer, President of Estonia beginning in 1992) declared:
‘The flag on Long Hermann is a symbol of the movement forward of the Estonian people and we are obliged to act in such a way that we all will feel the real value of this small piece of land, that we will be its honest owners, that this land will never need to be protected from us’ (Sovetskaja Estonia, December 31, 1989).

In addition, it was an actively constructed Estonian identity of an ethno-cultural group, united by native origin, common culture, history, national traditions, feelings, language, preservation of and pride in their culture and traditions, deeply connected with the Estonian territory and landscape. ‘Estonianness’ was always positively described in the Russian press. Such qualities as diligence, politeness, and intelligence were attributed to Estonians.

‘Fifteen torches will be lit from the fires of St. John’s Night. They will all arrive in Tartu Town Square from where representatives of all regions of Estonia will go to the memorial stone, which was established at the place where the first Estonian Song Festival was held. Fires will unite us at this place which is sacred to every Estonian. From St. John’s Day fires to the Song Festival, from heart to heart, from generation to generation, the Estonian people will transfer their traditions’ (Jaani, Sovetskaja Estonia, June 23, 1990).

This image has not changed. The only aspect, radically different in media texts of 1947–1988 and after 1989, was Estonians’ place in the world. Until 1988 Estonians were portrayed as a small, weak ethno-cultural group dependent upon foreign protection (the West or the USSR). Since 1989 Estonians have become a nation, capable of independent actions, possessing a place among independent nations of the world.

From 1989 to 1991 the Estonian ethnic and political identity shaped a common semantic field: ‘Estonian’ was interpreted as belonging to the Estonian nation in an ethno-cultural sense. At the same time Estonians were constructed as consisting of two main groups: ‘simple people’ who were friendly to Russians, and hostile ‘national-radicals’ (nationalist-minded politicians). It was the Soviet regime or its institutions, the pro-Soviet Intermovement or Estonian nationalist-minded politicians, who promulgated tensions and misunderstanding, but not Estonian-Russians or Estonians as an ethnic group.

‘In some sense, there’s a desire for revenge ... Deportations and transfers of population are mentioned. They took place, nobody denies it. But why should young people personally suffer because of state policy?’ (Torshina, Molodozhr Estonii, October 25, 1991).

‘Simple Estonian people do not share the opinion of Toompea politicians. Politicians are afraid of our co-operation’ (Tolstikov, Estonia, March 17, 1992).
Here we see that in the 1990s the Russian press still worked in an internationalist paradigm, claming that common class identity and shared class interests were more important for mutual understanding and co-operation of people than a common cultural background.

The Estonian civic identity is the most contradictory one. The Estonian State was often criticised and sometimes approved, but no other state except the Estonian Republic was proposed as ‘Ours’. Even in 1993 the idea of a regional autonomy for Narva within the Estonian State was not much supported by the Russian press. Estonian society was constructed as deeply split on an ethnic and class basis. The Estonian Republic was constructed as a state under conditions of deep economic and political crisis; economic policy was described as expressing interests of the ruling class, but not of ‘simple people’:

The ‘Economic mirror’ in Estonia is built on people’s poverty. The salary at Krenholm decreased 40% compared with 1990, and unemployed people are starving; this promotes an increase in criminality among them’ (Ashimhin, *Molodozh Estonii*, May 1, 1995).

Nationalist-minded politicians were constructed as trying to switch people’s attention from economic inequality to the ‘national question’.

‘It is necessary to find a guilty party or to create one. This aim is necessary to make the most unprotected part of the population feel that they should not expect anything good. And when ‘they’ start to argue and try to defend their rights, it’s necessary to point out to ‘us’: look WHO is creating instability in the society!’ (Ivanov, *Estonia*, January 25, 1992).

The relations between the state and local Russians could be described as misunderstood, distrustful, estranged, characterised by mutual dissatisfaction and non-recognition.

‘There are no illusions. IT – the state – doesn’t love me. I always suspected that my relations with the state had a purely mercenary character. Let it be! Let it not love me, but at least it should treat me as a human being!’ (Kekelidze, *Estonia*, December 31, 1992).

Dissatisfaction was expressed by the Russian press at the labels, which Estonians gave to Russians, such as ‘occupants’, ‘foreigners’, ‘illegal migrants’, and for deprivation of Estonian citizenship, and demands for Estonian language proficiency. The press did not call on readers to accept their status, which mostly seemed to them unacceptable, but rather called on them to avoid open conflict.
On the other hand, sometimes Estonia was also described as a state of great economic development, which focused on the stabilisation of the national currency. The national army was constructed, striving to become strong and well-trained, to co-operate with NATO and to conform to its standards. Estonian legislation was constructed according to European standards, thus developing a democratic European-style state, which will soon become a member of the EU.

‘We are building a democratic state. No one in the European commission found any mistakes in Estonian legislation regarding foreigners ... We have to be the real owners of the country ourselves; only our own efforts may provide us a place in the world that we deserve. It will take a lot of effort to join Europe as an equal partner. I believe that it’s a common interest of all people who connect their destiny with Estonia, regardless of sex, race, nationality, and religion, as stated in Estonian laws’ (Sher, *Estonia*, February 24, 1994).

Nevertheless initial optimism gave way to concerns regarding the necessity of Estonian Russians learning the Estonian language and the preserving and developing of Russian culture in Estonia.

Constructing of a **Russian political identity** loyal to Russian State institutions did not take place in the Russian press of Estonia. The Russian territory or Russian Federation’s institutions were never constructed as markers of Russian ethnic or political identity. In 1992–1993 the Russian population was perceived as forgotten by Russia. Russia’s position towards the Russian-speaking population of Estonia, including Russian citizens, has been negatively portrayed as ‘Russia has left/betrayed us’, ‘Russia uses us in its political game’, ‘the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned away from our problems’ (Ashimhin, *Molodozh Estonii*, June 23, 1995). It was also repeated that many people had accepted Russian citizenship not because they felt themselves to be *Rossijane* (Russians in a political sense), but for practical reasons: they wanted to have a travel document, which would provide them the opportunity to go to Russia and to the West, and some feeling of security. Nevertheless, it was often mentioned that co-operation with Russia was economically profitable for Estonia, and that local Russians had friends and relatives in Russia and would like to keep these contacts. Some articles about Russian affairs, and interviews with Russian actors and singers were also published. In 1998-2000 we see a tendency toward an increasing share of Russian news in the Russian press (from 6% in October 1999 to 15.7% in October 2000). Since 1998, the weekly *Vesty*, and since 2000 also the weekly *Molodozh Estonii Subbota* have published several pages of selected articles from Russian newspapers (*Novaja Gazeta*, *Komsomolskaja Pravda*, *Sobesednik*, etc.). By 2000 both of the main Russian dailies were giving most foreign news (regarding the West, Asia, conflict regions, etc.) not from the perspective of Reuters or BNS, but from that of ITAR-TASS. So, the press constructed the **civic identity**
of Estonian Russians, in some spheres, in connection with Russians from the Russian Federation.

The Russian ethno-cultural identity was not constructed until 1987, and after 1987 it was not constructed very intensively. The main factors uniting Russians from Estonia and those from Russia, were a common historical experience and ethnic self-consciousness, a common culture, feelings, traditions, and religion, but never a common territory. The attempts to mobilise Russians as an ethnic group were weak and unsystematic. Sometimes the necessity of protecting the ‘Russianness’ of Russians was discussed. Nevertheless, this discourse, in most cases, became pivotal, as the goal of these statements was usually the political mobilisation of Russians for the sake of the Russian political elite.

After 1989 we can speak of constructing local cultural and civic identities of local Russians, but it is still difficult to use a common name for this group. Most often it is described as the Russian-speaking population of Estonia. Also, this group is sometimes described as non-citizens, non-Estonians, unrooted, a non-titular population, non-homogeneous, etc. This set of labels shows that bearers of these labels are often described through their losses, and the Russian language remains the only ‘positive’ characteristic of the group, uniting it and binding it together and to the Motherland. At the same time, the label ‘Russian-speaking population of Estonia’ creates one more positive link in their identity – a link with the Estonian territory.

In the time period 1991–1996, Russians were constructed as having more similarities than differences with the out-group (Estonians). They were seen as striving to establish good relations with Estonians, but unable to do so because of the opposition of the Estonian state, and as hoping that this unity could be reached after Estonia joined the EC (see Figure 8.3).

Figure 8.3. “Picture of the world” in the Estonian Russian-language press in 1992–1996
This entity was described as breaking into smaller groups, interacting and conflicting among themselves. So, the press reflected the process of the dissolution of collective identities and an ongoing search for new ones. Until 1999 Russians were viewed as isolated, passive, deprived, unable to undertake any actions themselves and needing some force to protect them from Estonian political institutions. Starting in 1995, the role of saviour was delegated to Russian politicians. Even in 1999 members of the Russian community were perceived as passive and only since 2000 have they been seen as more active.

In 1999–2000 the differences between Russians and Estonians were underlined. Depending on the particular political situation, their relations were constructed as ones of conflict or co-operation, but their differences were constructed as a basis for mutual co-operation. The role of state became more diverse. On the one hand, through the system of education and a State Program of Integration, the state was promoting an increase in proximity, especially between young people. The legal system was equally fair for both Russians and Estonians. At the same time it produced obstacles for the reuniting of families, in which one of the spouses had no residence permit. At this point the Russian community was constructed as less isolated than in the first half of the 1990s and closer to Estonia, Estonians and Russia (Figure 8.4). The image of the USSR nearly disappeared from the media.

Figure 8.4. “Picture of the world” in the Estonian Russian-language press in 1999-2000

Conclusions

In the Soviet period, it was possible to speak about a planned and systematic construction of a national identity in the press. The Soviet identity could be regarded as a combination of political and civic identities, relying on a certain ideology and
value system, common experience, history, newly formed traditions, symbols and norms, semantic space and communicational instrumentation. It defined the place and role of the state and population within the state. It was an identity within a strong, highly developed state. It also possessed a strong cultural element. Nevertheless, ideology, rather than culture, was constructed as a main marker of belonging to the in-group.

It co-existed with ethnic identities of titular nations, local civic identities (such as with Soviet Estonia, where the main element uniting the population of Soviet Estonia, was the common labour of the population of the given territory) and various social identities (professional, etc.). So, even during Soviet times, the press constructed multiple identities. The majority of them united different ethnic groups on political, territorial and social grounds.

The Estonian identity was recognised and supported in the Russian press during the Soviet period as an identity of a certain ethno-cultural group. The Russian ethno-cultural identity was not expressed until 1987 and after 1987 was expressed quite weakly.

After 1989 the press started forming a local civic Russian identity, where ethnic and cultural elements were quite important, but only in combination with a number of political and social characteristics. The press presented such common traits of this group as the Russian language, readiness and desire to stay in Estonia, economic deprivation, and absence of Estonian citizenship. In fact social-political characteristics played as large a role in the self-definition of the group as ethno-cultural ones. At the same time, the image of ‘Russians in Estonia’ is an antipode of the ‘Soviet people’: it is a minority group, deprived of political rights, whose language has no status in this state, living in a small country with a fragile economy and army. Meanwhile, the Soviet people were identifying themselves with the Soviet State. Thus Estonian-Russians were estranged from the Estonian State and were sometimes in conflict with it.

Although the Estonian political identity was not intensively supported (in the 1990s Russians were not constructed as Estonian citizens or active in Estonian society), no alternative to the Estonian state was proposed. ‘We’, located ‘here’ in Estonia and united with Estonians by common territory and problems, were governed by the same political institutions and laws. The necessity of learning the Estonian language was recognised. So, it could be said that some kind of civic Estonian identity was constructed/reflected. From Figure 8.1 we can see that in the 1990s the local Russian civic identity was constructed more intensively than the ethnic one (based mainly on cultural features). The Russian press constructed neither a Baltic, nor a Russian, political identity, although in 1998–2000 the construction of a common civic identity with Russia was becoming more intensive.

We believe that in 1991–1996 a systematic construction of a political identity, uniting Russians and Estonians, or any collective identity, uniting all Russians in
Estonia, did not take place because of confusion about Russians’ role and place in Estonia, the heterogeneity of the local Russian community, a lack of dialogue between Russians and the Estonian state, the vagueness of national priorities, and an absence of political power, which could propose an attractive national ideology capable of mobilising and uniting the population of Estonia. This was contemporaneous with the deconstruction of collective identities, reflected and promoted by the press. This was a dominant tendency concerning emerging multiple identities, where ethnic and social class dominated. This was also taking place in Russia in these years (Danilova, 1997: 25).

In 2000 there was an increasing number of statements claiming that the social welfare program on the local level had been created for town/county dwellers of all nationalities. Soon there were examples of practical co-operation between Russians and Estonians on different levels. In general, the common virtual economic-political space, which was a basis for an emerging common civic identity started to re-appear, although it still co-existed with social conflict and segregation. It is more difficult to speak about a common cultural component of this civic identity, as a number of cultures (Estonian, Russian, different post-modern cultures of youth and music, some of them uniting Russians with Estonians and other Russians) were constructed. It seemed that by 2000 the Russian language media in Estonia started playing a more important role in constructing a common civic and cultural identity between local Russians and Estonia and Estonians.

References

THE ROLE OF THE MINORITY PRESS IN THE PROCESS OF INTERGRATION

The main issue in this chapter is the role played by the Russian-language press as an instrument of social integration of the Russian population into Estonian society in 1999–2000. This question is studied within a general theoretical context of the potential role of minority media as well as within the context of the development of a social and political process of integration in Estonia during the last half of the 1990s. Traditionally minority media researchers stress two aspects: (1) preserving minorities’ national, cultural and social identities, thus maintaining connections with the historical Motherland; (2) facilitating integration into the host society (Levkovic, 1986: 66–67; McQuail, 1984: 204; Togora, 1986: 52–54). We expect that minority media will inform minority members about the aims of these processes and propose methods for their achievement, provide minority members with information about host society institutions and culture, and serve as a forum for public discussion. Also, they may form images of an in-group and an out-group and construct their interrelations.

Riggins (1992: 276–285) writes that commercial, ethical media combine all dominant ideologies, expressing the elite’s interests and an explicit counter-ideology which opposes the elite’s interests, expressed in terms of ethnicity. The media use information sources belonging to the dominant group, borrowing styles and genres, words and names, from the majority language and such phenomena as intellectual ghettoisation (when the target audience becomes bored by content that does not seem to convey new information); they promote gradual and partial assimilation of the audience. At the same time they use counter-ideology, with minority language, the establishment of a minority news agenda, and announcement of the community events promoting minority organisations that actively oppose minority cultural assimilation. So, initially minority media play a contradictory role in preserving and changing minority identity, defining its place as dominant in society.

The results of the monitoring raised a question about the actual growth of mutual tolerance between representatives of both language communities. In 1999 the Russian press reflected mostly negative estimations of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia, especially on the axis ‘the Estonian state and politicians vs. the Russian-speaking population’ (see Korts & Kõuts, 2000). This discordance between tendencies in public opinion and the press is contradictory and deserves special attention.
In order to answer these questions, we conducted a content analysis of all the articles from the newspapers *Estonia* and *Molodozh Estonii*, excluding foreign news, horoscopes and small ads, from the period October 11–18, 1999 (local elections) and from October 24 – November 2, 2000 (the crisis of the municipal government in Tallinn).

**Aims of the integration and proposed methods of achievement**

Generally, the visions of an integrated society presented in the Russian-language press can be divided into four main patterns, which can be placed along an X-axis between optimism and pessimism, and along a Y-axis between declarativity and latency (Figure 17.1).

**Figure 17.1. Models of integration in the Russian-language press in 1999 and 2000**

**Optimism**
- 92% of texts in both 1999 and 2000
- in 6.4% of texts in 1999 in 7.5% in 2000

**Declarativity**
- in 17% of texts in 1999
- in 9% in 2000

**Latency**
- analytical pattern underlying patterns 1 and 2

**Pessimism**
1. The declarative optimistic pattern

This model was dominant in the press in 1999–2000. Its main feature is that the integrated society should provide high living standards and security to its members.

‘It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the heating systems of the district, as this will help to decrease expenses for communal services … to work out the re-birth of the Põhja-Tallinn district and plan concrete measures which will help to decrease unemployment, and soften many social problems … to build municipal living blocks for poor people who have lost their flats as a result of so-called ‘ownership reform’ … to bring problems of education to the attention of town government, to organise local cultural and integration Centres, and to work out and accept a plan of co-operation between the municipal council and government, NGOs, and schools…’ (Barabaner, member of United People’s Party, Molodozh Estonii, October 11, 1999).

In 2000 they added the statement that Estonia should be a state with an effective legal system. Also, on several occasions, notions such as compassion and humanism on the personal level (not on the level of state institutions or society in general) were added. In turn, this model could be divided into the following variants:

According to the interpretation of Russian politicians and supporting journalists, Variant 1 of this model contains the following features, regarding the political, legal and cultural spheres: (1) legal equality of Russians and Estonians (citizenship for all permanent citizens without any pre-conditions); (2) the Russian language should get the status of a second state language; (3) Russian culture should be preserved and supported by the state; (4) Russian parties should be proportionally represented in governmental and municipal bodies. Co-operation with Russia in both the economic and the social spheres was supported. The main method of achievement of this model is that Russian voters would support Russian politicians, who are constructed only as agents and able to represent the Russian-speaking population of Estonia and to solve their problems.

‘Russians … seek support from the Russian Party and have the right to be represented in town and country legislative bodies’ (Molodozh Estonii, October 13, 1999).

In 2000 the share of this variant diminished three-fold. However, it started to be supported by cultural activists and teachers. Criticism and aggression decreased, and statements acquired a strong cultural accent. Related articles concentrated on preserving Russian culture, language, and education in Estonia and strengthening
cultural contacts with Russia. Even in the articles concerning the position of Russian politicians during the conflict between the ruling coalition and the opposition in the Tallinn municipal government, they emphasised pragmatic, rather than ethnic, reasons for support by Russian politicians for any of the sides of the conflict. Support was provided to those who would guarantee political and financial benefits.

Variant 2 of this pattern was proposed by Estonian officials and politicians and, in 2000, also by professionals, teachers, cultural activists and volunteers of all nationalities. It emphasises the aspect of integration of the Estonian Republic into the EU and NATO. The total population of Estonia should speak Estonian and know Estonian culture. The methods of achievement of this model are: (1) bringing Estonian realities into accordance with EU norms and demands, and (2) support for the Estonian political parties by all nationalities living in Estonia. In 2000, cooperation between Estonians and Russians (politicians, professionals, teachers, and cultural and voluntary workers) in common state and municipal institutions was included. Here the actors are those who propose this sub-variant of the model.

Variant 3 is mostly supported by businessmen. It includes improvement of the economic relations with the EU and Russia as well as creating equal opportunities for economic competition. This could be achieved through legal amendments and negotiations with the EU. Here actors are representatives of Estonian and international business, as well as Estonian and foreign officials.

2. The declarative pessimistic pattern

This pattern is said to be the antipode of the first one, and involves assimilation of all non-Estonians. This is said to be inevitable if political rivals of the established source of opinion, such as ‘the bad opposite Russian party’ and ‘the Estonian parties and politicians’, come to power.

‘Power in Tallinn is held captive by a coalition of national-radicals, right-wing parties and the Union ‘People’s Trust’, which has betrayed its supporters ... Our enemies carry out intensive work, aiming to split the Russian Diaspora ... Estonian political forces consolidate ... At the same time Sergei Ivanov openly creates one more ‘Russian’ party, which will certainly become an obedient ‘pocket’ organisation’ (Andreev, Chairman of United People’s Party, Molodozh Estonii, November 3, 1999).

The descriptive terms in this model were quite vague. One often comes across such expressions as ‘rumours are circulating’, and ‘people say’. The mystical ‘them’ or ‘Estonian politicians’, who have negative intentions towards Russians are often
mentioned. Neither the concrete sources nor the purpose of these intentions is clarified.

In 2000 the share of this model diminishes. The ‘black’ model is associated not with the assimilation of Russians, but with a decrease in the standard of living. The enemies are constructed not on an ethnic principle, but on a political one; they have certain names and there are certain reasons for their accusations. The new phenomenon is that, in one of the analysed newspapers (Estonia), there has arisen an arena of political struggle between representatives of Estonian political institutions. Usually the image of enemy co-exists with the image of saviour (supported politician or party) who could save the voters from the evil which comes mainly from competitors.

3. The latent pessimistic pattern

This pattern can be described through analysis of patterns 1–2, in particular the proposed means of achievement of the declared aims of social integration. In order to reveal these aims in our study in 2000 (Jakobson & Iljina 2000) we analysed (1) how the sources appealed to the audience through the press (direct appeals such as you, we, readers, as well as descriptions of the audience were taken into consideration); (2) self-presentations of candidates to Town Councils, assuming that, if they are ready to govern the society and describe themselves as successful, they consider themselves to be socially ‘integrated’.

In October 1999 the Russian community was mostly described in the Russian-language press as consisting of ‘poor Russian non-citizens’. The audience was often described functionally (‘voters’), their dominant definitions related to various forms of deprivation, including moral and intellectual (‘passive’, ‘frightened’, ‘distressed’, ‘uninformed’, ‘unconscious’, ‘offended’, ‘disassociated’), economic (‘poor’, ‘deprived’), and legal deprivation (‘non-citizens’, ‘discriminated against’). In some cases youngsters, who were mostly characterised by some form of deviance (drug-addicts, criminals, drunkards, the poor) were mentioned. Only a few articles were addressed to active representatives of the population (‘house dwellers’). By 2000 new tendencies appeared: in 45–70% of materials (Estonia and Molodozh Estonii respectively), representatives of the Russian community were described as ‘active’. These were ‘town dwellers’, ‘successful high school students’, ‘Russian politicians’, ‘Russians as a cultural minority’, ‘readers’, ‘simple people’, ‘street-cleaners’, and ‘town citizens’. Passive Russians were described as ‘discriminated against’ (former KGB-officers, non-citizens, Orthodox believers, youngsters), ‘Russians in Estonia’, ‘deceived’, and ‘children’. They were said to be unable to undertake any steps to achieve their aims themselves, except (1) to vote for a certain political power; (2) to delegate all activity to politicians, officials, and businessmen; (3) to wait patiently. The latter is hidden in expressions
such as ‘the solving of these problems takes time’, ‘many circumstances should be considered’, ‘people should be patient’, ‘those in power can not make everyone happy at once’, etc.

‘Considering the present situation, I ask you to delegate your votes to those who have a real chance to be elected, who want and are able to work in the local administration’ (Starostin, Head of Lasnamäe district, *Molodozh Estonii*, October 11, 1999).

So, the population is mostly constructed not as a subject of social processes, but as an object of governing.

In relation to the self-representations of the Town Councils’ candidates, we discovered that the integrated Russian was described as aggressive (whether latently or overtly), active and industrious, highly educated, honest, well off, devoted to his/her family, and capable of speaking Estonian. At the same time the proposed methods of obtaining these qualities were not effective or not accessible to the audience. Firstly, newly established private institutes of higher education, promoted by the Russian newspapers, in which the language of instruction is Russian, were expensive and often provided education which was not recognised by the Ministry of Education as sufficient. Also, teaching of the Estonian language was quite poor there. So this education allowed Russians to find a job only in a private (likely Russian) business. Secondly, the language courses and self-teaching, promoted for learning the Estonian language, actually did not provide sufficient opportunities to learn the language (Kruusvall, 2000). Thirdly, those politicians who actually co-operated with their Estonian counterparts were presented in *Molodozh Estonii* as sources of evil, assimilators, labelled as ‘traitors to the Russian people’, ‘so-called Russian-speaking actors’, etc. Tolerance and openness were hardly mentioned among positive qualities of integrated Russians during this period. In 2000 pragmatism was added to the above-mentioned qualities, in the sense of readiness to reach agreement with any political force / national group in order to reach one’s aims. Nevertheless, aggressiveness and exclusiveness were again constructed as ideal qualities of a Russian.

In summary, the audience was mostly constructed in the Russian press in 1999–2000 as deprived (i.e. a victimised minority) and helpless, needing ‘a saviour’. At the same time, the ‘saviour’ who considered himself or herself to be integrated was constructed as an intolerant aggressive person, not open to other cultures, so that following this pattern could lead only to further isolation of Russian-speakers. One may suppose that the underlying motive of this pattern for the present Russian-speaking political elite is to attract and keep Russian voters, to transfer responsibility for all problems to others and thus to preserve or improve its own social status.
4. The latent optimistic pattern

As the representatives of the population do not declare any ideals about society in general, their pattern remains latent. Nevertheless, we could discern some of its elements from calls and letters of the audience and other sources. These are civic equality, stable legal status (permanent residence permit or achieving citizenship through one’s children), material stability, a high level of information acquisition and positive human relations. The legal steps, proposed by the population, are ‘independent solving of problems’, and ‘activity and self-organisation’. At the same time, practically all sources report that the population more often attempts illegal ways of reaching aims, most likely when legal ones are too complicated. People rely only on themselves, almost never ask for help, and rarely complain.

In 1999 people avoided the influence of the media and preferred alternative sources of information (rumours and information obtained on an interpersonal level). The press was in 1999 useful to people who mostly asked ‘where’ to go or ‘where’ to get additional information to solve problems, but not ‘how’ to solve problems. Readers avoided counting on the press. On the other hand, in November 2000 an article appeared in *Molodozh Estonii*: ‘Street-cleaner against employer’, in which a street-cleaner came to the newspaper to tell others about her positive experience of protecting her own rights in court:

‘I live in a state that is governed by law. So, I hope that some institution can help to solve the problem … I was offended and I have to protect my dignity. And there are all kinds of people in this world. My neighbour Klara helps me to translate documents from Russian into Estonian, and my neighbour Galja – from Estonian into Russian ... I didn’t get a salary for more than a year and didn’t starve to death. All neighbours – both Russians and Estonians – supported me. And I will not give up. If I give up, people around me will not trust Law and Justice any more’ (*Molodozh Estonii*, October 31, 2000).

The journalist praises the woman’s perseverance and says that this story should be an example for other people who remain passive when their rights are violated. This story presents a new image of a ‘simple person’, who is active, legally literate, persistent, able to co-operate successfully with people of different nationalities, as well as with state and municipal institutions of different levels, and willing to share her positive experience to help others. Presently this example is more of an exception than a rule, but gradually it will change.
Conclusions

The analysis has shown that in autumn 1999 the Russian-speaking press mostly promoted patterns of social and inter-ethnic relations, proposed by Russian politicians, which were strongly based upon elements of ethno-cultural isolationism and paternalism. Certainly it had nothing to do with a separatist political project. Its aim was to promote the preservation of the existing informational, social, and cultural barriers between Russians and Estonians and Estonian political institutions in order to preserve certain political powers whose interests are openly expressed in the Russian-language press. The success of this minority project would lead to: (1) the institutionalisation of the Russian-speaking elite as mediators between the Estonian state/society and the Russian population; (2) further separation between ethnic communities, the Russian population, and the state; (3) a resulting decrease in Russians’ standard of living due to a shortage of social capital and skills that would lead to social and economic success in Estonian society.

To some degree in 1999 we were dealing with a pre-election syndrome, but this trend could be observed also in 2000, although to a lesser extent. The importance of such elements as welfare and the strengthening of the legal system increased. All the subjects of the process involved in mass communication promoted these elements, so that it appeared that in society an understanding of national social and economic interests, common to all Estonian society was forming. In pattern 1 in 2000 the accent shifted from the political rights of non-Estonians to preserving Russian culture, language and education in Estonia. At the same time, representatives of different political parties, officials, scientists, etc. say that the different communities should preserve their cultural uniqueness. Also, integration into European structures, as well as development of international economic relations, has become a more important topic, and the relations between different ethnic groups are described as more tolerant and various.

At the same time the elite did not propose ways of achieving the propagated ‘integrated society’, which would be accessible for the majority of the audience and where the representatives of the population would be active participants (some exceptions could be found in Molodozh Estonii). So, treatment of the Russian-speaking minority in the media was mainly paternalistic, and it was treated as a passive object of governing by both the Estonian State and Russian elite. As a result, social integration as well as social management appeared to be a state or upper class function. In the context of studies of political attitudes and actual political activity of the Russian-speaking population, conducted by the leading Estonian sociologists and political scientists (Ruutsoo, 2000; Vihalem, 2000a) this strategy seems to be old-fashioned and ineffective compared with a strategy of encouraging and supporting people’s own initiative.
In this context the optimistic latent pattern could be considered a spontaneous response of the audience to patterns 1-3. Although the share of this pattern is quite small, we could observe that the press reflected a gradual increase in the activity of the population in solving its problems on a personal and small group level. From their texts we can see that people do not appeal to those who pretend to be mediators between them and the Estonian State, but appeal directly to state and municipal institutions or rely only on themselves. In considering: (1) the constantly decreasing participation of Russian-speakers in voting (in the local elections in 1993 about 60% of non-citizens and 52.6% of voters in general voted; in 1999, 43% of non-citizens and 49% in general voted); (2) the limited support of these voters for Russian parties, as even of this 43% over 1/3 of the Russian-speakers voted in 1999 for so-called ‘Estonian’ parties; we can assume that the Russian elite did not gain, or perhaps even lost, support among those whose interests it claims to defend. Moreover, recent analysis of the patterns of integration in the press, which exposed the estrangement between the Russian community and the elite / state institutions / press, correlates with the results of the Saar Poll survey of 2000, which revealed a tendency of growing estrangement and distrust of the population toward state institutions; this tendency is especially acute among Russians. At the same time, among Estonian citizens of Russian origin, the level of political activity is the same as among Estonians (Vihalemm, 2000a), so that it is possible to assume that acceptance of Russians into Estonian citizenship would promote an increase in their participation in democratic procedures.

Turning again to the Russian-language press in Estonia, it is possible to conclude that in general its potential as a tool in the integration process remained virtually unused. Instead of being an agent of integration and of building a civic society, it mostly performed the role of a social barrier between the Russian population and Estonia, Estonians, and host society institutions, especially in 1999. In 2000 the situation started to change, but still we could see that the press did not inform its audience about the important events of Estonian social and political life, or informed readers in a fragmented and biased way.

During elections and crisis periods the press also played the role of ‘trader-mediated’, ‘selling’ votes and the trust of the voters to the political elite. Nevertheless, by 1999-2000 their performance was not very effective. The poor quality of information and lack of analysis and constructive proposals promoted a further rejection of the press by the audience, as well as a preference for alternative sources of information (mostly based on interpersonal communication). Here we could see a typical intellectual ghettoisation, expressed in a concentration on topics, which flattered the minority group. Also, in Variants 2 and 3 of the first pattern, we can see an evidence of a dominant ideology that increased in 2000, while in Variant 1 of the first pattern and in models 2, 3, and 4 we see a counter-ideology in ethnic terms. In turn, this counter-ideology mainly expressed the interests of the dominant
section of the minority, so that we can divide counter-ideologies into ethno-social (represented by latent model 4) and ethnic (models 1.1, 2, 3).

Why is the range of visions and opinions in the Russian press so narrow? At the beginning of the 1990s, Estonian state institutions and politicians practically refused to use the Russian-language press (using it only for dialogue with the population, for providing information, for explaining their position, etc.), and declared that those Russians who remained in Estonia, should follow the Estonian media. The privatised press started searching for new sources of finance and information. Russian businesses and politicians provided them with both. After that the Russian-speaking press became biased.

As a result, the consumption of daily newspapers by the potential audience decreased from 23,000–25,000 copies in 1992 to 5,000–9,000 copies, so that only 33% of non-Estonians read local Russian dailies regularly and 56% only once per week (Vihalemm, 2000b). Saar Poll surveys conducted between May 1997 and November 2000 showed that the trust of the population, especially Russian-speakers, in the objectivity of journalism in reporting the power institutions’ activity had a tendency to decrease: in November 2000 only 34% of Russian-speakers (42% in general) believed that journalists were objective or mostly objective and 48% of Russian-speakers (41% in general) believed the opposite. So, the effectiveness of role of the press decreased as it ceased to be a trustworthy source of information for its potential audience. Searching for alternative ways of getting information, the audience has chosen to not use the other language media, but rather to rely on rumours and information obtained on an interpersonal level. As a result, the Estonian State and society are in danger of losing the local Russian press as a tool for the regulation of social processes.

References


THE CHECHENIAN CASE IN ESTONIA’S DUAL PRESS

Introduction

In the framework of the current research, we have compared the structure and character of the discussion of the Chechenian conflict in the Estonian and Russian-language press in Estonia in connection with the Chechenian war discussion at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul on 17–18 November, 1999.

As a number of previous studies (Kirch M. 1997, Raudsepp 1998, Vetik 1999, Korts & Kouts 2000) has revealed that 1) the shared readership of Estonian and the Russian-language newspapers is very small, approximately 5% of all readers; 2) that there are substantial differences in the coverage of different problems in the Estonian and Russian-language media in Estonia; 3) as well as given proof that Estonians and Russian-speakers in Estonia have limited common semantic and informational space, we presumed that this discussion in Estonian and the Russian-language press was also different. We were interested in how different was the representation of the events in the Estonian and Russian-language press and what could cause these differences.

We supposed that some differences could take place due to the different positions and functioning conditions of the Estonian and the Russian-language press, where the Estonian press could be seen as an active participant of the Estonian nation building in Andersonian sense (Anderson 1989) while the Russian-language as a minority press. Moreover, the situation of the Russian-speaking minority is complicated by facts that two third of this minority are excluded from the political citizenship of the country and thus from the process of the nation-building. We should also consider the different interests and orientations of Estonian and the Russian-speaking readerships, where the Estonian readership is oriented to the Estonian/Western media and the Russian-speaking to the Russian/Russian-language media (see Vihalem 2000). Likewise, their attitudes are partly shaped on the basis of this information. So, the Russian-language press has to balance between the interests of state institutions and its readership and has therefore to demonstrate loyalty to all of them.
Dual society and dual press in Estonia

The population of Estonia consists of two cultural groups – Estonians and Russian-speakers comprising in 1999 65% and 35% of population respectively. In 1991 Estonians became the state majority, while Russian-speakers have turned from a state majority in the former USSR to national minority in Estonian Republic. Estonian Citizenship Law, adopted in February 1992, granted citizenship to people whose ancestors had lived in the Estonian Republic in 1918-1940, all the others could get it through the process of naturalization. So far in the opinion of non-Estonians themselves, the main difficulty in acquiring Estonian citizenship has been the Estonian language test. At present only 22% of non-Estonians speak Estonian fluently, 22% ‘normally’, 30% ‘a little’ and 26% do not speak it at all (Kruusvall 2000a). Thus by 1999 nearly 100% of Estonians and only 38% of non-Estonians had Estonian citizenship, 18% of non-Estonians had Russian citizenship, 1% other citizenships and 43% were stateless persons (Legal Centre for Human Rights). Non-citizens are provided with social guarantees, but they have no right to vote at Parliament elections, to take positions in state and municipal administration or to serve in the Estonian Army. Having compared the data regarding the dynamics of close friendly and work relations between Estonians and non-Estonians, sociologist Kruusvall (2000a) concluded that these two groups lived in quite a segregated way.

Unlike the majority of Estonians, 60% of Russian-speakers do not read Estonian press, 53% do not listen to the Estonian Radio, 49% do not watch Estonian TV (Kruusvall 2000a). The main sources of information for Russian-speakers are Russian television channels (Vihalemm 2000), local Russian-language radio and press, and for Estonians – Estonian and Western media channels. Actually two media systems had been functioning in Estonia in 1990s – one in Estonian and the other in Russian.

In spite of this duality, preservation of some degree of stability within the Estonian society was a common interests of 1) the state, which reported to the EU, that there is no national conflict in the country and the national integration process is going successfully; 2) the readership, which according to numerous sociological surveys was interested in avoiding the open conflict; 3) the press, which needed some degree of economic and social stability as the condition of its functioning. Thus, the task of the dual press had been manufacturing some kind of consent with two separated segments of populace (see Herman & Chomsky 1988).

Nevertheless, this process was complicated by number of circumstances. The Estonian side usually had been standing on the position towards the Russian-speakers, that Estonia is not their Motherland even if they had been born here and that these ‘aliens’ should prove their loyalty, above all, by learning the Estonian language. Persons who fail to prove their loyalty are not considered as belonging to Estonia. On the contrary, the Russian side had been standing on the position that the Estonian state should moderate citizenship and language requirements (Kruusvall 2000b)
and include them into the Estonian citizenry on the basis of its contribution into the economic development of Estonia. It also insisted on the right to preserve some of its specific culturally and historically formed attitudes, such as sympathy to Orthodox Jugoslavia and suspicious attitude to the Moslim nations. On the contrary, Estonians mainly grant their compassion to other nationalities on the basis of size criteria. Well-known environmentalist motto ‘Small is beautiful’ precisely characterizes Estonians’ sympathy towards small nationalities. Thus, the basis for manufacturing of deep consent with Estonians and Russian-speakers had been absent, as starting points for estimation of their own place and role at the Estonian society and their environment were initially different.

Social context

The Istanbul summit events occurred half a year after the bombing of Yugoslavia by the United States, against which Russia protested. At this period the Russian authorities compared Russian-speakers in Estonia with Kosovo Albanians, saying that if USA can protect Albanians in Kosovo, then Russia can protect Russians in North-East of Estonia. This statement caused protests from Estonians, who compared Russia with Serbia and Estonians with Albanians. In Russia it was a period of preparation to the next Parliament elections, negative estimation of the Chechenian war by part of an intelligentsia. Therefore it was necessary to convince people of the justice of the military operation not only the West, but also the domestic opposition in order to ensure the stability of Putin’s new government course.

In Estonia all these events took place in context of 1) Estonia seeking membership of NATO and EU and the campaign for the removal of the OSCE mission from Estonia, as in the Estonian official position, in Estonia there is no more a problem of national minorities’ rights; 2) the opposition of Russia to Estonia’s application to NATO, proposals about the protection of Estonia from the side of Russia within the OSCE framework, and negative estimation by the Estonian leaders of the Russian proposal; 3) the gradual rapprochement of Estonia with Russia in the sphere of culture, business, boundary collaboration, since at the same period there took place the days of Russian culture in Estonia, collection of aid for children from Pskov orphanages, negotiations about the resumption of air traffic between Tallinn and St.Petersburg, etc. 4) continuing policy of exclusion of Russian-speakers from the Estonian citizenry, decreased tempo of naturalization due to stiffening of the Citizenship and Language Laws, lower level of income, growing unemployment and decreasing education level among Russian-speakers (Pavelson 2000); 5) protests of Russia against stiffening of the legislation concerning Russian-speaking non-citizens.
and European Commission criticism regarding the situation of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia.

Material and method

It is necessary to specify that the word ‘Estonian’, further applied to newspapers, refers only to newspapers issued in the Estonian language. While word ‘Russian’ refers to sources and authors from the Russian Federation to distinguish them from the Russian-speaking journalists and politicians working and living in Estonia.

We analysed two Estonian dailies (‘Postimees’ and ‘Eesti Päevaleht’) and two Russian-language dailies (‘Estonia’ and ‘Molodozh Estonii’) issued between November 15-19, 1999, selecting all the articles, where Chechnya was mentioned. The unit of analysis was an article.

As we supposed that representation in the media of the Chechenian conflict during such an important international event as the Istanbul OSCE summit could contain strong elements of propaganda, we used a number of elements of propaganda study after Jowatt and O’Donnel (after Pocheptsov 2001, 386–387). This includes the ideology and aims of the propaganda campaign, the social context, identification of target audience, propaganda technique (including the structure of the discussion and tactics of propaganda, such as repetition of statements, ‘testimony’, ‘plain folks’, ‘card stacking’, ‘transfer’, glittering generalities, ‘name calling’ (after Larson 1998, 345-354), used myths as well as audience reaction on this technique.

The ‘identification of the propagandist’ is not described here as a special sub-chapter, as the coded materials are initially grouped in our analysis as belonging to different ‘sources of information’, which are propagandists in broad sense of the term ‘propaganda’. The latter is understood after Herman & Chomsky (1988, 1) as a tool to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs and norms of behaviour and to integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. The division of the sources into 1) authorities; 2) journalists; 3) experts; 4) ordinary readers helped us to follow differences in their representations and thus to analyse differences in their specific interests. It was especially important to follow and compare, in what chronological sequence these sources had expressed their opinions in both presses, i.e. who had been the initial source of the opinion presented and if media/journalists had supported some of these groups either expressed their own opinion. As the propaganda is inevitably directed on the audience, it was especially interesting to follow, if there had been any feedback from these newspapers’ readership and how this feedback correlated with other opinions presented. It helped us to answer the question, if concerning the studied topic the analyzed media performed as a free forum for various and sometimes ambiguous opinions or served mainly as propaganda tool to those, who control it.
Target audience

In order to analyze the difference in the representations, it was necessary to show here the main differences between the readerships of the Estonian and Russian-language newspapers considering that these are two different readerships. The readership of Estonian newspapers was somewhat younger than that of the Russian-language newspapers: in the Russian-language newspapers, the basic group of readership were people of 35–55 years old, while in the Estonian, 20–40 years old.

Social status and the income of the readership of Estonian newspapers were higher than the Russian-language newspapers. There were more managers, owners and clerks among them, which is natural, since the social position and income of Estonians on the average are higher than of Russian-speakers (Pavelson 2000). Among the readers of the Russian-language newspapers, there were more workers, small employees, and retired people.

Estonian newspapers are oriented both to the urban population and to the inhabitants of villages and small towns, where Russian-speakers are virtually non-existent and where the ideas about them can be quite mythological. The Russian-language newspapers are oriented predominantly to the population of Tallinn and the Northeast of Estonia, where live whole enclaves of Russian-speakers. (data from Postimees and Eesti Päevaleht web-pages, http://www.saarpoll.ee)

The Chechenian discussion as a nation-building propaganda

We started from the event, which was the basis for the discussion in Estonian and the Russian-language press and then analyzed the difference between Estonian and the Russian-language press coverage of this event. We analyzed these differences on formal (frequency of articles, genre structure, placement of articles, authors and sources of information) and content (chronological sequence of presented events, objects of the discussion, sides of the conflict, propaganda tactics) criteria. This division into formal and informal criteria was necessary in order to check if possible differences in the representations could have been conditioned by different journalist traditions, genre structures of both presses, different importance, given to the analyzed events, or by deeper conflict of interests, sympathies and ideologies, represented in both presses.
Frequency, genre structure and placement of articles

We found 32 articles in the Russian-language press and 35 articles in the Estonian press. Thus, the level of reaction to the events of both presses was almost identical.

Both presses were dominated by features (up to half of all texts) and news (7-8 texts), these genres were equally represented in Estonian and the Russian-speaking press. In the Estonian press there were 3 front-page articles and 3 editorials, what is compatible with 5 front-page articles plus one editorial in the Russian-language press. There were 3 letters to the editor in Estonian newspapers and none in the Russian-language. In Estonian newspaper ’Postimees’ it was published one document: the Declaration of the Estonian Parliament blaming Russia for the Chechenian war, while both Russian-language newspapers published the Application of the Russian Ambassador to Estonia Gluchov (2 texts). I. e. the genre structure of the related articles was similar, except for ordinary readers’ letters (see Tableaux 2). Their presence in Estonian press and absence in the Russian-speaking is the only significant difference in genre structure.

Herewith the domination of features and front-page articles, which are as emotional as features, in the genre structure of the representations shows that the media targeted making these events psychologically ‘closer’ to the readership. It could help to gain the emotional response and empathy of the readership and to influence its attitudes.

As to the position of the articles at the newspapers, in the Russian-language newspapers texts relating to the Chechenian case were of slightly higher importance than in Estonian. There were 10 texts placed at the 1st page of the Russian-language newspapers and 7 texts at the 1st page of Estonian newspapers. The content of these texts was virtually similar, except that sometimes in Estonian press 2 events were described in 1 article (Students’ protests and Russian Ambassador to Estonia Mr.Gluchov reaction) while in the Russian-language these events were represented in 2 separate materials. Also, in both the Estonian and Russian-language press there were articles regarding the Days of Russian culture in Estonia on the front-pages, but only in the Russian-language articles the Chechenian case was mentioned here, while in the related Estonian front-page articles it was not.

There were 5 pictures in front-pages of the Russian-language newspapers and 4 in front pages of Estonian newspapers. 3 of these pictures coincided: there were pictures of the ‘main actors’ coming from Reuters and Estonian News Agency, such as 1) ‘Bill Clinton conducting European politicians’; 2) ‘B.Jeltsin’s talking head’ with angry face expression and 3) ‘Protesting Estonian students in front of the Russian Embassy’.
Thus the representation of the Chechenian case in the dual press of Estonia was virtually similar regarding criteria of frequency, genre structure (except for presence/absence of ordinary readers’ letters) and placement at the newspapers.

**Authors and sources of information**

In the Estonian texts analysed, over two third of the authors were Estonian journalists. To a lesser extent sources included Reuters and Interfax newsagencies, ordinary readers’ letters, one expert, one Russian-speaking journalist and one document: the Declaration of the Estonian Parliament supporting Chechnya. The majority of information thus came to Estonian reader packaged by Estonian journalists. In the articles analysed in the Russian-language press authors from Russia dominated over local Russian-speaking journalists. Estonian and Western authors were scarcely presented (see Tableaux 3). The low share of local Russian-speaking journalists among the Russian-language press authors shows that they avoided expressing their own point of view on the events, preferring simply to give information from other sources.

Comparing the sources of information used it is evident that the Russian-language newspapers refer to the Russian sources twice more frequently than do the Estonian ones, at the same time the Estonian newspapers refer to the Western sources 2.5 times more frequently than the Russian-language ones (see Tableaux 4). The opinions from different sources thus were not equally presented in Estonian and the Russian-language press.

**Chronological sequence of represented opinions**

Initial event was the military operation of Russian federal troops in Chechnya as a reaction to a number of the terrorist actions (blowing up of houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, an attempt to occupy villages in Dagestan, seizure of hostages, drug trade), which were committed, in the opinion of Russian authorities, by thugs belonging to the Chechens. As the representatives of the belligerent Chechens repeatedly turned to Western authorities and to the international organizations with complaints about the violation of human rights in Chechnya, this conflict was discussed on November 17–18 in the OSCE meeting in Istanbul.

The chronological sequence of represented opinions was as follows in Estonian and the Russian-language press: (see Tableaux 1)
Tableaux 1. The chronological sequence of represented opinions in Estonian and the Russian-language press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estonian press</th>
<th>Russian-language press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03.11.1999</td>
<td>News about the collection of signatures by Tartu University students under the Statement against Russia’s military operation in Chechnya. News about Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs position: Chechnya is a part of the Russian Federation, military operation is Russia’s domestic affair.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.11.1999</td>
<td>News about preparation by the Estonian Parliament of Statement in the support of Chechnya.</td>
<td>News about preparation by the Estonian parliament of a Statement in the support of Chechnya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–15.11.1999</td>
<td>News and journalist opinions. No evaluations.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.1999</td>
<td>2 letters to the editor from the ordinary readers.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.1999</td>
<td>Conducting by the Tartu University students of the picket outside the Russian Federation embassy.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11.1999</td>
<td>News about the Tartu University students’ picket outside the Russian embassy. Slogans: ‘Russia, return to common sense’, ‘War is not a solution’, ‘Putin is a war criminal’, ‘Today Chechnya, tomorrow Estonia’.</td>
<td>News about the Tartu University students picket outside the Russian embassy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11.1999</td>
<td>Comments to the Russian Ambassador to Estonia Mr. Gluchov Statement.</td>
<td>Publication of the Russian Ambassador to Estonia Mr. Gluchov Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11.1999</td>
<td>Opinions: expert (1), Estonian Army Head (1), Russian professor (1), Russian oppositional politician (1), Western politician (1), Chechens (1), Estonian journalist (1)</td>
<td>Re-prints of experts’ opinions from the Russian press. No comments. Opinion of Russian professor (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.11.1999</td>
<td>1 letter to the editor from the ordinary reader</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.11.1999</td>
<td>Publication by the Estonian Parliament of Statement in the support of Chechnya.</td>
<td>Journalists’ comments to the Estonian Parliament of Statement in the support of Chechnya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At first glance, a sequence of events in the Estonian press looks like as follows: the Estonian official position on Chechenian conflict is neutral, the press does not give any evaluations, then appear spontaneous protests among the population (picket, ordinary readers’ letters to editors), different experts and public figures speak out their opinions, then the press speaks out, spontaneous opinions take shape in the form of the Statement of Parliament, which legitimises unanimous support by the Estonian small nation of the Chechenian small nation.

The detailed examination shows that the picket was organized by the leaders of the Committee in support to Chechnya (Mr Herkel, Mr and Mrs Kelam), i.e., by public organization, and 50 students of only one university participated in it, so that it is impossible to consider it to be the representative expression of public opinion or even youth opinion. Further, here we may see the disruption of the traditional sequence of public discussion, when opinions are spoken by politicians, then by experts, then the readership reacts to a topic of vital importance, expressing different opinions. Here letters were published before the opinions of experts and journalists and their anti-Russian content was identical. We may thus exclude neither ‘ordering’ letters, nor the selection of the points of view presented. It deserves attention that in spite of the concentrated media campaign November 17–19, there were no readers’ responses during the next 2 weeks. However, if this theme had this resonance among the population, the flow of letters must fall on the week after the event. The chronological sequence of media events could therefore be artificially designed.

Concerning the Russian-language press, it is difficult to speak about the intentional chronological structure here: events are simply reflected as they occur. It is important that the local Russian-speaking journalists dared to make some evaluations only on the last day, when the results of the summit were already known. Even here these ‘last day’ evaluations concerned not the Chechenian case, but the domestic political situation and local political actors.

**Objects of the discussion and sides of the conflict**

The object of discussion was defined on the basis of 3 criteria: key words, their frequency and interconnection with other elements of text, the structure of text. Analysis has shown that in the Estonian press there 7 objects had been discussed, in the Russian-language 6 objects, all of them united by the Chechenian case in a wider context. (see Tableaux 5)

**The Chechenian war**

In the Estonian press the discussion deals directly with the war in Chechnya only in only one third of materials. Moreover, in all materials about this object, where the source is Estonian (8 texts), participants in the conflict are the following:
Russia: bombs peaceful population

Civilized world (OSCE, UN, EU) demand Russia to stop war. The peaceful Chechenian population suffer. Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine protest against the war.

Here mainly militaristic terminology is used towards Russia. There are often ‘testimonials’ (‘Prime minister Mart Laar said’... ‘president Lennart Meri thinks’...) and ‘glittering generalities’ (‘Civilized world demand Russia stop the war’ etc.). Russia is compared here with such countries as Iraq and Libya. It is said that it is acting against international norms and thus should be an object of international condemnation and isolation.

Russia here is constructed as resisting the entire civilized world: the peaceful population of Chechnya, which is a victim, and the remaining countries and international organizations as defenders of the Chechens. Actually, in this context Russia is constructed not as the sovereign state, which is the subject of international law, independently solving problems in its territory, but as a non-state, as a pathological aggressor, source of absolute evil.

In less than one third of the Estonian materials about the Chechenian war (quoting Russian sources, British ambassador in Moscow) the opposite opinion is presented: Russia is thus constructed here as a civilized state and the subject of international law.

In the Russian-language press the war is mentioned as an object in 22 materials and the proportion of the opinions is contrary to the Estonian press: 18 materials represent the ‘Russian’ opinion and only 4 the ‘Estonian’ one

**Russian banditism**

This is an object of the discussion in 11 Estonian texts and in 0 of the Russian-language texts. The sources of the texts are Estonian journalists, authorities and readers. The participants of the conflict are the following:
Russians: thugs, fascists, bandit-terrorist formations. They kill, attack, destroy, take away property and work, leave without food, medical aid and housing. Lie, threaten the world.

Chechens resist, take vengeance, suffer. Chechnya: separate country (it they occupied, in has an army of its own, its name of the capital is not Grozny, but Dzhokhar).

World, OSCE, EU + threatened by Russia, allow Russia banditism.

In fact, here the Russia actions in Chechnya are interpreted not as a struggle against terrorism or even war, but as purely bandit behaviour. The main characteristics of Russia here are depriving people of property, work, food, medical aid and housing.

Looking carefully at the Statement of the Estonian Parliament in support of Chechnya, we can find the same characteristics:

We pay attention of the World Community that under the pretext of catching of the individual so-called criminals it is inadmissible to bombard peaceful population, cities and villages, to erase factories from the face of the earth. We focus attention on the situation that 200 000 refugees are left without food and medical aid. On the threshold of winter thousands of women, old people and children remained under the open sky.¹

Also, an ethnic aspect of the conflict is underlined here: Russians as an ethnic group wherever they live are constructed as bandits and barbarians:

Russians are awful people /…/. They don’t obey any rules. They think that they can attack and kill and remain unpunished /…/ Russians have nothing to propose except war – Russians do not know how to conduct negotiations.²

Different sources construct the second participant in the conflict differently: in one case these are Chechens as a nation, in another Chechnya as an independent state. Accordingly, in the first case the discussion deals with the ethnic conflict, in the second - with the seizure by Russian thugs of the Chechenian state. Both versions are cases of ‘card stacking’, as relating to the version of ‘ethnic conflict’ neither terrorists nor Federal troops or Chechenian population belong to one ethnic group, as to the version of ‘occupation’, the Chechenian Republic is not an independent state.

In respect to the ‘other world, World, the OSCE, EU’, they are constructed here as threatened and deceived by Russia and at the same time allowing Russia bandit behaviour. Here can be found the direct appeal to the West:

We appeal to the EC, the OSCE, UN and other international organisations to interfere actively and immediately.³
It is necessary to unite and struggle against the Russians.⁴

Such calls, especially in the official Statement, could be interpreted as a call to establish sanctions against Russia or even to military intervention into the conflict.

The most frequently used propaganda method here is ‘name calling’: Russia ‘threatens to undermine the whole new European system of security’, ‘Jeltsin attacked countries which criticized Russian military actions in Chechnya’, ‘Russia is bombing, destroying’, ‘Russia pretends to struggle against terrorism’, ‘lies’, etc.

In general, this approach is based on two myths: 1) the myth of ‘Russian threat’, coming back to Cold War period myth of ‘Soviet threat’ and even the older Bolshevik myth about Russia as ‘a People’s prison’; 2) The myth about ‘natural democratism of smaller nations’ and ’a natural inclination to tyranny of bigger ones’.

The OSCE/EU double standards

The third object in Estonian press (in 8 texts) is not at all represented in the Russian-language press. The sources of opinion are here Estonian journalists and authorities, the sides of conflict are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OSCE:</th>
<th>Chechnya suffers.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>passive, useless, hypocritical.</td>
<td>Estonia is unjustly blamed for violation of Russian-speakers’ rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should leave Estonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This object is mentioned mainly on November 19, 1999, when the results of Istanbul summit were known. The results of the summit are therefore interpreted here as ‘a Russian-American deal’, ‘the big states could make deals at the expense of third states and nations’, etc. The conclusion is the following, that the OSCE mission should leave Estonia.

The independence of Chechnya

The independence of Chechnya is an object in 4 Estonian texts and 2 Russian-language texts. The sources of texts in the Estonian press are 2 Estonian journalists, the President of Chechnya Mr. Maskhadov, the General of the Estonian Army Mr. Laaneots, in the Russian-language press: Western expert and one member of an Islamic radical organization. The participants in the conflict are the following:

Russia = Russians: bombing, militant, destroying everything, lying to Europe, constituting threat to Estonia.

Chechens: fight for independence

Chechnya and Estonia – small states.

Here Chechnya is directly identified with Estonia on size criteria (both are ‘small states’), the discussion deals with the occupation by one state of another, moreover both Russia and Chechnya are identified with only one ethnic group. Again we are dealing with the same propaganda methods.

Other objects

In general, in connection with the Chechenian topic, in the Estonian press in 2 articles other objects are mentioned: once Russian totalitarianism is mentioned and Russian interest in Caspian oil. The sides of conflict here are Russia, which occupies and lies, and Chechnya, struggling for independence. Only in connection with ethnic relations in Estonia are the sides of the conflict Russians and Estonians in Estonia, who have different estimations of the Chechenian events.

In the Russian-language press other objects are the nucleus of 9 texts: 3 texts concern the national relations in Estonia (the same conflict sides as in the Estonian press) and the threat of Islamic terrorism (sides of the conflict: civilized world, including Russia, on one hand, and Islamic terrorist organizations all over the world on the other), 1 text concerns Caspian oil and 1 text the interests of Latvia in improving state relations with Russia in spite of the Chechenian war.

Goals of propaganda

Concerning the Estonian press, the relationship between the objects of discussion shows that the Chechenian case was only a pretext for disputing above mentioned issues. Judging by the frequency of themes in the Estonian press and the ways of
constructing the objects of the discussion, the representation of the Chechenian case here had two goals.

The first goal was the minimization of the interference of both Russia and the OSCE in the interrelations of the Estonian state and the local Russian-speakers. On the basis of related texts there was the fear that Russia will obtain from the world community the right to shield its citizens wherever they are (in Estonia there live more than 100,000 citizens of Russia) by any means, including military ones. By the moment of the discussion only the USA actually conducted such policy. Therefore the propaganda was based on general principle of Estonian’s sympathy to small nations and directed toward the protection of ‘small people on their native territory’ against big Russia.

The second goal was likely shaping of negative attitude towards the international organizations and the West, which were constructed as passive, useless, deceitful, two-faced, etc. It is possible only to assume why this was required; however, it is obvious that in the case of failures in the interrelations of Estonia with the West (for example, obstacles to entrance to EU or NATO, reproaches from the side of the West, etc.) this makes it possible for Estonian politicians to reject their own responsibility and to lay it on the West.

As to the Russian-language press, the material presented above permits to the conclusion that here the activity of press regarding the Chechenian case is closer to mere informing, than to a deliberate propaganda. Accordingly, it is not a matter of propaganda.

Readership reaction and effects

As to the Estonian readership, formally it would be possible to draw the conclusion that it actively reacted to the Chechenian events, since of all foreign policy events in recent years only conflicts in Yugoslavia and Chechnya caused ordinary readers’ letters. However, the letters actually concerned not the conflict in Chechnya, but Russian banditism and terrorism. They emphasized the ethnic aspect of the Chechenian conflict and blamed the West for double standards. The Chechenian case was only a pretext, while the authors were actually concerned with domestic policy problems. It is also important that after 18-19 November 1999 (most intensive flow of texts) readers’ letters regarding the Chechenian case were absent in the long terms, although the authorities attempted to continue the discussion afterwards via ‘opinion’ column.

Of course, this media campaign did not influence the results of the OSCE summit in Istanbul. The OSCE Declaration content was very different from the Estonian Parliament Statement: it criticized Russia, but treated it as a full-right subject of international law, confirming Russian sovereignty on its own territory. However, just before the Summit was started the campaign for the removal of the OSCE Mission from Estonia, which was successfully completed by December 2001, when
the solution about the removal of the Mission was accepted. Moreover, after this campaign in the Estonian press there gradually began to appear ordinary readers’ letters with negative opinions about the OSCE, the EU and other Western institutions.

Concerning the Russian-speaking readership as responses from its side are absent is practically impossible to draw conclusions about its reaction. However, on the basis of the fact, that during of the Yugoslavian crisis in the spring of 1999 there were registered letters telephone calls of the readers to the editorial staff with expressions of sympathy to Yugoslavs, similar responses with expressions of sympathy to one or the other side could be met here. Moreover, here we are dealing with two small countries who have survived or are surviving either potential or open national conflict, situated aside big neighbour, who insists on its right to protect its citizens abroad. We cannot say why there was no reaction. We can just suggest that the readership could consider it to be pointless as its opinion could not influence the situation, or was afraid of being accused of disloyalty, not personally, but in a corporative way (i.e. Russian-speakers were afraid of being blamed for ‘pro-imperial moods’), did not fully support either side (for example, condemning both bombing peaceful cities and acts of terrorism). It is more likely that these reasons for silence work together.

Conclusions

The analysis has shown, that the representation of the Chechenian case in the dual press of Estonia was nearly similar regarding formal criteria and different in content.

As to formal criteria, during the week analysed a similar amount of articles was published and the genre structure of articles was also practically identical. Thus, the level of reaction of both presses to the event was almost identical.

As to the sources of information, the opinions from different sources were not equally presented in Estonian and the Russian-language press. The majority of information came to Estonian readership packaged by Estonian journalists. By contrast in the Russian-language press authors from Russia dominated over local Russian-speaking journalists. The low share of local Russian-speaking journalists among the Russian-language press authors shows that they avoided expressing their own point of view on the events, preferring simply to give information from other sources. It is possible to note that the Russian-language newspapers refer more to Russian sources, while the Estonian newspapers more frequently refer to Western sources. Estonian and the Russian-speaking readerships get information from different sources and the information is not balanced.
In the Estonian press the sequence of the events reflected is well-structured and seems to be artificially designed as an element of the propaganda. In the Russian-language press no intentional chronological structure of the events can be found.

We could conclude that in the Estonian press the discussion contains strong elements of propaganda, while in the Russian-language press in general it does not. Although here could be met traces of Russian contra-propaganda, in general the reflection of the event looks more like informing than a planned and well-structured campaign, there was no intended propaganda aim. At the same time, the Estonian press perceived a minimum two definite aims: 1) minimization of the interference of both Russia and the OSCE in the interrelations of the Estonian state and local Russian-speakers, and 2) shaping of negative attitude towards the international organizations and the West. Both aims were partly achieved, as the OSCE mission had to leave Estonia in 2002 and the attitude to various Western institutions in the Estonian society has become more sceptical, which is also confirmed by the data of the opinion polls (Saar Poll 2000), which show a gradual decline of the wish of Estonians for Estonia’s EU membership. Thus, the Chechenian case was just a pretext for the discussion of other subjects, relating to Estonian domestic problems.

Analysing differences in discussing the discussion objects we mentioned, that in the Estonian press there could be followed two definite oppositions in evaluating the national environment of Estonia:

**West** (EU, OSCE, USA, Finland, Great Britain, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine): human, enlightened, fair, legal, free.

**East** (Russia): inhuman, barbaric, dark, illegal, tyrannical.

**Small** (Estonia, Chechnya): victim, active, brave, freedom-loving

**Big** (Russia, EU, OSCE, USA): aggressor/deceiver, bandit, passive, tyrannical.

Where the 1st opposition is based on the Western orientalist ideology (see Ekekrants 2000, 17) and the 2nd on the popular Estonian nationalist mythology relying myths of ‘Russian threat’, ‘Russia as a People’s prison’, ‘a natural democratism of smaller nations and a natural inclination to tyranny of bigger ones’ and sympathy to small nations, oppressed, to Estonians’ mind, by bigger ones.

At the same time, the Russian-language press does not construct East and West as opposing, but as complimentary, able to find compromises on important
questions on the basis of internationally accepted rules and norms. Thus the main opposition here is as follows:

| **Legal** (actions of Russian, Western and Estonian authorities, such as prevention of terrorism, international agreements) |
| **Illegal** (terrorism all over the world, including Chechenian) |

These differences are explained by the different position of the Estonian and the Russian-language press, different status of their readership in Estonian state and society, their different interests, historical memories, sympathies and evaluations and consequently different roles on these presses in Estonian nation/building process. While the Estonian press reflects the official position relating to foreign policy issues, the Russian-language press has to balance between the interests of state institutions and its Russian-speaking readership.

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http://lichr.ee/eng/researchers.analysis/non-estonians_in_figures.htm

Tableaux 2. Genres of the articles (number of the texts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Estonian, N</th>
<th>Russian, N</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front-page</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters to the editor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

Tableaux 3. Authors of the texts (number of the texts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<th>Russian-language</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Authorities</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinary readers</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russ speaking</td>
<td>Journalists</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
Tableaux 4. Main sources of information (number of the texts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press</th>
<th>Russian sources</th>
<th>Western sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian-language</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tableaux 5. Objects of discussion in the Estonian and Russian-language press (number of the texts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonian press</th>
<th>The Russian-language press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>Chechenian war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian banditism</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The OSCE double standards</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chechnya independence</td>
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<td>Russian totalitarianism</td>
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<td>Caspian oil</td>
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<td>Difference between Russians and Estonians</td>
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<td></td>
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